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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

HEGEL'S DEFENSE OP THE ONTOLOGICAL
ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

The following dissertation is a study of the "ontological proof' for God's
existence, specifically of the controversy concerning this proof from the seventeenth
thrQugh the nineteenth centuries. As the title indicates, the primary theme is Hegel's
defense and reformulation of the proof. I argue for a metaphysical interpretation of
Hegel's Science ofLogic, by showing that one of Hegel's chief goals in the Logic is to
provide a demonstration for the thesis that "necessary existence belongs to God's nature."
I conclude that while Hegel offers a coherent and informative account of this thesis, his
analysis does not overcome one of the principal shortcomings of the ontological proof,
namely, that the argument involves an appeal to intuition. The ontological proof is thus,
if in some sense valid, not persuasive.
The discussion of Hegel is preceded by a detailed analysis of Descartes'
formulation of the proof. I argue that Descartes consistently defends his argument by
appealing to metaphysical and epistemological doctrines as premises, so that the proof
represents a conclusion of his entire philosophical system. I also provide a lengthy

treatment of Kant's objections to the proof, and I conclude (1) that most of his arguments
are repetitions of older objections and (2) that even his best arguments are questionbegging. I show that Hegel sides with Descartes, and against Kant, on every relevant
issue, and that Hegel's metaphysical system brings Descartes' assumptions to their
ultimate consequences.
In the concluding chapters I examine some of the problems that underlie the

theoretical philosophies of Kant and Hegel. I argue that Hegel fails to show that Kant's
philosophy is self-refuting, and that Kant's critique of the ontological argument is
consistent with the basic principles of his philosophy. The shortcoming of Kant's view is
merely that he fails to justify some of those principles. In the final chapter I argue that
any transcendental critique of the ontological argument, or of metaphysics in general, is
doomed
to failure.
-

-
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Introduction

This dissertation is the culmination of a project that began in the summer of 1999
in fulfillment of part of my summer research as required by the University of Kentucky
College of Arts and Sciences Graduate Fellowship. In the previous fall semester Daniel
Breazeale had led a seminar on Hegel's Phenomenology ofSpirit, the success of which
inspired my proposal of an independent study on the Science ofLogic as part of the
summer reading project. Professor Breazeale agreed to direct the study, which in fact
occupied more than one summer. The following year I produced an essay that
concentrated on a single chapter from the middle of the "Doctrine of Essence." My
analysis concerned the development of the concept of existence from Hegel's chapter on
"Ground." I organized my essay around a passage from the opening of the chapter on
"Existence" in which Hegel briefly discusses the ontological argument as well as Kant's
1

critique of that argument. I argued that Hegel's transition from "ground" to "existence"
represents both a rejection of Kant and a defense of the rationalists' definition of God as a
unity of essenee and existence. The dissertation addresses a similar point, focusing not
only on the Logic but also on Hegel's entire philosophy.
Although the central theme of this dissertation is a single argument as this appears
in several philosophical systems, my original plan was to write a kind of commentary on
Hegel's philosophy. My conviction that the ontological argument is of great importance
in the interpretation of that philosophy arose from two sources. First, due partly to my
interest in seventeenth-century metaphysics, Hegel's frequent but unsystematic

1

Suhrkamp 6, pg. 125-6

comments on the ontological argument made a greater impression on me than they do on
most readers of Hegel. The discussions of that argument encouraged me to develop the
line of thought that I had begun in the seminar on the Phenomenology; I had attempted to
understand that work as a more thorough version of Spinoza's Treatise on the
Emendation ofthe Intellect, a thesis which finds its place in the dissertation.2 My entire

study of Hegel became focused on interpreting his philosophy as a later version of
Spinozism.
The second impetus for my placing the ontological argument at the center of
Hegel's philosophy arose from a cursory study of the current Hegel literature. What
struck me most was the unjust emphasis on Hegel's relationship to Kant. Although
Hegel refers to Kant more frequently than to any other philosopher, I considered it
inappropriate to place his thinking primarily or only in a Kantian context. Indeed, most
of Hegel's comments on Kant are dismissive and express nothing more than his
annoyance at the prevalence of Kant's ideas. It seemed to me, and still seems,
uncontroversial to assert that Hegel is first and foremost the heir of a metaphysical
tradition that stretches from the neo-Platonists to Descartes and Spinoza.
Further study of the Hegel literature led me to the so-called "non-metaphysical"
Hegel. 3 My impression of this school of Hegel interpretation was that it simply does not
provide an accurate account of his philosophy. There could be no better way, I
concluded, to combat simultaneously these two literary trends than to show that the
ontological argument lies at the heart of Hegel's philosophy. I had arrived at this idea
2

3

See Chapter 2, note 54, pg. 83.

See Klaus Hartmann's "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View" in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays.
Ed. Alisdair MacIntyre. Notre Dame, 1972.

initially through my study of the Logic and the Phenomenology, and my subsequent study
of the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion confirmed that I was headed in the right
direction.
That Hegel is a metaphysician, even a kind of Cartesian, is one of the theses of
this dissertation. It is not, however, the main thesis. The dissertation is not a
commentary on Hegel, but rather an analysis of the ontological argument in the writings
of Descartes, Kant and Hegel. Hegel's right to exclusive mention in the title has even
become questionable. I have spent less time and energy on arguing that the ontological
proof is crucial to Hegel's philosophy than I have spent developing a number of claims
about the proof itself. First, I needed to show that Kant's refutation of the proof is not
decisive. Second, I discovered that Descartes anticipates and addresses nearly all of the
points later discussed by Kant and Hegel. Third, I eventually decided that Hegel's
defense of the argument is best conceived, not as a thorough revision of the argument, but
as an actual defense of Descartes' argument. Descartes' argument, I concluded,
possesses most of the virtues of Hegel's, and Hegel's argument possesses the same
shortcomings as Descartes'.
The dissertation thus developed into a partial account of the history of the
ontological argument in the modern period. My account is partial because it gives short
shrift to many of the discussions of the ontological argument in the eighteenth-century.
The reason for this stems from a prejudice of my own that I have found confirmed by
both Descartes and Hegel. Leibniz' claim that God first must be proved to be possible
appeared to me to contradict the intention of the ontological argument. If God's

possibility and existence are inseparable, then it seems unnecessary to discuss his
possibility as a prelude to the proof of his existence. It even seems wrongheaded in the
first place to speak of God as "possible." Descartes avoids this error in two, albeit
incompatible, ways. First, he restricts the designation of "possibility'' to finite entities.4
Leibniz can thus be accused of the cardinal sin of confusing God with finite things.
Second, he argues that our knowledge of God's possibility follows from, and is thus not a
prior condition for, our knowledge of his existence. 5 Since both Hegel and Kant share
similar views on Leibniz' critique of Descartes' argument, I decided that I would be
justified in writing a history of the argument that focuses mainly on Descartes, Kant, and
Hegel. I list Leibniz' claim as one of the four main objections to Descartes' argument,
but I do not discuss his own ontological arguments or those of his successors such as
Wolff and Baumgarten.
In the course of studying and writing this history, I was aided by a rapidly
growing literature on the ontological argument. In recent decades dozens of essays
analyzing the argument have appeared in mainstream English-language journals. While
most of these discuss contemporary versions of the argument, many philosophers have
addressed the specific problems that arise both in the Cartesian proof and in Kant's
refutation. What is lacking, however, is not only a literature on Hegel's defense of the
argument, but also a more general account of the argument's history. In this endeavor I
am aware of only one precedent, although it is probable that there are others. I was
fortunate enough to discover an essay by Oded Balaban and Asnat Avshalom entitled
4

See Chapter One, pg. 53.

5

See Chapter One, pg. 51.

"The Ontological Argument Reconsidered."6 They offer a brief history of the argument
from Descartes to Marx, and include a helpful summary of the treatment of the argument
in Hegel's Logic. Their essay assisted me greatly in my initial outline for this
dissertation, and their discussion of several points has influenced even my current view.
A small number of book-length studies on the history of the ontological argument
are extant in both French and German, and these have served as the bases of my
secondary research. The first book that I discovered was Wolfgang Roed's Der Gott der
1

reinen Vernunft. His analyses of some of the details of the argument are helpful, and I
was specifically pleased to find in his work recognition of the most important point in the
modem history of the ontological argument, namely, that divergent concepts of existence
underlie the disagreement between the rationalists and Kant. Comprehensive studies by
8

9

Louis Girard and Jan Rohls have also clarified some particulars of the argument's
history. Dieter Henrich's Der ontologische Gottesbeweis, 10 however, stands as the most
original and innovative study of the history of the ontological argument, and his work
more than any other has influenced this dissertation. It would thus be inappropriate to
introduce the dissertation without some discussion ofHenrich's book and of the
relationship between his account and mine.

6

Journal ofPhilosophical Research. 1990; 15, 279-310

7

C.H. Beck, Munich, 1992.

8

L 'argument ontologique chez Saint A nselme et chez Hegel. Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1995.

9

Theologie und M etaphysik: der ontologische Gottesbeweis und seine Kritiker. Mohn. 1987.

10

Tuebingen, 1960.

One of the main theses ofHenrich's study is that there are in fact two ontological
arguments. The two arguments derive from two distinct concepts of God, viz., ens
perfectissimum and ens necessarium. He claims that the philosophers of the early
modem period distinguish the two arguments, although they also recognize their
interdependence. Henrich's story of pre-Kantian ontotheology is the story of the
gradually increasing emphasis on the unity of the two arguments: "The path from
Descartes to Baumgarten is the path from the distinction of the two proofs to the
cognition of their inner unity." 11 This story culminates in Baumgarten's metaphysics, the
central notion of which, according to Henrich, is that the omnitudo realitatis (i.e., ens
p erf ectissimum) is the ens necessarium.
Henrich then gives a very enlightening account of Kant's "Transcendental
Dialectic" as structurally dependent upon Baumgarten's Metaphysica. Kant organizes his
critique of speculative theology around the claim that the notion of ens necessarium is, in
its origin, distinct from the notion of an omnitudo realitatis. The central claim of
ontological argument is, on Kant's reading, that the ens necessarium is the omnitudo
realitatis. His allegation that these represent distinct concepts that preclude unification
thus constitutes the kernel of his critique of ontotheology. Kant's critique, on Henrich's
account, attacks primarily a Baumgartian interpretation of the ontological argument.
While I accept Henrich's interpretation of Kant (indeed, I borrow from him
heavily), and do not question his account of Baumgarten, I disagree with the suggestion
that Kant's criticisms of Baumgarten have broad historical implications that extend back
to Descartes. Since Henrich is probably the first philosopher since Kant to actually hold
11

Henrich, pg. 5

that Baumgarten was the greatest pre-Kantian philosopher, I do not feel that I am making
a controversial claim here. I contradict Henrich's analysis chiefly by offering a more
detailed and more sympathetic account of Descartes' ontological argument.
The shortcoming ofHenrich's book is that his reading of Descartes is as weak as
his reading of Kant is strong. He simply overlooks Descartes' persistent efforts at
providing a single, comprehensive, and systematic argument. His claim that Descartes
distinguishes two arguments, and that only the argument from necessity is his real
argument, is clearly little more than a projection of Kant's "Dialectic" (and thus
Baumgarten's Metaphysica) onto Descartes' work. 12 One of the aims of my first chapter
is to show that a serious approach to Descartes' argument complicates any story that
leads to a clear Kantian victory. The fact that Descartes anticipates and rejects Leibniz'
revision of the argument is important in this regard, since Henrich's story requires a
consistent progression from Descartes to Baumgarten.
Although Henrich sides unambiguously with Kant, his subsequent analysis of
Hegel's ontological argument is insightful, and this also has exerted a profound influence
on my dissertation, specifically on the third chapter. Henrich's chapter on Hegel helped
me to understand the relationship between the Logic and the "Dialectic." I disagree,
however, with his claim that Hegel is entirely unsuccessful in reviving the argument.
There is no need to discuss here why I think that Hegel is at least partly successful, since
there is sufficient discussion of that in the following. It is enough to note that my
conviction that Kant never really refuted the argument alleviates most of the difficulties

12

For further discussion of this point, see note 7 below in Chapter One, pg. 13

7

that Henrich and others perceive in this regard. My contention is that there was no need
to revive the argument, although there was a need to provide a better explanation of it.
Lastly, Henrich' s division of the objections to the ontological argument has
influenced the organization of my first two chapters in ways that will be obvious to the
reader. I accept his distinction of the "Critical objection" from the logical and empirical
objections; I make two small additions to his division. First, I include Leibniz' position
among the objections, so that I consider a total of four objections. Second, I distinguish
two logical objections, whereas Henrich conflates these. Henrich and I disagree on so
many of the particulars that it would be inconvenient discuss them here. In some cases I
indicate his position in the notes.

Chapter One: The Cartesian proof and the traditional objections

The current chapter represents an attempt to elucidate the problems involved in
the ontological argument for the existence of God, primarily as this argument is defended
by Descartes and attacked by Kant. The overriding concern of the chapter is to highlight
the dependency, of the argument itself, as well as the most prevalent objections raised
against it, upon broader philosophical doctrines and perspectives. The presence within
this dissertation of such a variety of themes is justified by their relevance to Hegel's
reformulation of the proof in question. In the first chapter, certain metaphysical and
epistemological doctrines and assumptions are shown to have conditioned the respective
acceptance or rejection of the proof. These doctrines and assumptions will be
incorporated into the subsequent discussion of the ontological proof in Hegel's writings.
That proof, I will argue, becomes an essential component of Hegel's metaphysical
system, so that the argument's success or failure serves as an indicator of the success or
failure of his entire philosophical standpoint.
If the systematic nature of the argument is emphasized in this preliminary
discussion, this results not solely from the influence of Hegel, but derives from the
argument itself as Descartes proposes it. A remark addressed to Gassendi from the Fifth

Set ofReplies provides a pertinent warning:

This obliges me to point out that you have not paid sufficient attention to
the way in which what I wrote all fits together. I think this
interconnection is such that, for any given point, all the preceding remarks
and most of those that follow contribute to the proof of what is asserted.

Hence you cannot give a fair account of what I have to say on any topic
unless you go into everything I wrote about all the other related issues. 1

In the following we will by no means "go into everything" Descartes "wrote
about all the other related issues." It will suffice merely to underline which issues are the
relevant ones. The first step in this procedure is to identify the authoritative form of the
proof in question, and to distinguish this from the subsidiary arguments. The complete
"ontological argument" that corresponds to the structure of Meditation Vis listed as a
syllogism in three important discussions: The First Set ofReplies2; The Second Set of
Replies3; and the "Geometrical Demonstration" appended to the latter4• The first of these

includes one clause omitted by the other two, namely, the subordinate clause of the minor
premise. As the most thorough formulation, then, this argument serves as the referent of
"Descartes' ontological argument" throughout the following. The proof runs:

Pl: That which we clearly understand to belong to the true and immutable
nature, or essence, or form of something, can be truly asserted of that
thing.

AT vn 379; CSM II 261. Citations from Descartes are taken from The Philosophical Writings of
Descartes. Three Volumes. Translation Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch. Cambridge, 1984. Hereafter
"CSM." Page numbers to the edition by Adam and Tannery, Ouvres de Descartes. ParisNrin, revised
edition 1964-76, are indicated by "AT."
1

2

AT VIl 115-6; CSM II 83.

3

AT VIl 150; CSM II 107.

4

AT VIl 166-7; CSM II 117.
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P2: But once we have made a sufficiently careful investigation of what
God is, we clearly and distinctly understand that existence belongs to his
true and immutable nature.
Conclusion: Hence we can now truly assert of God that he does exist.

The first premise of this argument alludes to the Cartesian epistemology, and thus
offers an immediate suggestion of the deeper context of the argument. The relevant
doctrine, that what is distinctly and clearly perceived is thereby true, has been
traditionally excluded from discussion of the argument, with the result that the minor
premise, and the arguments summoned to its aid, have been mistaken for the entire proof.
An objection voiced by the pre-critical Kant represents one instance of this oversight, the

details of which are analyzed below.5
Descartes attempts to justify the minor premise in Meditation Vas well as in the

First and Fifth Sets ofReplies, and in doing so he designates a series of other
philosophical doctrines as auxiliary conditions of the argument. In the following, these
doctrines are cited as anticipations of the major objections which history has raised
against the proof. In three cases, the objections receive explicit discussion by Descartes
in correspondence with his contemporaries Caterus, Gassendi and Mersenne, so that a
Cartesian response to the objections, which were subsequently given greater attention and
assent, can be simply collected from the appropriate texts in the Replies to the

Meditations.

5
See below, pg. 21. Hegel likewise frequently mistakes the same argument for existence as a perfection
for the "ontological argument". See below, Chapter Two.

Four objections are considered, and the analysis proceeds according to this
division. 6 They are:

1. The logical or Thomistic objection, or the claim that the argument
conflates existence as conceived with existence in rerum natura.
2. The empirical objection, or the claim that the proof makes illicit use of
'existence' as a predicate.
3. The possibility objection, or the claim that the Cartesian argument has
illegitimately assumed the non-contradictoriness of the idea of God.
4. The Critical objection, or the claim that the proof consists of either
arbitrarily constructed ideas or of a fallacious application of empirical
concepts.

Since the Critique ofPure Reason employs all four objections, Kant is here
selected as the exemplary case of the objector. In the first three cases, however, the
passages in the Critique consist primarily of reiterations of traditional contentions, so that
only the last objection remains as characteristically Kantian. The analysis portrays Kant

6
The division and titles nearly matches those given by Dieter Henrich in Der onto/ogische Gottesbeweis
(Tuebingen, 1960), the only major differences being that he does not distinguish the two forms of the first
objection, and that he does not list what is here the "third objection." My intention regarding the latter, as
will be clear below, is to distinguish the Cartesian argument from those proofs devised by Leibniz and his
followers. A similar division of objections is given by Paresh Chandra Debnath in ''The Ontological
Argument and Leibniz' Formulation." Indian Philosophical Quarterly, v. 12, no. 4. October-December
1985.

as the collector and systematizer of traditional philosophical perspectives, rather than, as
is often the case, the revolutionary who decisively refuted the argument. 7

I. The logical objection

A. Thomas' two objections

The scholastic critique of Anselm's unum argumentum is restricted primarily to
what we designate as the logical or Thomistic objection. Thomas himself poses in fact
two objections, or at least expresses the logical objection in two distinct ways. Even
today these represent the most general and common objections to the argument, and
nearly every philosopher who has attacked the proof has employed some version of them.
It is thus appropriate that we begin with Thomas' own words from Summa theologicae 1a
2, 1. This first article of the question of "whether there is a God" concerns the selfevidence of the question. Anselm's reasoning is cited as the affirmative position:

7

Henrich has brought this popular view to its extreme consequences. The key to his analysis involves
insight into the historical context of the Critique ofPure Reason. Henrich shows, convincingly, the Kant's
Critical philosophy is ultimately a development ofBaumgarten's metaphysical system. In order to justify a
strong reading of Kant as the victorious critic of"ontotheology," then, it is necessary to trace the
development from Descartes to Baumgarten as a progressive movement in which each step amounts to
progress over the previous. This history, on Henrich's view, is analogous to that of the exact sciences.
Henrich himself stops just short of actually saying that Baumgarten's system is the system ofpure reason
(pg. 171-2), since only thus could Kant's critique ofBaumgarten's system actually live up to its title: the
critique of pure reason. Henrich' s entire argument would fit better as a premise in a reductio of the claim
that Kant decisively refutes the ontological argument: If Kant's Critique possessed the historical status that
its author conceived, then the history of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century metaphysics must read exactly
as Henrich describes this. Henrich's reading of Descartes is enough to trump the idea. Nowhere does he
recognize the authoritative form of the argument, and thus its systematic nature. He instead treats the very
tangential argument from the " immense power" of God {AT VII 119) as the only really Cartesian
argument, because only this argument supports the misled notion that there are in fact two ontological

... a proposition is self evident if we perceive its truth immediately upon
perceiving the meaning of its terms ... Now once we understand the
meaning of the word 'God' it follows that God exists. For the word means
'that than which nothing greater can be meant'. Consequently, since
existence in thought and fact is greater than existence in thought alone,
and since, once we understand the word 'God', he exists in thought, he
must also exist in fact. It is therefore self-evident that there is a God. 8

Leaving aside the fact that Aquinas here substitutes significari for cogi,tari, as
well as that he discusses only the argument from Proslogi,on 2, to the neglect of the
modal argument from Proslogi,on 3, the use of the argument is legitimate. Anselm had
indeed intended, like Descartes after him, not only to prove God's existence, but also his
self-evident existence. Thomas offers a two-fold reply: he first states his general position

concerning God's self-evidence; secondly he claims that the argument does not follow
even if we grant the definition in question. In regard to the first issue, the conflicting
positions concerning self-evidence are resolved, in typical fashion, via a distinction. The
proposition 'God exists' is in se per se nota, in itself self-evident, because the subject and
predicate denote the same; God is the same as his existence. Intrinsic self-evidence,
however, is to be distinguished from 'self-evidence to us'. The proposition is not nobis
per se nota because we do not know ''what it is to be God," or because we do not

perceive God's essence.
arguments. This latter idea is influenced by Kant's synthetic interpretation of Descartes' minor premise.
On this see below, pg. 53-8.
8

Summa theologicae, v. 2. McGraw Hill, 1963. Pg. 5

Knowledge of God's essence, although generally recognized as an important
condition for the proof in question, is here only a secondary concern. Aquinas takes
himself, more importantly, to refute Anselms's position even granting that God is defined
as illud quo maius cogitari non potest; for from this defintion "nothing thus defined
would thereby be granted in the world of fact, but merely as thought about." It follows
from Anselm's premises that God exists "in the apprehension of the intellect," to translate
by the letter, but not in nature. This first Thomistic objection allows only that ifwe
accept Anselm's definition we have to think of God as existing.
The second formulation adds a skeptical dilemma: from the fact that we have to
think of God as existing it does not follow that he does "in fact" exist. Necessity in
thought is not yet being. The conclusion of the argument is thus only true if a
corresponding object is given. Thomas thus continues: "Unless one is given that
something in fact exists than which nothing greater can be thought - and this nobody
denying the existence of God would grant - the conclusion that God in fact exists does
not follow."
In reference to these passages, the expression "Thomistic objection" will hereafter
refer to either the idea (1) that from the premises of the ontological argument it follows
only that God exists as thought about or (2) that it follows from the argument that God
exists only if it is already given that he in fact exists. The intention of both formulations
is to stipulate an irreconcilable difference between 'being' and 'being thought about'. A
sixteenth century commentary on the Summa summarizes the position succinctly: "an

argument from signified and understood to being does not follow ." 9 Any argument can
be said to employ this objection if it denies the general possibility of an inference from
thought to actual existence.

B. Descartes vs. the Thomist

Descartes was certainly aware of Aquinas' position before writing Meditations V.
Whether he actually meant to take the objection into account when formulating his
version of what would later be named the "ontological argument" is disputable. What we
do know is that Descartes did not understand himself to be reviving Anselm's argument,
and thus would not have immediately felt the need to defend himself against Aquinas'
rejection of the latter. The Cartesian argument is rather based on uniquely Cartesian
premises. In several discussions of these premises we find recognition of the relevance
of the Thomistic objection, as well as a proposed solution to the problem. Descartes, in
other words, accepts the position of Thomas as a convincing refutation of the Proslogion
argument, but nonetheless believes himself capable of inferring from thought to actuality.
The Thomist philospher Caterus introduces the logical objection in the First Set of
Objections to the Meditations. Caterus indicates that the argument of Meditation V
resembles that from Anselm (as summarized by Aquinas), and requests a reply to

9

Cajetan, Commentaria in summam theologiae. Cited by Blake Dutton in "The ontological argument:
Aquinas's objection and Descartes' reply." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly. 1993; 67(4), 431450.

Thomas' rejection, which he cites without adding any significant gloss of his own. 10
11

Descartes obliges by insisting on his own agreement with Thomas:

... on this issue I do not differ from the Angelic doctor in any respect.
St. Thomas asks whether the existence of God is self-evident as far as we
are concerned, that is, whether it is obvious to everyone. And he answers,
correctly, that it is not.

To Thomas' formulation of Anselm's argument he adds:

In this form the argument is manifestly invalid. For the only conclusion

that should have been drawn is: 'Therefore, once we have understood the
meaning of the word "God" we understand that what is conveyed is that
God exists in reality as well as in the understanding.' (my italics)

Descartes is seen here not only to acknowledge the logical objection as a
refutation of Anselm's argument, he even lends the force of his own authority to the
claim. The argument in Meditation V, however, is to be contrasted with the one Thomas
refutes. In the subsequent passage our author accordingly highlights the difference
between the scholastic argument and his own, and in the process he offers a more concise
version of his argument than he had previously given:

10

AT VII 97-99; CSM II 70-72.

My argument, however, was as follows: 'That which we clearly
understand to belong to the true and immutable nature, or essence, or form
of something, can be truly asserted of that thing. But once we have made
a sufficiently careful investigation into what God is, we clearly and
distinctly understand that existence belongs to his true and immutable
nature. Hence we can now truly assert of God that he does exist.'

This Cartesian demonstration includes an onto-epistemic axiom as the major
premise in the argument; i.e., the proof will be valid only under the condition that what
we clearly perceive to belong to something really belongs to that thing. The premise
remains unelaborated in the First Set ofReplies; Descartes claims that it provides no
difficulty "because it has already been conceded that whatever we clearly and distinctly
understand is true."

12

The specific axiom that stipulates the reality of predication thus

refers to the more general axiom concerning the reality of the understood. The status of
the former as a premise in the argument represents an acknowledgement of the
dependency of the proof upon rationalist epistemology. Without the presumption of this
larger context, the inference from our idea of God to his existence would be vulnerable to
the criticism that Caterus mentions.
Although the structure of Meditation V corresponds to this syllogistic argument,
that text had not cited this claim so explicitly as a premise in the ontological argument. 13
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AT VII 115-120; CSM II 82-85

12

AT VII 116; CSM II 83

13
The discussion of premise 2 in Meditation Vbegins with the claim that the first premise provides the
"basis" : ''But if the mere fact that I can produce from my thought the idea of something entails that
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The emphasis there is rather on the necessity of the thought of God's existence: "I am not
free to think of God without existence ..." 14 Greater attention is given to the predication
of necessary existence (viz., the minor premise) so that the contingency of the proof as a
whole upon the preceding epistemological reflections can be overlooked. The argument
for necessary existence demands only the logical necessity suggested by the analogy with
geometry, and not yet actual existence, for its result: "even if it turned out that not
everything on which I have meditated in these past days is true, I ought still to regard the
existence of God as having at least the same level of certainty as I have hitherto attributed
to the truths of mathematics."15
The argument in Principles 1.14 is also directed at the necessity of thought, so that
that text likewise omits any reference to the major premise of the complete proof:"...
simply on the basis of its perception that necessary and eternal existence is contained in
the idea of a supremely perfect being, the mind must clearly conclude that the supreme
being does exist" (my emphasis).

16

Only much later in that work do we receive assurance

of the reality ofperception.17
The tendency of Descartes' exposition is thus not merely to leave the argument
vulnerable to the Thomistic objection, but rather to circumvent the problem altogether by
proceeding entirely according to the necessity of the mind. It is only the Reply to Caterus

everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to that thing really does belong to it, is this not
a possible basis for another argument to prove the existence of God?" AT VII 65; CSM II 45.
14

AT VII 67; CSM II 46

15

AT VII 65-6; CSM II 45

16

AT VIIIA 10; CSM I 198
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At Book I, Proposition 30. In the Meditations the rule is often bracketed and this talk of necessity of the
mind ("according to its nature") prevails.
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and the "Geometrical Demonstration" which supply the missing premise and thus assert
existence outside the intellect. In the two more popular texts (the Meditations and the

Principles), the ultimate truth of the argument is contingent upon other discussions. The
truth of our perceptions, including our perception of God's existence, requires its own
validation.

C. Kant and the logical objection

The story of Kant's employment of the Thomistic objection is a more complex
one. Thomas' reasoning certainly does not hold a preeminent place in the Critical
philosophy. Another objection, or perhaps several others, precedes this in importance.
At best our logical objection remains as an auxiliary argument in the Critique ofPure

Reason. Kant nonetheless wrestled with the objection for decades, and seems ultimately
not to have abandoned it. In the following we will briefly recapitulate the various
arguments, Critical and pre-Critical, that represent some version of the objection in
question. Kant assumes at least three distinct and mutually incompatible positions with
respect to the logical objection, which we delineate in chronological order.

(i.)

Nova dilucidatio

The Habilitationschrift, Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova

dilucidatio, demonstrates unreserved support for the medieval objection. A brief
discussion of what he at this point names the "Cartesian argument" is found in the

Scholium to Proposition VI. The proposition itself addresses one of the Cartesian
concepts of God: "It is inconsistent that something should be said to contain the reason
for its own existence within itself."18 The objection to the concept of self-causing or selfdetermining being consists mainly in the fact that the term "ratio" is not given its usual
meaning in this case. Kant understands the principle of sufficient reason, to which he
devotes Proposositions IV and V, to imply that to the existence of everything belongs a
reason or ground distinct from the thing itself. 19 The definition of God according to
which he is the reason for his own existence thus represents a blatant equivocation.
To illuminate the erroneous use of the term "ratio" in the definition of God, Kant
distinguishes the cause of being from the cause of thought, which distinction he
designates with the expressions "cause of knowledge" and "antecedent determining
cause." The Corollary to the Proposition asserts that necessary existence pertains to the
former2°; i.e., to say that "God exists necessarily'' is to say only that it is impossible to
think of God as non-existent. Our proof of God' s existence, according to this view,

appeals to this incomprehensibility of God's non-existence, or to the "impossibility of the
opposite" of what the conclusion asserts. Impossibility is as such a logical characteristic,
and is thus cause only of our cognition, not of the thing itself. The Cartesian concept of
God thus provides only a ratio cognoscendi, not a determining cause; i.e., it indicates the

18

Werke I, A 430. References to works of Kant other than the Critique ofPure Reason are to Immanuel
Kant, Werke in Z ehn Baenden, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel. Darmstadt 1968. Translations from the
Nova dilucidatio are my own.
19

This is already a frequent theme in the Objections and Replies to the Meditations. Arnauld and Caterus
anticipate much of what Kant says here and subsequently. See AT VII 207-214; CSM II 145-150 and
Descartes' reply at AT VII 237-247; CSM II 165-172.
20

"This impossibility of the opposite is a ground of our knowledge of the existence, but an antecedent
determining cause is simply lacking." Werke I, A 430.
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reason for our knowledge of the divine existence, without at the same time asserting a
cause of this existence.
With this qualification of the notion of a self-causing or self-grounding entity,
Kant introduces his general distinction between thought and being and accordingly
employs the Thomistic objection against the argumentum Cartesianum. The concept of
causa sui pertains only to our idea of God; it indicates only that we must think of God as
existing, but it does not itself ensure God's actuality. These reflections are completed in
the Scholium:

I am of course aware that this same concept of God is appealed to, from
which the determinate existence of the same is postulated. It is, however,
easy to see that this occurs only in thought, not in reality. The concept of
such a being is constructed in which the sum of all realities is contained.
Granted, one must assent to the existence of such a being. The proof thus
proceeds: if all realities are to be united without limitation in one being,
that being exists. But if these are only conceived as unified, then the
existence is also only conceived. The following opinion ought therefore to
have been expressed: if we form the concept of such a being, and name
this "God", we have determined this concept in such a way that it includes
being. If this concept, therefore, is a true one, then that being exists. This
much is said for those who assent to the Cartesian argument. (My

· ) 21
emph as1s

21

Ibid., A 432.
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The italicized sentence presents the Thomistic objection in its first formulation; if
the unity of the realities in God is merely thought, then the existence is also merely
thought. With that Kant raises the issue of "existence as conceived," and thereby accuses
the Cartesian proof of a confusion of existence-in-thought with real or actual existence.
The accusation reiterates the scholastic distinction between existentia in animo meo and

existentia in rerum natura. It is allowed that the object of this notion may exist, but
existence in rerum natura is not included in the concept. The passage accordingly closes
with a hypothetical that resembles the Thomistic objection in its second formulation: if
concept is true, then God exists. To make the tautological nature of the objection more
explicit: if our idea that God exists is true, then God exists.
It should be noted here that the "Cartesian argument" that Kant considers differs
from the above-discussed ontological argument. Kant begins with the concept of a being
that possesses all realities or perfections. Among these is "existence" or "necessary
existence," so that the entity in question should be said to exist. This argument indeed
derives from Meditation V, but in support of the claim that serves, in the complete
argument, as the minor premise.

22

In other words, Kant attacks only a premise to

Descartes' argument under the misunderstanding that this premise constitutes the entire
proof. The (Thomistic) objection he raises, however, is addressed by a preceding
reflection in Descartes' other premise, so that it would be correct, though without critical
import, to raise this objection against the supporting argument for existence as a
perfection.

22

AT VIl 67-8; CSM 46-7.

Kant's position concerning the ontological argument in his Nova dilucidatio is
thus at only a slight remove from the Cartesian argument. Descartes himself, as we have
seen, also acknowledges the observation that the argument is in danger of confusing
existence-in-thought from real existence. He confronts this problem, however, with his
"rule for establishing the truth," and thus in accordance with his general refutation of
23

skepticism.

Kant opts for another escape from the dilemma: the subsequent proposition

offers a neo-Leibnizian proof of God's existence. The argument also foreshadows his
later attempt in The Only Possible Ground for Proof.24 In other words, the pre-critical
Kant, like many philosophers of the eighteenth century who rejected Descartes'
reasoning, took recourse in the notion of possibility to bridge the gap between thought
and existence. Further discussion of this issue belongs only in the context of what we
will call the third objection to Descartes' argument. The logical objection, our current
theme, itself undergoes several permutations in the course of Kant's development.

(ii.) Reflection 3706

Before discussing the Thomistic influence of the Critique ofPure Reason, we
should address a certain dismissal of the logical objection that is to be found in Dieter
Henrich's Der ontologische Gottesbeweis. Henrich's work, it seems, underestimates this
objection. The matter is discussed in the "Introduction" to the main text, where the

23

The rule is derived from the cogito at AT VII 35, CSM II 24, and the elimination of skepticism follows
directly.
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On the relation of these proofs see J. Schmucker, ''Die Fruegestalt des kantischen ontotheologischen
Arguments in der Nova Dilucidatio und ihr Verhaeltnis zum 'einzig moeglichen Beweisgrund von 1762" '
in Studien zu Kants Philosophischer Entwicklung. Ed., Heimsoeth, Henrich and Tonelli. Hildesheim 1967.

author is concerned (a) to show that the objection is an "empty hesitation" and (b) that it
is not to be confused with Kant's objection. The first issue is itselfresolved only with
Kant's help. Henrich begins by asserting that the distinction between existence-inthought and actual existence is senseless. If we grant that, for instance, existence is a
property of a certain idea of "God," it would be futile to argue that this existence is
contained only in thought. Such a hesitation would then have to be extended to all
predicates; we should thus likewise say of a triangle that the sum of its angles existed
only in our thought.

The same extension from God's existence to all other predicates is

leads to the second formulation of the logical objection, which Henrich rejects as a result
of the analogy: "It makes no sense to say, restrictively, that the triangle has angles of a
certain sum only under the presupposition that it has them."25
A few general historical claims accompany this discussion. Henrich takes much
of modem metaphysics to be a response to the Thomistic objection: ''the entire history of
modem ontotheology can be understood as a defense of the proof against this
objection."

26

Such a generalization is not entirely misplaced; the objection, as we have

already indicated, has remained to this day the primary one. The second claim, however,
is more suspect; Henrich wants to argue that the mature Kant had rejected this line of
thinking altogether. He thus writes: "There is not a single passage from his Critical
works that lends itself to the idea that he combats ontotheology in the manner of St.
Thomas." This, we will shortly see, is patently false. Kant indeed offers several versions
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Henrich, pgs. 8-9
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Ibid., pg. 7

of both Thomistic objections in the First Critique. The dismissal of the Thomistic
objection is instead limited to a second phase of Kant's development.
We are nevertheless indebted to Henrich for, among other things, the following
discussion from Kant's Nachlass, whose role in Kant's development he seems to
overestimate. Kant, in the time following his Only Possible Groundfor Proof, writes:

If existence could be ascribed to a thing on the basis of the inclusion of
this among the thing's many predicates, then no proof could be required to
demonstrate God's existence that would be more conclusive and at the
same time more comprehensible than the Cartesian argument. One objects
only in vain that the possibility of such a thing would include existence
only in thought. One could not object, that is, that the thing exists only in
thought, and not outside the mind, because by the same reasoning it would
follow for all predicates that they belonged to things only in thought and
• .c.
not m
1act.27

The fact that the opening sentence is expressed as a conditional suggests that
Kant, at the time he wrote this note, had already accepted the empirical objection to the
ontological argument, which states that existence is not a predicate. This objection had
been noticeably absent from the Nova dilucidatio. To the contrary of that earlier text, the
position of this passage clearly entails that, the empirical objection notwithstanding, the
Cartesian argument would be valid. It would be valid for the reason that an objection like

27

Refl. 3706. Cited in Henrich pg. 9. My translation.

the Thomistic one, if allowed for God's existence, would lead to a universal skepticism
about the reality of predicates.
The Thomistic objection, according to the passage, leads to a broad skepticism
about the reality of predication. If we accept the objection, we are not entitled to claim
that any perceived attribute belongs to a thing "in reality." The first point to consider is
that such an idea is consistent with the Cartesian position. Descartes had indeed engaged
in such a skepticism, but this is overcome with the help of the same dogma that supports

the major premise in the First Replies argument.28 In the note Kant proposes an
alternative: the rationalist axiom is discarded in favor of nai:ve realism. The Thomistic
objection is thus refuted indirectly: ifwe accept this objection, then we also accept a
universal skepticism. Presumably Kant means to add the modus tollens: we do not
engage in such skepticism, therefore we also do not accept the objection. The second
point is thus that the hesitation concerning the logical objection, in this stage of Kant's
thinking, results from a more general philosophical orientation that rejects "external
world" skepticism on grounds not unique to the ontological argument or its refutation.
The objection, at least here, is discarded solely due to its affinity with skepticism.

(iii.) Logical objections in the First Critique

The note, however, and the orientation towards realism that it expresses, is only
one among so many Kantian discussions of the Thomistic objection. We have still to
account for the fact that the objection receives a very detailed treatment in the

28

Seen. 23.
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"Transcendental Dialectic." Kant, it seems, does not completely abandon the objection.
The position of the First Critique is on this point closer to the Nova dilucidatio than to
the above-described, second phase of Kant's development. Nearly one-half of the section
"On the impossibility of an ontological proof of God's existence" treats of Thomistic
arguments. The status of these within Kant's opus is ambiguous; these arguments, unlike
some others, proceed independently of the results of the "Analytic." The ambiguity
pertains to whether these objections provide support for the more systematic arguments
or vice versa. 29
In regards to the ontological argument, the logical, theory-independent refutations

seem to serve merely as introductions to the systematic part of the discussion, and it is
unlikely that Kant intended to rest much importance on them, though this says nothing of
his estimation of their strength. The first half of the section consists oflogical objections
to the idea that some thing or concept can be said to possess necessary existence. In the
second, more systematic part of the chapter Kant formulates the empirical objection,
which will be treated here accordingly.
The first logical objection appears in the context of a discussion about the
intelligibility of the concept of God as ens necessarium. Kant treats this concept as a
distinct definition of a being, whereas in the Cartesian argument necessity of existence is
a perfection that is asserted of God in the minor premise of the main proof.30 The
question thus concerns merely whether necessary existence can, in Cartesian terms, be
29

Concerning the relative dependency of the "Dialectic" on the "Analytic," see Herbert J. Nelson, ''Kant on
Arguments Cosmological and Ontological" in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 67 (2), 1993, pp.
167-84.
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That Kant takes the concept of a "necessary being" to represent something distinct from the concept of
God determines the greater part of bis conflict with the proof. See below, pp. 53-8 as well as Chapters 2
and 3.
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contained in the nature of a thing. Kant deals first with the examples Descartes had used
to explain the idea. He understands the Cartesian analogies as an attempt to make the
idea of a necessary being intelligible; or rather, he implies that the analogies are attempts
to conceal the idea's essential incomprehensibility. The examples, Kant claims, are
offered "so that all further demands concerning its (the concept's) intelligibility appeared
entirely unnecessary'' (par. 3).31
The next several paragraphs discuss the analogies in question. The first
observation is that "all the alleged examples are taken only from judgments, but not from
things and their existence" (par. 4). Kant wants to distinguish between the "necessity of
judgments" and the "necessity of things." The analogy with the triangle and the sum of
its sides refers only to a necessary judgment. Ifl think of the triangle, then I am forced to
make certain judgments about the three angles. The necessity of such a judgment,
however, does not imply the necessity of the thing about which it judges. Kant thus
writes: "the above triangle does not say that the three angles are absolutely necessary, but
rather that under the condition that a triangle exists (is given), three angles also exist (in
it) necessarily."
The reapplication of the analogy quickly leads to the Thomistic objection in its
second formulation. As with all instances of the objection, this is derives from a general
distinction between concept and thing. Kant considers this difference here with respect to
the asserted necessity. Necessity in thought is different from necessity of the thing, or

31

Throughout the remainder, references to citations from this section will be given in the text according to
the established practice ofnumbered paragraphs (1-14). Translations are from the 1997 Cambridge edition
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logical necessity is different from ontological necessity. 32 The geometrical propositions
are necessary judgments, or in them the combination of subject and predicate is necessary
for thought. The geometrical entity (the triangle), however, is not ontologically
necessary. The triangle does not necessarily exist. A statement that anticipates the
second Thomistic objection complements this distinction: what is logically necessary is
also ontologically necessary provided that the object in question exists. In other words,
the angles exist necessarily if the triangle exists.
Assuming the plausibility of the Cartesian analogy, God can now be said to exist
ifwe presuppose that he is given. Kant proceeds:

Nevertheless the illusion of this logical necessity has proved so powerful
that when one has made a concept a priori of a thing that was set up so
that its existence was comprehended within the range of its meaning, one
believed that one could infer with certainty that because existence
necessarily pertains to the object of this concept, i.e., under the condition
that I posit this thing as given (existing), its existence can also be posited
necessarily (according to the rule of identity), and this being itself,
therefore, is necessarily, because its existence is assumed arbitrarily and
under the condition that I posit its object. (Par. 4; My emphasis).

Kant had begun by granting a version of the Cartesian example: the judgment
"God exists" is strictly analogous to the geometrical judgments. The existential judgment
32

This distinction is prevalent in current discussions of the argument. See, e.g., John Hick's "A Critique of
the ' Second Argument."' The Many Faced Argument. Edited by Hick and McGill. Macmillan, 1967. Pp.
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is supposed to be as necessary as the predication of certain properties of a triangle. Since,
however, the logical objection holds for the geometrical judgments, it should likewise
prevail over the theological judgment. In other words, since the predication of the
properties of the triangle presupposes that the triangle itself exists, so should the
predication of God's existence presuppose that he exist. Kant thus concludes that I can
with necessity infer God's existence ''under the condition that I posit this thing as given
(existing)."
The subsequent paragraph (#5) reveals further difficulties in the analogy, and
serves to illuminate the intention of the entire discussion. The claim "God exists" is
considered as an identical judgment. Such a judgment yields a contradiction when the
predicate is "cancelled" and the subject remains. This holds evidently of our geometric
example. "To posit a triangle and cancel its three angles is contradictory." Ifwe reapply
the analogy, then a contradiction should likewise ensue for the claim of God's existence.
The statement "God is not" should produce a contradiction. Kant, however, retreats from
this under the assumption that nothing is left to be contradicted: "If you cancel its
existence, then you cancel the thing itself with all its predicates; where then is the
contradiction supposed to come from?"
The intention of the passage is to place the cogency of the analogy into question.
The claim that "God is not" is contradictory is not in itself absurd. It is also not,
however, strictly analogous to claim that ''the triangle does not have three angles" is
contradictory. Kant, of course, establishes this only by assuming that "exists" posits "the
subject together with all its predicates" and is to that extent to be distinguished from

341-356.

predicates such as ''having three angles = 180 degrees" or "omnipotence." In other
words, the analysis of the claim "God exists" as an identical statement has to a certain
extent already assumed the empirical objection. 33
The Thomistic objection, though, appears in yet another form in the Critique.
This time it arises among the possible answers to what for Kant is the decisive question
concerning the ontological argument. The problem is posed in paragraph eight: "I ask
you: is the proposition, this or that thing exists - is this proposition, I say, an analytic or a
synthetic proposition." The first option is considered, with the result that the claim is
either tautologous or is subject to the Thomistic objection in its first formulation:

if it is the former, then with existence you add nothing to your thought of
the thing; but then either the thought that is in you must be the thing itself,
or else you have presupposed an existence as belonging to possibility, and
then inferred that existence on this pretext from its inner possibility, which
is nothing but a miserable tautology. (My emphasis)

We reserve the latter disjunct for the discussion of Leibniz' objection. Of
immediate concern is the former claim: ''the thought that is in you must be the thing
itself." Toe ontological argument, according to Kant, confuses (or identifies}34 our
thought of God with God himself. The implicit reasoning is as follows. In an analytic
33 It is well documented in the literature that the argument in paragraph 5 is question begging. See, e.g.,
Charles Nussbaum, "Did Kant refute the ontological argument?" in Southwest Philosophy Review. 1994;
10(1), 147-156. See also Nicholas Everitt, "Kant's discussion of the ontological argument" in KantStudien. 1995; 86, 385-405 and Herbert Nelson, "Kant on arguments cosmological and ontological" in
American Catholic Philosophic Quarterly. 1993; 67 (2), 167-84.

34Kant directly attributes

only an identification, but the context of the argument suggests that it is rather a
confusion; i.e., the identification, Kant suggests, is an error.

claim the predicate states only what is already contained in the subject.35 The claim "God
exists" is, by assumption, an analytic claim. The grammatical predicate "exists" thus
adds nothing to the subject "God." Kant makes one further assumption before drawing
his conclusion: the subject term designates only our thought of the thing. With this we
can validly conclude: "then with existence you add nothing to your thought of the thing."
Under investigation here is not the inference from "God" to "God exists." It has
been granted with the assumption of analyticity that this follows immediately. The
problem concerns rather the inference from our thought ofGod to God's existence.
According to the Thomistic objection, it follows from our idea of God only that we must
think of God as existing; i.e., the Thomistic objector allows only the inference from the

thought of God to the thought of his existence, or from the thought of the subject to the
thought of the predicate. Kant proceeds, however, in the reverse manner. He begins with
the intended conclusion "God exists," and attempts to trace this back to the idea of God.
To repeat, the conclusion follows from the subject itself ("God") analytically. The
desired result, however, is that it follow from our mere thought of the subject. The
ontological argument would thus be valid only if this idea is the same as the subject
itself.36 In other words, God's existence would follow from our idea of God only under
the condition that our idea is the same as the thing itself.
Contrary to both Reflection 3706 and Henrich's interpretation of the Critique,
then, the Critical Kant indeed argues in a manner that is logically equivalent to the
Thomistic objection. According to the objection in its traditional form, the proof contains

35

KrV A 6/ B 10. References to the First Critique are indicated by "KrV" with page numbers from both
editions.
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a confusion of existence-in-thought with real existence. Kant's objection differs only in
its presentation; the ontotheologian is said to have failed to distinguish the thought of
God from the thing itself. The confusion is placed in the subject term, rather than, as by
Aquinas and Caterus, in the predicate term. This difference, however, is entirely
negligible with respect to the proposition in question, since the predicate and subject
terms are assumed to be indistinguishable.
Kant's version of the objection, however, poses a different metaphysical
challenge to the proponent of the argument. The rationalist dogma concerning the reality
of predication serves as an adequate response only to the traditional form of the
objection. Descartes accepts the objection itself; from our thought of God it indeed
follows only that we must think of him as existing. But since the necessity of thought in
this instance meets the epistemological criterion of clarity and distinctness, it is certain
that the existence posited in thought is also real. The relevant doctrine, however,
concerns only the reality of predication, so that it fails to respond to the Kantian
objection. The latter implies, correctly, that the ontological proof assumes in addition
some form of identity between our thought of God and the thing itself. This suggests yet
a further systematic requirement for ontotheology: there must be some mediation
between God and our idea ofhim.
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To review quickly the logical objection as it appears both in Descartes and in
Kant; first, Descartes unambiguously accepts the objection in Aquinas' formulation as a
36
37

Identity is certainly too strong here, but it is what Kant asserts.

Descartes and Spinoza provide the mediation at best indirectly. In Meditation III, it is proved that God
causes our idea of him, so that there is some relation of the sort required. Spinoza's notion of an 'adequate
idea' offers a superior option; an adequate idea is not something different from its object. If we were to
conceive of God adequately, then, our idea would indeed be the thing itself. Hegel, however, brings the
notion to its greatest clarity: our knowledge of God is ultimately God's self-knowledge.

rejection of Anselm's argument. His own argument, however, includes in its major
premise a guarantee of the reality of predication, and thus meets the challenge that
Thomas poses. The result is that the argument, in its complete form, is contingent upon
an axiom of rationalist epistemology. Kant handles the objection in three distinct phases.

In the Nova dilucidatio he employs the objection without hesitance. In the period of the
Only Possible Ground for Proof, however, he rejects the objection on the basis that its
acceptance would lead to skepticism. In the Critique ofPure Reason he places the
objection in context: if necessary existence is accepted as a predicate of God, he argues,
then this objection holds. The ensuing discussion, of course, negates the antecedent of
this claim by insisting that existence is in no case a "real" predicate, or that all existential
claims are synthetic.

IL The empirical objection

The second major objection that has been leveled against the ontological
argument is called ''the empirical objection." The claim here is simply that existence is
not a predicate, so that the_minor premise of the ontological argument is denied. The
Thomistic objector, by contrast, accepts both Anselm's definition and his sole premise,
namely, that "existence in thought and fact is greater than existence in thought alone."
The acceptance of the premises was requisite for the attack on the inference. That the
conclusion follows from the premises is repudiated by the Thomistic objection. Kant
thus employs that objection in the section in which he grants the argument's premises,
among which are included, in the modern argument, the claim that "existence is a

predicate." The empirical objection, however, attacks this latter premise and, for that
reason, does not need to consider the inference itself This objection is to that extent
weaker than the previous, since a proponent of the argument can, with entire justification,
merely indicate its irrelevance. With this objection we enter the realm of spurious debate,
or the dispute over irreconcilable assumptions.

A. Descartes vs. Gassendi

Although the empirical objection owes its celebrity to Kant, its appearance in the
history of philosophy is the original contribution of Gassendi. 38 This interlocutor of
Descartes', however, merely brings an already very explicit claim into question. The
authoritative form of Descartes' argument, cited above, contains two premises. The
major premise serves as a response to the Thomistic objection. In the empirical objection
it is the minor premise that is under attack. Descartes recognizes the latter as more
controversial, if only because he understands the major premise to be "already
conceded." Our text from the First Replies issues a twofold warning about the minor
premise with which we begin our discussion of the empirical objection.
To reiterate the premise in question: "once we have made sufficiently careful
investigation of what God is, we clearly and distinctly understand that existence belongs
to his true and immutable nature. " 39 Two difficulties pertain to the idea that existence
belongs to God's nature, the first of which involves a reply to the empirical objection.

38 Fifth

Set of Objections. AT VIl 322-6; CSM II 224-7.

39 First Set

ofReplies. Cited above pgs. 11, 17.
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The problem is that God is the only entity to whose essence or nature existence belongs,
so that the danger remains of confusing God with everything else. Descartes poses the
solution first terminologically, then methodologically. A modal distinction comprises the
terminological response4°: "we must distinguish between possible and necessary
existence." The former kind of existence belongs to the essence of everything except
God, whereas the latter belongs only to God. The "Geometrical Demonstration"
expresses the point definitively: "possible or contingent existence is contained in the
concept of a limited thing, whereas necessary or perfect existence is contained in the
concept of a supremely perfect being.',4 1
Descartes adds a methodological caveat directed at this first problem; his concern
lies with our remembering what this distinction asserts; God, namely, is here said to be
essentially different from limited or finite entities, and this difference concerns also his
existence. Since this qualification is important to the second premise of the ontological
argument, it is also important to that argument that we do not fail to remember this
distinction. A precondition of our analyzing the argument is thus that we "attend to this
difference between the idea God and every other idea," and do not ascribe to the idea of
God properties that are relevant only to other ideas.
Including what is stated in the subordinate clause of Descartes' formulation of the
premise, three auxiliary conditions are appended to the claim that "existence is a
predicate." The first is indicated by the phrase "once we have made sufficiently careful
investigation of what God is." The argument is thereby noted to be contingent upon our
40

Descartes point is prevalent in contemporary modal arguments. See Hartshome's ''What did Anselm
discover?" in Hick and McGill, pp. 321-334.
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knowledge of the metaphysical conception of God, with the result that the argument is
42

not intended to be evident to everyone.

Secondly, we must distinguish necessary from

possible existence. Lastly, we must "attend" to the absolute distinction between God and
all other entities.
The employment of the empirical objection must be judged in light of these
conditions, and not merely compared to the claim of which they are conditions.
Reference to these issues suggests that the dispute over the premises of the proof
becomes increasingly a matter oflarger philosophical context, so that ignorance of this
context would lead to fatal misunderstandings. Before investigating this phenomenon in
Kant's encounter with the proof, we should review the empirical objection as Gassendi
expresses it. We see immediately that it is no small injustice of philosophical
historiography that has attributed the objection primarily to Kant. Several paragraphs of
the latter's discussion "On the impossibility of an ontological argument" are nearly
verbatim repetitions of the Fifth Set ofObjections.
Like Kant, Gassendi begins his attack on the ontological argument with a
treatment of the analogy with the triangle:

It is quite all right for you to compare essence with essence, but instead of
going on to compare existence with existence or a property with a
property, you compare existence with a property. It seems that you should
have said that omnipotence can no more be separated from the essence of
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Although Descartes takes the proof to be self-evident, he would agree with Aquinas and Boethius that
"certain notions are self-evident and commonplaces only to the learned." Summa, pg. 6-7. Hence the

God than the fact that its angles equal two right angles can be separated
from the essence of a triangle. Or, at any rate, you should have said that
the existence of God can no more be separated from his essence than the
existence of a triangle can be separated from its essence.43

Gassendi indicates here, quite rightly, that the compared properties are
incongruent. "Existence" is not normally a property like "having three angles equal to
two right angles," so that the analogy fails in its appeal to ordinary intuition. We have
already seen Kant's explication of this: existence is presupposed in the assertion of other
properties, with the result that the analogy demands that existence be presupposed in the
assertion of existence (the second Thomistic objection). Gassendi likewise refers the
analogy to a specific concept of 'existence', one that is in entire accordance with the
critical philosophy. "Existence" is described as "that without which no perfections can be
present" or "that in virtue of which both the thing in itself and its perfections are
existent.',44 Existence is thus not a perfection (or "predicate") in the same sense as the
property of the triangle.
A final reflection on the analogy concludes against the inclusion of existence in
the definition of God:

frequent warning, in the context of the proof, that "its conclusion can be grasped as self-evident by those
who are free ofpreconceived opinions." AT VII 167; CSM 117-8.
43
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Thus, just as when you listed the perfections of the triangle you did not
include existence or conclude that the triangle existed, so when you listed
the perfections of God you should not have included existence among
them so as to reach the conclusion that God exists.45

"Existence," according to Gassendi, is not included in the definition of a triangle,
but is rather a precondition for the "existence" or real inherence of the other properties.
The same observation should hold in the case of God. The problem indicated here,
however, does not represent a mere oversight on the part of the proponent of the proof.
The text of Meditation V anticipates this discussion by insisting on the difference
between God and all other entities. The ontological argument, Descartes admits, has "the
appearance of being a sophism" because we are "accustomed to distinguish between
existence and essence in everything else." 46 The argument does not deny the difference
between "essence" and "existence" in the case of any other entity. An inference from the
latter to the former is thus impossible in all instances except God. A general analysis of
existence as distinct from essence, then, clearly misses the point of the argument.
Gassendi, like Kant after him, recognizes the intention of the Cartesian argument
to involve this difference between God and other entities concerning the relation of
essence to existence. The exception is denied in accordance with Gassendi's
nominalism:

45
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You say that existence is distinct from essence in the case of all other
things, but not in the case of God. But how, may I ask, are we to
distinguish the essence of Plato from his existence, except merely in our
thought? Suppose that Plato no longer exists: where now is his essence?
Surely in the case of God the distinction between essence and existence is
just of this kind: the distinction occurs in our thought.47

That the distinction is said to occur only in thought indicates the sharp divergence
of Gassendi from Descartes' philosophical position. The latter is, famously, a realist
concerning essences or universals, while the former outlines a strongly nominalist
position just a few pages prior to the discussion in question.48 The Cartesian argument
seems to presuppose a real distinction of essence and existence in finite things. Only thus
could a real identity of essence and existence distinguish God from such entities.
Gassendi, in turn, denies a difference between God and finite things as far as existence is
concerned; for him essence and existence are distinguished only nominally in both cases.
This vast difference in views explains why Descartes' reply is not very
instructive. The latter can do little more than insist on what has been denied, namely, the
difference between God and finite things as concerns the distinction between essence and
existence: "the relation between essence and existence is manifestly quite different in
God from what it is in the case of the triangle.',49 This difference justifies the analogy
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The dependency of the proof on a strong realism is unmistakable from either Meditation V or the Fifth
Replies.
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with the triangle, or at least qualifies the critique of that analogy: "Hence the existence of
a triangle should not be compared with the existence of God. ,,so Viewed from Descartes'
standpoint, then, it is Gassendi (and therefore Kant as well) who suggests the comparison
of unlike things. Descartes consistently appeals to the premise that God's existence
should not be compared to the existence of the triangle, so that any attempt to attack the
ontological argument through such a comparison would miss the entire point of the
argument.

B. Kant and the empirical objection

Kant elaborates the Gassendian theory of existence in paragraphs 10-14 of his
refutation. The basic claim is that existence is not a perfection; in Kant's terminology
this reads "being is obviously not a real predicate." The term "real predicate" is
distinguished from "logical predicate" in that the former denotes "the determination of a
thing." The famous example of "one hundred dollars" illustrates this notion of''real
predicate." The concept of the sum of money involves only the content, and this remains
the same whether it is an actual content or a merely possible content. In other words, the
hundred dollars evidently do not increase by their existing. Indeed, if the existent and
conceived contents were not the same, it could not be said that the concept was ofthose
hundred dollars. In the traditional metaphysical terminology Kant's claim would read:
existence does not belong to the essence of the hundred dollars.

so Ibid.

In the context of Kantian philosophy the analysis of"existence" is restricted to

"experience," this latter being construed in a somewhat narrow sense. Kant's chapter
thus concludes with reference to experiential cognition: "our consciousness of all
existence belongs entirely and without exception to the unity of experience" (par. 12).
Evaluation of the proof proceeds in accordance with this standard; the Cartesian
argument does not represent an advance of our empirical cognition. This is all Kant
means when he writes that the concept of a highest being "is entirely incapable by itself
of extending our cognition in regard to what exists" (par. 13).
This same restricted concept of"what exists" is employed in the analysis of the
ontological argument, so that the empirical objection is reducible to the trivial
observation that God is not an object of experience, a finite entity, etc. Kant's critique of
theology is in this respect an extension of his analysis of experience. The idea of God is
subject to comparison with the conditions for an object of experience. The objection is
stated that the proposition "this or that thing exists" is synthetic, under which the peculiar
object "God" is to be subsumed.
The empirical objector considers God under the category of a thing in general.
Further empirical criticisms accordingly consist of observations that "God" fails to meet
the criteria for some idea of what a thing is, and it is enlightening to compare these
observations with traditional theology. Kant states one such criterion in the penultimate
paragraph of the refutation: ''the connection of all real properties in a thing is a synthesis
about whose possibility we cannot judge a priori." Even the most superficial knowledge
of metaphysics would suffice in order to see the problem here. "God," namely, has been
traditionally understood as simple. In other words, the connection of God's properties is
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not synthetic but rather immediate. The various attributes of God are said not to be
distinct insofar as they inhere in God. From empirical considerations, then, it can only be
determined that the ontological argument presupposes a conception like this metaphysical
one. Evidence for the consistency and agreement of the proponents of the argument in
this regard is found, among others places, in Anselm's Monologion as well as Descartes' s

Meditations.51

III. The arguments from possibility

A. Kant's critique of Leibniz' contribution

The empirical objection represents a refusal of the second premise of the
Cartesian argument, which premise asserts that necessary existence belongs to the
essence of God. The general claim that ''being is not a predicate" indicates that existence
cannot belong to an essence, but is always something over and beyond the characteristics
that determine a thing's nature. Kant's development ofthis doctrine begins with a
criticism of the concept of ens necessarium. The ontological argument, he argues, should
be preceded by a consideration of ''whether through this concept (ens necessarium) we
are thinking anything at all." (par. 2). In other words, it should first be considered
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Ch. 17 of the Monologion is entitled: "The supreme being is so simple that whatever things can be
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whether and how a being could possess necessary existence as an attribute, such that this
being could be said to be a necessary being.
This question frames the discussion of the Thomistic objection. That objection, as
mentioned above, grants the second premise of the Cartesian proof, but denies the
inference from the concept of a necessary being to its reality. The claim that necessary
existence is a predicate or property of God, Kant argues, implies that the assertions of
God' s existence obey the same logic as other attributions of properties, and the analogical
arguments arise in this context. The structure of Kant's refutation suggests that ifwe
accept that necessary existence is a predicate of a certain being, i.e., that we think
"something" through the concept of an ens necessarium, then the claim that this being
exists is subject to the general logic of predicative judgments. This logic includes the
presupposition of the existence of the subject, with the result that the Thomistic objection
in its second formulation would be a valid criticism of the concept of a necessary being.
The Thomistic objection arises here through a difficulty in the analogy. The
example compares an existence claim to predicative claim, and the difficulty is that these
appear to differ logically. The judgment that ''the angles of the triangle have the given
sum" is equivalent, in Kant's view, to the claim that ''the angles have the given sum

assuming that the triangle exists." If we apply the same reasoning to the claim that God
exists, however, we conclude: "God exists assuming that he exists," which would be all
that follows from the Cartesian premises. Kant's position thus suggests: ifexistence is a
predicate, then the Thomistic objection holds. It would seem more sensible, then, to deny
the antecedent and admit that existence is not a predicate.
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The subsequent employment of the empirical objection emphasizes the
hypothetical nature of this development. The Thomistic objection falls short of
demanding a denial of the antecedent claim "existence is a predicate" in any strict sense.
The empirical objection stems instead from altogether different considerations.
Specifically, the doctrine that ''being is not a predicate" relies on Kant's view that
knowledge of existence is based on experience. Kant thus establishes the objection only
with reference to other doctrines espoused in the Critique that are not related to the idea
of God or to the proof of his existence. The Thomistic arguments, again, do not directly
support the claim, but only contribute indirectly to its plausibility.
Kant's overall strategy thus involves a combination of Thomistic and empirical
objections. The latter objection denies outright the concept of ens necessarium, or the
claim that necessary existence is a predicate in one special case. The further analysis of
this objection, however, reveals its spurious nature. Existence is, by the admission of all,
not a predicate in general. The proponents of ontological argument allege to find an
exception to this rule, whereas the empirical objectors deny that there is an exception.52
Discussions such as that of the "hundred dollars" are thus entirely irrelevant, if not
dangerously obfuscating, because they ignore the frequently and unambiguously asserted
status of God as an exception to the rule. No theological conclusions are reached by
means of such empirical examples.
Gassendi was shown to have recognized the intention of the ontological argument,
and thereby the futility of such examples. Kant likewise grants a small recognition to the
52
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status of God as an exception to any rule of empirical knowledge, and our third objection
arises in this context. The brief acknowledgement reads as follows:

Against all these general inferences (which no human being can refuse to
draw) you challenge me with the one case that you set up as a proof
through the fact that there is one and indeed only this one concept where
the non-being or the canceling of its object is contradictory within itself,
and this is the concept of a most real being. (par. 7)

Kant is thus not guilty of entirely ignoring the thought of God as such. He
recognizes that the proponents of the argument had not simply mistaken, in his terms, a
logical for a real predicate. They had rather asserted that the logical predicate 'to exist' is
in one instance also a real predicate. This exceptional instance pertains to the
metaphysical concept of God as ens realissimum, or supremely real entity. Kant himself
reviews a version of the ontological argument based on this concept:

It has, you say, all reality, and you are justified in assuming such a being
as possible .. . now existence is also comprehended under all reality: thus
existence lies in the concept of something possible. If this thing is
cancelled, then the internal possibility of the thing is cancelled, which is
contradictory. (ibid)

who take up this argument are intent on demonstrating a particular case of this gap .. . regarding this point,
modem empiricists, in attacking the argument, are trying to beat down an open door." Pg. 286.
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Two criticisms of the argument follow. One of these is directed at the premise,
the other at the inference:

I answer: you have already committed a contradiction when you have
brought the concept of its existence, under whatever disguised name, into
the concept of a thing which you would think merely in terms of its
possibility. If one allows you to do that, then you have won the illusion of
a victory, but in fact you have said nothing; for you have committed a
mere tautology. (Par. 8)

The argument in question is, according to Kant, partly contradictory and partly
tautological. These objections are addressed to the argument from the premise: if the
being to whose possibility existence belongs is possible, then that being exists. Kant is
right to label the inference tautological; the consequent follows from the antecedent by
the law of identity alone. The objection of contradiction, however, aims not at the
inference but at the antecedent itself. The inclusion of existence in the definition of a
possible is said to be contradictory. Such a definition, however, is problematic, not in
itself, but together with the consideration of the entity "merely in terms of its possibility."

In other words, the contradiction rests in considering an entity in terms of its possibility
while simultaneously denying that its possibility is separable from its existence.
The obvious target of this argument is not Descartes but the Leibnizian school.
Leibniz had famously modified the Cartesian argument in a manner resembling the
version Kant cites. The locus classicus for the modification is a passage from the New

Essays in which Leibniz alleges to have located a presupposition of the argument: "it is
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tacitly assumed that this idea of a wholly great or wholly perfect being is possible and
does not imply a contradiction."

53

On this reading, the Cartesian argument should

conclude only: "if God is possible, he exists." 54 The proof thus requires a supplementary
argument establishing the possibility of God, so that the final version would read
something like:

Pl: If God is possible, he exists. (Conclusion of Cartesian Argument)
P2: God is possible. (Conclusion of Supplementary Proof)
Conclusion: God exists.

B. Descartes vs. Mersenne

As is the case with the previous objections, Descartes and his interlocutors had
not failed to consider this line of reasoning. Just as Gassendi anticipates Kant with
astonishing accuracy, so does Mersenne anticipate Leibniz. In the Second Set of

Obj ections Mersenne considers the premises of the syllogistic Cartesian argument and
claims:

The conclusion should have been: 'hence, once we have made a
sufficiently careful investigation of what God is, we can with truth affirm
that existence belongs to the nature of God'. Now it does not follow from
53
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this that God in fact exists, but merely that he would have to exist if his
nature is possible, or non-contradictory. In other words, the nature or
essence of God cannot be conceived apart from existence; hence, granted
the essence, God really exists. This comes down to an argument which
others have stated as follows: 'If there is no contradiction in God's
existing, it is certain that he exists; but there is no contradiction in his
existing. "'55

According to Mersenne, the minor premise in this argument, ''there is no
contradiction in his existing," is open to doubt. Knowledge of God's essence seems
requisite in order to claim that this (the essence) is not contradictory. The objector
appeals, however, to what he knows Descartes to already allow: we do not know God's
essence, since we are finite whereas God is infinite. It would seem, then, that we could
not be sure that God's essence does not contain a contradiction, so that the given
argument would falter.
Mersenne's position here is complicit with both Leibniz' and the one Kant
attributes to his potential opponents. All recognize the Cartesian claim that existence
belongs to the essence of God, or that in the case of God existence and possibility are
inseparable. The completion of the argument thus seems simple: establish possibility and
existence follows immediately. Leibniz, for at least much of his career, wrestled with
arguments for God's possibility, viz. non-contradictoriness.
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diverges sharply from these three. His view asserts, to the contrary of the Leibnizian
argument, that the assurance of God's possibility or non-contradictoriness does not
precede but rather follows from our knowledge that God exists.
Mersenne's worry about our knowledge of God's essence is simultaneously
eased; full knowledge of God's essence, Descartes argues, is not necessary. We need
only be certain that existence belongs to the essence of God, and this does not imply that
we perceive this essence fully or that we know each of God's attributes. The argument
from the Second Replies reads:

All self-contradictoriness or impossibility resides solely in our thought,
when we make the mistake of joining together mutually inconsistent ideas;
it cannot occur in anything which is outside the intellect. For the very fact
that something exists outside the intellect manifestly shows that it is not
self-contradictory but possible. Self-contradictoriness in our concepts
arises merely from their obscurity and their confusion: there can be none
in the case of clear and distinct concepts. Hence, in the case of the few
attributes of God which we do distinctly perceive, it is enough that we
understand them clearly and distinctly, even though our understanding is
in no way adequate. And the fact that, amongst other things, we notice
that necessary existence is contained in our concept of God (however
inadequate that concept may be) is enough to enable us to assert both that
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we have examined his nature with sufficient clarity, and that his nature is
not self-contradictory. 57

Two further doctrines have been presumed in the argument. The first is the claim
that "all self-contradictoriness or impossibility resides solely in our thought." It seems
that all of the relevant parties would accept some version of this principle. 58 Second,
Descartes distinguishes between clear and adequate knowledge, which distinction is a

conditio sine qua non of the proof of God's existence. 59 It is not necessary to evaluate
these doctrines here; we are concerned, as in the previous instances, only to show that the
theological arguments refer to them.
These matters aside, Descartes' metaphysical position is clear: knowledge of noncontradictoriness is not a condition for but rather a result of the ontological proof. The
argument Kant considers, then, is far from anything to which Descartes could have
assented. The remarks appended to the minor premise of the main argument disable the
critique in advance. God's existence is necessary; possible existence, by contrast,
belongs only to the nature of a "limited being." Leibniz' and Mersenne, then, are both
guilty of confusing God with finite things, i.e., of failing to heed the methodological
caveat, to the extent that they propose to inquire into the mere possibility of the idea of
God.
In neglecting these two conditions of the minor premise, the possibility arguments
anticipate the empirical objection. The latter objection consists in a generalization of the
57
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Hegel, at least, frequently accuses Kant of having assumed this prejudice from his predecessors.
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Only thus could a finite intellect truly perceive anything about the infinite.
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distinction of "essence" from "existence." To the essence or nature of a thing belongs
only possibility; consideration of the thing's possibility, then, should rightly precede
inquiry about its existence. Such a rule holds in all cases except that of God. This last
does not possess "possible existence" in the sense that all other entities possess it. A
further metaphysical doctrine illuminates the error here; God is said to be the same as his
existence, and this serves as the entire basis for the traditional argument. 60 God is thus
not "something'' that could be considered apart from his existence, which is all that is
implied by the predication of"necessary'' existence. Neglect of these points by
Mersenne, Leibniz, and others made the argument susceptible to this criticism of Kant's.
The objection is entirely valid; it is indeed contradictory to at once assume the identity of
possibility and existence and consider the possibility in isolation from existence.61

IV. The origin of the idea of God

A. Descartes on the idea of God

Accompanying the minor premise in the First Replies are two warnings regarding
possible objections to the claim that necessary existence belongs to the idea of God. The
first of these, as discussed above,62 represents an anticipation of the empirical objection,
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Some standard texts for the doctrine are: Aquinas, referred to above, pgs. 13-6; Descartes' Fifth Replies,
AT VII 383; CSM II 263; and Spinoza's Ethics I P22.

61

Hegel seconds Kant' s contention in the "Seventh Lecture" of the 1929 series. See Suhrkamp 17,393.
Jose Silva discusses this problem without reference to Kant or Hegel in "A Criticism of Leibniz' Views on
the Ontological Argument." Dialogos 1996; 31(68), 183-92.
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Above pp. 37ff.
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and consists in the modal qualification of existence together with the reminder of the
absolute difference between God and all other entities. The second difficulty pertains to
the assurance that our idea of God is not fictional, and this anticipates our fourth and final
objection to the ontological argument. A vast array of philosophical positions could be
cited as instances of the fourth objection, the most extreme of which would be positivism.
The basic objection claims simply that the idea of God is an arbitrarily constructed
concept. In the following, however, we will again consider Kant as the main proponent
of the view, to the extent that he considers the ontological argument to represent a misuse
of ideas whose proper function involves only the regulation of empirical knowledge.
Kant's attack on the ontological argument stems ultimately from an analysis of the origin
of the notions involved in theological proof, so that what has been labeled the "criticist
63

objection"

targets yet another systematic condition of the argument, namely, the theory

of innate ideas.
In the second part of his justification of the minor premise, Descartes reminds the
reader that we are accustomed to overlooking another distinction: ''we do not distinguish
what belongs to the true and immutable essence of a thing from what is attributed to it
64

merely by a fiction of the intellect."

The argument is thus shown once more to be

contingent upon a major trope of rationalist epistemology: before proceeding in
philosophy we must distinguish intellection from imagination, true ideas from fictional
ones, etc. Our text elaborates this point concisely enough:
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This perhaps unfortunate locution occurs as a translation ofHenrich's "der kritische Einwand" in the
English version of Walter Jaeschke's Reason in Religion: The Foundations ofHegel's Philosophy of
Religion. Tr. Michael J. Stewart and Peter Hodgson. University of California Press, 1990. Pg. 18ff.
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To remove the second part of the difficulty, we must notice a point about
ideas which do not contain true and immutable natures but merely ones
which are invented and put together by the intellect. Such ideas can
always be split up by the same intellect, not simply by abstraction but by a
clear and distinct intellectual operation, so that any ideas which the
intellect cannot split up in this way were clearly not put together by the
intellect.65

Our ideas of "true and immutable natures," of essences, are distinguished from
fictional ideas insofar as we can divide the latter but not the former. The idea "existing
lion" (Caterus' example) is thus a fictional idea to the extent that I can clearly distinguish
its components; i.e., I can imagine the lion also as not existing. The idea of God's
existence, however, is analogous to the idea that sum of three angles of a triangle are
equal to two right angles. Just as we cannot separate the latter from our idea of the
triangle ( under the condition that we are aware of this rule), so we also cannot separate
the idea of necessary existence from the idea of God, provided that we have "sufficiently
investigated" this idea. In both cases our perception of the given property necessarily
follows our consideration of the idea.
The guarantee that the argument is not based on a :fictional idea receives various
formulations among Descartes' works. The Principles addresses this dilemma only by
appealing to the uniqueness of the property of necessary existence. From the fact that the
mind can find no other ideas that contain necessary existence it ''understands that the idea
64

AT VII 116; CSM II 83

of an ens perfictissimum is not an idea which was invented by the mind." 66 Descartes'
intention is, presumably, that we could not have borrowed our representation of
"necessary existence" from any other idea. The Meditations cites a plurality of
assurances that the idea is not fictitious, although it neglects to provide detailed
arguments for them. 67

B. Kant's Critical objection

Kant diverges perhaps more sharply from Descartes on this issue than on any of
the others; this is because the Critical objection is more system-specific than the
Thomistic or empirical objections. The complete argument dedicated to it is not limited
to the small section "On the impossibility of an ontological proof," but rather comprises
much of the "Transcendental Dialectic," with frequent and explicit reference to the
''Transcendental Analytic." The "Dialectic" develops a critique of the minor premise as
synthetic. The argument culminates in the third chapter, "The ideal of pure reason," but
commences in the previous, "The antinomy of pure reason." The antinomy concludes
with an account of the genesis of the concept of "necessary being" as the fulfillment of
the need of reason to complete the series of empirically conditioned beings.
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From the

fact that every existence is empirically conditioned, reason concludes that there must be a
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AT VII 117; CSM II 83
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AT VIIIA 10; CSM I 198
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AT VII 68; CSM II 47. That the idea of God is innate had already been proved in Meditation III.
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A 559/ B 587

"a non-empirical condition of the entire series" of conditioned appearances. 69 In ''The
ideal of pure reason" Kant claims that ontotheology consists in the attempt to determine
this idea, which belongs essentially to cosmology, through the concept of a ''highest
being," i.e., through the idea of God.
The minor premise of the ontological argument is interpreted as synthetic to the
extent that Kant takes it as established separately and beforehand that there must be some
necessary existent.

° From the analysis of the cosmological idea we become aware only

7

that at least one being is necessary, but we do not yet know which being possesses this
attribute. The concept of a necessary being thus requires combination with another
concept, and this last is found in the idea of "a sum total of all possibility." The latter
concept is likewise derived from an empirical use of reason, namely, the "principle of
thoroughgoing determination," and it has its own legitimate use within the scheme of
transcendental idealism.71 The proofs for the existence of a ''highest being" thus amount,
according to the Critical view, to a synthesis of the idea of a necessary being with the
idea of the sum total of all reality. Kant summarizes his argument thusly:

This, therefore, is how the natural course of human reason is constituted.
First it convinces itself of the existence of some necessary being. In this it

69

A 560/ B588. This represents the solution to the "fourth conflict" of the antinomy, so that the argument
alluded to here properly begins at A 452/ B480.
70

This is the basic theme of Chapter Three, Section Three, of the Second Book of the Dialectic, which is
entitled "The grounds of proof of speculative reason for inferring the existence of a highest being." The
point is reiterated several times, e.g., "reason takes it as already settled that something or other has to exist
with absolute necessity." A 585/ B 613. The previous page emphasizes that reason is "urged.from another
source to seek somewhere a resting place in the regress from the conditioned ..." (my italics).
71

A 571/ B 599 -A 591/ B 619

recognizes an unconditioned existence. Now it seeks for the concept of
something independent of all conditions, and finds it in that which is the
sufficient condition for everything else, i.e., in that which contains all
reality. The All without limits, however, is the absolute unity, and carries
with it the concept of one single being, namely the highest being; and thus
reason infers that the highest being, as the original ground of all things,
exists in an absolutely necessary way. 72

Kant's argument thus aims at the minor premise, or the claim that necessary
existence belongs to the nature of God. According to this view, the premise contains two
distinct concepts whose necessary relation requires demonstration. This is the
background for the entire discussion of the ontological proof. The logical and empirical
objections are subordinate to the Critical, to the extent that the former represent only the
detailed criticism of this relation. In other words, the two traditional objections serve
only to illuminate the problems implied by the desired connection between the ens

necessarium and the ens realissimum. The superseding Critical objection maintains that
this endeavor is doomed from the start, since the proper function of both concepts is
limited to the regulation of empirical knowledge.73
Just as we found in our discussion of the empirical objection, we see here again
that the Kantian criticism of the ontological argument derives essentially from the
primacy assigned to empirical knowledge. The concept of a necessary being, Kant
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A 586-7/ B 614-5
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This is a brief summary ofHenrich's main argument concerning Kant. Henrich, pgs. 137-188.

allows, is non-empirical. But this non-empirical concept remains only relative to the
empirical, so that the purpose of the former is understood to be its usefulness for the
latter. The fate of the ontological argument, then, hinges ultimately upon the possibility
of a non-empirical knowledge of an existent, which possibility Kant seems to preclude as
a matter of principle. This preclusion results from Kant's assumption that our knowledge
of a ''merely intelligible" entity arises only by analogy to sensible entities. 74 Descartes
proceeds from a very different assumption. He understands finite entities to be only by
equivocation on the only real thing, namely, God. In other words, sensible entities are
defined precisely by their dependence upon a non-empirical. 75
One final observation should be noted as a corollary to the Critical objection, as
far as the interpretation of the minor premise as synthetic is concerned. It has been
correctly observed that, viewed from the Critical standpoint, two distinct concepts are
conjoined in the premise as if this conjunction were self-evident. 76 This problem,
however, follows only upon the assumption that there are indeed two distinct concepts,
God (ens realissimum) and necessary existence (ens necessarium). The assumption is
overtly contradicted by the metaphysical doctrine that God is the same as his existence,
so that, from the standpoint of ontotheology, any argument establishing the connection
would be superfluous. Whether these are two concepts or just one is precisely the
question begged on both sides of the debate. I.e., to the critic it appears that the
metaphysician conflates two concepts, or at least identifies them without justification. To
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"nothing is left for us but the analogy by which we utilize concepts of experience in making some sort of
concept of intelligible things, with which we have not the least acquaintance as they are in themselves." A
566/ B 594
75

SeePPI 52. AT VIIIA24; CSM I 210.

76 Henrich,

pgs. 152-3, where it is written that Descartes "makes this connection as if it were self-evident."
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the metaphysician however, the critic demands a synthetic account of an idea that is
essentially simple.

Chapter Two: Objections to the objections: Hegel's defense of the Cartesian argument

In his Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion Hegel set for himself the task of

"restoring the proofs of God's existence to a position ofhonor." 1 In his earlier writings
he had often suggested that a reinterpretation of the proofs was possible. Discussion of
the arguments, however, was limited to the occasional remark, usually in the context of
his sweeping criticisms of Kant, and thus lay on the margins of his philosophical
contributions. On at least five occasions between 1824 and 1831, though, Hegel indeed
provided a very detailed outline for a reinterpretation and reformulation of the traditional
proofs. The analyses of the proofs given in the later philosophy ofreligion provide a
framework for interpreting Hegel's metaphysics as a restoration of "ontotheology," and
this represents our current theme.
Scholars of the ontological argument have frequently claimed that Hegel's
renewed proofs bear only slight resemblance to the traditional arguments.2 Any
ontological proof from the nineteenth-century, so runs the view, would indeed be "postKantian," and thus could not simply reiterate the definitions of Descartes or Anselm.
Hegel's interest in the argument, however, demonstrates his profound affinity to
Descartes. In the previous chapter we saw that the latter places the theological
demonstration in the context of a systematic metaphysics. Attention to this context
reveals certain shortcomings in the objections, and these same shortcomings motivate
1 Rel, III, 310. References to the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion are to the edition by Walter
Jaeschke (Felix Meiner, 1995). All other references to Hegel's works are to the Suhrkamp edition.
Translations of all texts, except where otherwise indicated, are my own.
2

Toe contrast between Hegel and the rationalists is strongly emphasized not only by Henrich, but also by
Jan Rohls (Theologie und Metaphysik: Der ontologische Gottesbeweis und seine Kritiker. Guetersloh,
1987) and Wolfgang Roed (Der Gott der reinen Vernunft. C.H. Beck, Munich, 1992)

Hegel's attempt to revise the proof. In the present chapter we will review Hegel' s
comments on the objections to the ontological argument, with the intention of
highlighting the similarities between the Hegelian and Cartesian views.
Hegel expresses interest in the ontological argument almost exclusively with
reference to Kant's attempt to refute it. The revision of the proof is thus inseparable from
the criticism of the Kantian objections. In this chapter we will accordingly follow the
order of the objections outlined in the foregoing.

I. The logical objection: Hegel on Kant and the metaphysicians

Several commentators have remarked that Hegel often mistakes the Thomistic
objection for Kant's full criticism of the argument.3 While it is true that Hegel is often
less than thorough in his account of his predecessors, the priority given to the Thomistic
objection does not stem from a failure to notice that Kant had raised other objections.4
Rather, the objection in question serves, for Hegel, as a focal point of the difference
between his own system and Kant's. The Critical philosophy, on Hegel's interpretation,
arrives at the basic conclusion that ''being" is distinct from the "concept." By contrast, he
frequently describes his own philosophy as an attempt to demonstrate that being is a
characteristic of the concept, or to prove in general the unity of thought and being. If
Hegel puts seemingly unjust emphasis on this first objection, then, it is not because he

3

4

Both Rohls and Jaeschke assume Henrich's claim concerning this point (pg. 196).

Toe discussion of Kant's critique of the cosmological argument that is inserted in the 1829 lectures
(Suhrkamp 17, pg. 421-439) provides ample evidence that Hegel is aware of the so-called "Critical
objection."

interprets Kant in such a way that this objection would serve,for Kant, as the central
point of criticism. Rather, it is because he interprets the difference between Kantian and
Hegelian philosophy in such a way that Aquinas' objection condenses the most basic
point of dispute between these approaches.
As is clear in the previous chapter, the purpose of the Thomistic objection is to
stipulate a general distinction between ' what is merely thought' and 'what is'. Descartes
overcomes the objection by means of his general epistemological doctrine that
"everything that I clearly and distinctly perceive is true." The Cartesian response is thus
direct enough: the clarity and distinctness of our perceptions bridges the gap between
thought and reality. Kant, on the other hand, ultimately assents to Thomas' claim,
however subordinate the role of this objection may be in the Critique. In his most
colorful expression of the objection, he claims that existence cannot be "plucked out"

(ausgeklaubt) of an idea.5

If Hegel at times appears to reduce the history of the ontological argument to a
conflict of assumptions concerning the difference or identity of thought and being, the
basic claim is not for that matter inaccurate. 6 The dispute between the Cartesian and
Kantian positions concerning the logical objection was, in fact, unresolved. Hegel's first
5

A 603/ B 631: "Es war etwas ganz Unnatuerliches und eine blosse Neuerung des Schulwitzes, aus einer
ganz willkuerlichen !dee das Dasein des ihr entsprechenden Gegenstandes selbst ausk/auben zu wollen."
As Hodgson has noted (The Lectures on the History ofPhilosophy Volume One, ed. Peter Hodgson. The
University of California Press, 1984. Pg. 435, n. 156) the English translators of the Critique, including
Guyer and Wood as well as Kemp Smith, unfortunately soften the expression by translating "extract." The
result is that one of Hegel's favorite jokes is lost, since he employs the term "ausklauben" or its near
equivalent "herausk/auben" dozens of times in humorous reference to this passage.
6

A typical summary of the history of the ontological argument in terms of the Thomistic objection runs:
' 'The ontological argument begins with the absolute concept; the transition is made from thought to being:
such is the case with Anselm, Descartes and Spinoza; all accept the unity of thought and being. Kant says,
however, that just as little reality can be assigned to this Ideal of Reason; there is no transition from the
concept to being, the latter cannot be derived from the concept." Suhrkamp 20, pg. 360.
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objective is to indicate the spurious nature of this conflict, and then to resolve it by
demonstrating the unity of thought and being {A). Secondly, he attempts to make this
view intuitively plausible by appealing to the nature of subjective action (B). Lastly, he
responds to Kant's claim that inferring existence from thought in the case of God implies
an identification of our idea of God with God himself (C).

A. The task of logic

In the diverse positions regarding the Thomistic objection Hegel sees two
opposed approaches to philosophy in general. A philosophy either accepts the unity of
thought and being, or denies it; it either accounts for a transition from thought to being, or
does not. In either case, for Hegel, the history of philosophy provides only unjustified
7

presuppositions with regard to this point. The ontotheologians merely stipulate the unity
of thought and being in the definition of God. Kant, likewise, fails to prove the
8

difference between the concept and being. In neither case do the philosophers offer an
acceptable justification for their respective assumptions.
To ''prove" the identity of thought and being, and thus to resolve the conflict
between Kant and the metaphysicians, constitutes the primary task of Hegel's Logk.
"Being" is designated as 'without concept' or das Begrifflose9; as such it is distinct from
7
''The identity of the concept and objectivity has appeared in two forms in the history of
philosophy ... either with the presupposition of the absolute diversity and self-sufficiency of the
concept for itself and likewise of objectivity for itself ... or as the absolute identity of the two
realms. The latter has been the ground of each and every philosophy, either as an unexpressed
thought ... or as a presupposed definition or axiom." Heidelberg Encylcopedia #139.
8

Rel. ill, 114-5.

9

Rel. I, 326
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the concept. In the Logic Hegel intends to prove only that being is distinct in such a way
that it also belongs to the concept. 10 He thus attempts to strike a balance between the two
poles of the history of philosophy; being and the concept are indeed diverse, but this
diversity is mediated. The two sides ultimately form a "concrete identity."
The mediate identity of being and thinking corresponds, for Hegel, to what the
ontological argument presupposes. In his Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion Hegel
writes that the proof requires ''that what is purely and simply other, the contrary of the
concept, should proceed from the concept."11 The demand of the ontological argument
thus coincides with the primary aim of the Logic. The traditional argument, however,
merely stipulates the unity of being and thought in the definition of God. Hegel
understands his Logic, by contrast, to actually demonstrate this unity, and thus to correct
the basic shortcoming of the argument. 12 This explains the frequent reference to the

Logic in the Realphilosophie; the analyses of the ontological argument in the latter are
dependent upon the truth of the preceding logical system. 13

10

Being is "certainly distinct from the concept, but only as a determination of the concept." Ibid.

11

Rel. III, 112. Translation Hodgson, III pg. 127

12

"The first thing is, that the determination of being is shown to be affirmatively contained within the
concept; this is then the unity of concept and being. Secondly, they are nonetheless different, so that their
unity is the negative unity of both ... The distinction must also be expressed, and the unity should be
produced in accordance with this distinction. It belongs to logic to demonstrate precisely this. That the
concept is this movement, to determine itself as being, is this dialectic, this movement, to determine itself
as being, as its opposite, that logical aspect is a further development that is not given in the ontological
argument. The shortcoming of the argument is its failure to provide this development." Rel. III, 115. My
italics.
13

See, for example, Suhrkamp 17, pgs. 439,445, and especially 451-2.
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B. Philosophy and action

Although it belongs to logic to demonstrate the mediation or unity between
thought and being, this unity is nonetheless available to common representation. 14 The
same unity that the Science ofLogic provides for theoretical philosophy is evident in
subjective action generally, such as the execution of a preconceived task or the
satisfaction of a drive. "Every satisfaction of a drive," Hegel writes, "is, for the I, this
process, to sublate its subjectivity ... and posit (the internal) as real." 15 Every subjective
action likewise begins with a mere representation, but produces an actuality, and thereby
brings about a unity of thought and being. 16 Kant is right to observe that the existence of
money cannot be "plucked out" of the representation thereof, but the existence can indeed
follow from the representation. This is possible because the imagining itself is already
subjective activity, the completion of which is work. In other words, ifI can imagine one
hundred dollars, I can also work to obtain them. 17 In that case a transition is made from
the mere representation to the actuality. The representation is initially distinct from
"reality," since the hundred dollars do not exist. That I can actually obtain what is
initially only imagined, however, underlines the fact that the distinction between the

14

Rel. I, pg. 327: ''It belongs to the Logic, as indicated, to show the movement of the concept as activity. It
can nevertheless be made comprehensible to representation."
15

Ibid.

16
" ••• every action in the world is this, to sublate the subjective and to posit the objective and thus to
produce the unity of both." Ibid., pg. 328.

17 " .•.

he who wants a hundred dollars must put his hand to work, i.e., he transcends his mere
imagination." Suhrkamp 20, pg. 361.
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imagined and the existent hundred dollars is mediated by my activity, so that the
distinction does not correspond to an absolute difference.

C. Two replies to Kant's objection

In the discussion of Kant's employment of the logical objection above, two
essentially Thomistic arguments were extracted from the Critique ofPure Reason. 18 The
first argument is nothing more than the second formulation of Thomas' objection. Kant's
second argument, however, differs from the first in both form and in metaphysical
import. Kant accuses the proponents of the proof not only of a confusion of "existence"
with the thought of the same, but also of an illicit identification of our concept of God
with God himself. Hegel addresses this second criticism in two stages. First, he
intervenes on behalf of the rationalist tradition, suggesting that the proponents of the
ontological proof had consistently defended themselves against the implication of Kant's
charge. Secondly, his later philosophy of religion Hegel offers an attempt to resolve the
conflict between Kant and the metaphysicians concerning the relationship between "God"
and our idea of the same.

(i) Schulze and the skepticism essay

Both Descartes and Kant associate the logical objection with skepticism:
Descartes' response to the objection is a mere corollary to his refutation of skepticism;

18

Above, Chapter 1, pg. 27ff.
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Kant likewise indicates that endorsing Thomas' quibble could lead to skepticism.19 It
should come as no surprise, then, that Hegel first addresses the logical objection in his
1803 essay "The Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy." 20 The occasion for the essay
is to provide a polemical review of Gottlob Ernst Schulze' s massive two volume work,

Critique of Theoretical Philosophy.21 As the article makes clear, the young Hegel
already expresses frustration with the disrepute of the ontological argument among the
followers of Kant. The first discussion of Schulze's criticism of the ontological proof
refers to the "supremely simple joke" that Kant had discovered, namely, that being is
something different from the concept.22 The ensuing passages foreshadow all of Hegel's
later remarks on the Kantian criticisms of the ontological argument, replete with jokes
and the use of the term herausklauben.
Like Kant, Schulze begins his discussion of the ontological argument by
indicating that although our understanding provides examples of necessary judgment,
these do not imply agreement with something outside the mind. This simple distinction
between cognitive and logical necessity and necessary existence is supposed to reveal
"the illusion and empty hairsplitting of the ontological argument."23 In greater detail than
Kant, Schulze identifies this objection to the proof with the relevant metaphysical
doctrine: if the transition from a necessary judgment to an existent is possible, the human

19

See above, Chapter 1, pg. 25-7.

20

Suhrkamp 2, pg. 213-272.

21 Bruxelles:

Culture et Civilisation, 1973.

22

Suhrkamp 2, pg. 252

23

Suhrkamp 20, pg. 258, 252 "das Blendwerk und die leere Spitzfindigkeit des ontologischen Beweises."
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intellect must possess some relation to the divine.24 He recognizes that Plato, Descartes,
Spinoza and Leibniz each describe versions of this relationship. Hegel offers the
following summary of Schulze's summary of this ''theosophical" tradition:

It is explained in the "Remark" that according to Plato the ideas and
principles that are inborn in the soul in our present life, through which
alone we are able to know the actual as it is, and not as it appears to the
senses, these ideas and principles are mere recollections of the intuitions in
which the soul participated during its contact with God. Descartes
appeals, in this matter, to the truthfulness of God. For Spinoza, our ideas
are true because they consist of God's representations and cognitions, to
the extent that God comprises the essence of our mind. These cognitions,
since they are in God, must be in complete agreement with their objects.
Cognition and object must be, in this case, one and the same. According
to Leibniz, the a priori principles of our minds, as well as our
representations generally, possess truth and reality because they are
images of the concepts and truths that are in God's intellect. The latter
truths are the principle of possibility, existence and creation of all real
things in the world.25

24

Schulze departs from the ontological argument at this point, and addresses instead Leibniz' justification
for the doctrine of innate ideas. The objection he raises, however, is the same with respect to either the
doctrine of innate ideas or the theological proofs. When applied to the doctrine of innate ideas, the logical
objection claims that if there are innate ideas, they are not for that matter true, since truth implies a relation
to something beyond the mind. That the ontological argument presupposes the doctrine of innate ideas is
clear from Descartes in his analysis of the fourth objection. See above, Chapter l pg. 51-3.

25

Suhrkamp 2, 262-3

Hegel agrees with Schulze that, within this metaphysical tradition, the reply to the
logical objection consists in the indication of some affinity between human and divine
intellects. He takes issue only with Schulze's presentation of the problem. The latter
separates subjective concepts from their corresponding realities, and then asks how these
two sides can be brought together. The answer lies, of course, in the indicated
relationship to the mind of God. But our knowledge that there is such a relationship,
Schulze notes, derives only from our innate ideas, or from the subjective concepts
themselves. The appeal to God thus involves circular reasoning, since our ideas about
our relationship to God must be true if this relationship is to guarantee the truth of our
ideas. Hegel recognizes the circularity, but objects only to the separation of the two
issues, namely, the truth of our concepts and the divine quality of our understanding. The
latter is not intended to justify the former. Rather, the truth of our concepts already
implies the divinity of our understanding. Conversely, to say that our understanding
possesses a divine character is to say nothing more than that we have true concepts.26
Hegel's defense of Leibniz and the metaphysical tradition in the skepticism essay
does not include the solution he formulates in his own mature system. It is all the more
interesting for that matter, since he instead indicates the seemingly irresolvable conflict
between traditional metaphysics and the logical objection. The latter objection
distinguishes subjective concepts from their corresponding realities. If the distinction is

26

"It was, however, not necessary to separate the truth and reliability of the so-called innate ideas from ...
the eternal and real cognitions in God ... rather both are one and the same; there is no matter of a proof of
the former by means of the latter; all circularity therefore disappears, and nothing remains except the
observation ... that reason, according to Leibniz, is divine." Suhrkamp 2, 264-5.
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accepted as a starting point, then the objection, it seems, is insurmountable. Any appeal
to the divine character ofreason would first presume the truth of at least one idea, viz.,
the idea that reason is divine, and would thereby contradict the accepted distinction. If
the distinction is accepted, there is no non-circular solution to the dilemma it poses.27
The assertion that reason is divine, however, presupposes in turn the nullity of the
distinction between subjective concepts and reality, so that the Thomistic objector is left
only with the illusion of a victory, having introduced a premise foreign to his opponent,
the ontotheologian. Hegel concludes, in a passage whose irony makes it difficult to
interpret, that there are simply two "races of consciousness":

Nothing remains, then, apart from the need to accept that there are two
races of consciousness: one race that is conscious ofthis relationship [to
God's nature] and one that explains such consciousness to be theosophical
charlatanism (theosphische Grille). 28

(ii.) Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion

The mature Hegel attempts to resolve this opposition, although his doctrine bears
closer resemblance to the theosophists. Among the primary goals of the Lectures on the
Philosophy ofReligion is to show that reason must be understood as divine. The analysis

27

As discussed in the preceding chapter, Descartes indeed accepts this distinction and thus the logical
objection. In resolving the dilemma, then, he faces the difficulty that Schulze points out. Arnauld raises
precisely this point in the Fourth Set ofObjections (AT VII 214; CSM II 150). Descartes does not seem to
have an adequate reply to the charge ofcircularity. See AT VII 245-6; CSM II 171.
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incorporates the skeptical moment, inasmuch as finite consciousness remains distinct
from a corresponding reality; the finitude of consciousness consists in exactly the
separation from a reality. What must be proved is what the metaphysicians had
presupposed, and what had denied efficacy to the Thomistic objector, namely, the
doctrine that finite consciousness is illusory. In the Introduction to the 1824 lecture
series Hegel outlines this task by suggesting that human reason cannot be something
diverse from divine reason:

... it is to be pointed out that there cannot be two kinds of reason and two
kinds of spirit ( Geist). There cannot be a divine reason and a human one,
a divine intellect ( Geist) and a human one that would be simply diverse,
and which would have opposed essences. Human reason, and the spiritual
consciousness of this, the consciousness of its essence, is reason in
general. This is the divine in the human; and the intellect ( Geist), to the
extent that it can be called the divine intellect, is not merely beyond the
stars or beyond the world. God is rather present and omnipresent, and
God, as mind (Geist), is present in the intellect (Geist). 29

The introduction of the unity of human and divine reason as a theme is what
ultimately distinguishes Hegel's "philosophy of religion" from the "natural theology'' of
the older metaphysics. 30 The former has as its object, not simply God as a highest being,
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Rel. I, 46.

30 Jaeschke

discusses this point at length. See especially pg. 231.
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but the relationship of human spirit to God. In the first division of the philosophy of
religion, "The Concept of Religion," Hegel alleges to show that the relationship to human
spirit belongs to the very concept of God. For Hegel it is essential to God that he appear
to a community.

31

The appearance to the religious community belongs to God's essence,

so that God is understood as spirit that appears to (finite) spirit. It thus belongs to God's
nature "to be known." It could not be by finite, human reason as such that God is known,
but only by ''the mind of God in man."32
Hegel's interpretation of this point hinges on his concept of "Geist" as
simultaneously 'consciousness', which is distinct from an object, and 'selfconsciousness', which is its own object.33 In other words, "Spirit" or "mind" refers to
knowledge in which consciousness recognizes itselfas knowing in an object that is
nonetheless distinct.

34

If religion is the relationship of finite spirit to absolute spirit, then

"spirit as the knowing is also the known or the absolute spirit itself." 35 If religious
knowledge is itself the "absolute spirit," then religion is the self-knowledge of absolute
spirit. To the extent that religious knowledge takes the form of consciousness, however,
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Reinhard Heede (Die goettliche /dee und ihre Erscheinung in der Religion: Untersuchungen zum
Verhae/tnis von Logik und Religionsphilosophie bei Hegel. Dissertation, Erlangen, 1972) interprets the
relationship to the mind of God in these terms. See pgs. 5-6.
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Rel I., 222, variation listed in the notes: "Spirit is not a kind of knowledge wherein the being of the object
is separate from the knowledge itself, but rather one in which the object is the same as the knowing, and the
consciousness consists in the knowledge of this identity."
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Ibid.
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religion is still a relationship of finite spirit. 36 Religion as the self-knowledge of absolute
spirit is thus mediated (mediates itself) as finite consciousness.
To the extent that the human consciousness possesses knowledge of God, it is
thus the divine in the human that possesses this knowledge. To that same extent, then,
the divinity constitutes the intellect, and our knowledge of God is God's self-knowledge.
God's self-knowledge is, of course, not substantially distinct from its object, so that the
Kantian objection ''the thought that is in you must be the thing itself' finds affirmation in
Hegel' s metaphysics. It would indeed follow from our idea of God that he exists ifour

idea ofGod is God's idea ofhimself.

II.

The empirical objection

Descartes was shown in the first chapter to provide a threefold response to the
empirical objection.37 First, in claiming that existence is in general not a predicate, the
empirical objector overlooks the fact that the ontotheologian accepts this as a general
rule, but is interested in the exceptional case of God. The objector instead attacks the
ontological argument in a manner that suggests that "God" could be subsumed under this
rule for the existence of entities in general. The objector thus fails to distinguish God
from other entities. Descartes stresses the importance ofthis distinction unambiguously

36

"Consciousness as such is finite consciousness, knowledge of something other than the I. Religion is
also consciousness and thereby includes finite consciousness, but as sublated finite consciousness, since the
other about which absolute spirit knows is itself, and the spirit first becomes absolute in knowing itself."
Ibid.
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in each of his discussions of the argument, so that the empirical objection, although
popularly accepted, fails as a refutation of the Cartesian proof.
A related distinction serves as the second part of the Cartesian response. Just as
God is to be distinguished from all other entities, so is his existence to be distinguished
from the existence of everything else. The underlying doctrine is consistent with
empiricism: while existence as such is not a predicate, modality of existence is a
predicate. It belongs to the nature of any finite entity to possibly exist. The proponent of
the ontological argument merely adds the claim that, in contrast to everything else,
necessary existence belongs to God's nature. Any simple generalization about finite
entities, e.g., the empirical objection, leaves this stipulation unchallenged.
The third response is ad hominem. Descartes incorporates a psychological
component into his statement of the minor premise of the ontological proof. The premise
in its entirety reads: "But once we have made a sufficient investigation ofwhat God is, we
clearly and distinctly understand that existence belongs to his true and immutable
nature."38 The italicized clause qualifies the distinctions asserted in the first two
responses. Adequate comprehension of the metaphysical conception of God is a
requirement for the intelligibility of the premise, and thus for the proof as a whole. The
distinction between God and other entities presupposes a privileged metaphysical
standpoint, which for Descartes translates into the liberation from "preconceived ideas."
To these three points should be added two further matters of dispute between the
empirical objector and the proponent of the ontological proof.39 Kant's analysis of the

38 AT VII
39

115-6; CSM II 83. My emphasis. Quoted above, chapter 1, pgs. 11, 34.

See above, chapter 1, pgs. 40-2.

empirical objection concludes that God is not an object of experience, and this is
represented as an attack on the proof. Any defender of the ontological argument would
allow this Kantian claim with impunity; the argument was certainly never intended to
prove God to be an object of experience. Lastly, Kant states in addition that the
"connection of all real properties in things is a synthesis," and this axiom is employed in
his version of the empirical objection.40 Traditional definitions of God as simple,
however, distinguish claims about God from such generalizations.
These five points of dispute between the ontotheologians and the empirical
objectors correspond to oft-repeated themes in Hegel's corpus. On each of these points
Hegel sides emphatically with Descartes and his followers and against Kant and the
empiricists. His analyses of the five points of contention can be summarized as follows:

A. Kant' s barbarism and Descartes' caveat

No reader of Hegel is unfamiliar with his disdain for Kant's employment of the
example of "one hundred dollars." Two retorts are the most common. First, it is a
"barbarism" to compare a sum of money to God.41 To compare these is to ignore the
most simple and common philosophical distinctions. Second, the example makes a
deceptive and unfair appeal to common sense, which had the historical effect that the
ontological argument fell into disrepute. As a result of this the consistency and subtlety
of the argument were generally ignored.
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Hegel draws attention to the inappropriateness of the comparison (between "God"
and "$100") frequently with reference to Descartes. In so doing he recognizes that the
latter distinguishes "God" from all other entities, and thereby nullifies the empirical
objection in advance. In the Lectures on the History ofPhilosophy this defense of
Descartes appears in the chapter on Kant:

I can imagine whatever I want, and it does not for that matter exist. It
depends, though, on what I represent to myself: if I think or comprehend
the subjective and being, then there is a transition. Descartes expressly
asserts this unity only of the concept of God (for exactly this is God), and
he does not speak of "one hundred dollars.',42

In the Science ofLogic a similar contention is raised with regard to the definition
of finite things. Among four discussions of the ontological argument in this work, Hegel
focuses on the empirical objection in the first of these. The first "Remark" inserted in the
first chapter addresses the mistakes involved in comparing a finite entity (e.g., one
hundred dollars) to God. The comparison itself expresses something true, namely, that
being is something distinct from a concept. The difference between God and finite
entities, however, is yet a greater and more important distinction. The latter distinction
qualifies the former; the distinction between God and finite entities reveals the fact that
the difference between concept and being is restricted to finite entities. Hegel likewise
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notes that the difference between the concept and being is not only limited to finite
things, it defines them.43
The failure to grasp the difference between God and finite things represents not
only a mistaken conception of the former, according to Hegel, but also an erroneous
conception of finitude. By the "concept" of a finite thing Kant understands the thing
abstracted from all of its relations. "Existence" denotes, by contrast, the thing posited in
relationship to both other things and to a percipient subject. The difference between the
concept of a finite thing and the existence of the same is thus the difference between an
isolated content and its relation to everything else. In other words, Kant's point is simply
that the content 'one hundred dollars' is the same content whether or not it enters into
relationship with the state of my fortune.44
The concept of"one hundred dollars," however, possesses this indifference to its
"existence" only to the extent that it is considered in isolation from its relations. Hegel's
objection to Kant centers on the fact that the latter remains fixated on the finite content
and imagines this to be something real apart from its relations. For the former, a content
is finite precisely in that it is determined in relation to others. The hundred dollars are
related to my fortune even when I do not possess them; an imagined hundred dollars are
related negatively to my fortune, to the extent that I lack them. Further, the content is
related to the economy in general, to what can be bought with them, etc. Apart from this
broad context the expression "one hundred dollars" is meaningless. The deception
43

"Although it is nonetheless correct that being is distinct from the concept, God is even more
distinct from the hundred dollars and other finite things. It is the definition offinite things, that
concept and being are distinct in them ... the abstract definition of God is, on the contrary,
precisely that his concept and his being are not separate and are inseparable." Suhrkamp 5, 92.
See also Rel. I, 329.
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involved in the empirical objection thus lies in the apparent self-sufficiency of the finite
content. If I imagine the hundred dollars I abstract them from every relation. But even as
imagined they are related to me, to my fortune, etc. Since the content as imagined
consists in nothing but the separation of this from its context, it is a spurious and illusory
concept. It does not actually possess the independence that I attribute to it; the
independence is instead "a borrowed form attached to it by the subjective
understanding.,,4s

B. The modality of existence

Like Descartes, Hegel distinguishes the existence intended in the claim "God
exists" from contingent existence. Kant's insistence on the distinction between sensuous
existence and representation is valid enough. His error consists in indicating that such
existence cannot belong to the definition of God, and then presenting this trivial point as
if it were a refutation of the Cartesian proof. God, however, is not supposed to possess an
existence that is distinct from his concept. On the contrary, God possesses an existence
that is necessary, which means, for Hegel, that it is also conceptual.
The concept of necessary existence finds its justification in another proof for
God's existence, the so-called cosmological, and Hegel's interpretation of this
differentiates him from both Kant and the Cartesians. Like the latter, Hegel takes
"necessary existence" to represent a distinct concept, valid only in the case of God. He

Translation A.V.. Miller, Science ofLogic. Humanites Press, 1969. Pg. 88. Hegel distinguishes
terminologically between the "concept" of a finite content and a concept in the more important sense by
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also assumes one of the key theses of Cartesian philosophy: the contingent must be
understood in terms of the necessary, which implies an inversion of the cosmological
argument. The traditional version of the proof begins from the contingent, and infers that
since there are contingent entities, there must be at least one necessary being. This
argument, however, lends itself to the misconception that the necessary exists because the
contingent exists, if only because it (the argument) contains an incongruity between what
it proves and how that is proved. The proof is, of course, not supposed to make the
necessary contingent upon the contingent. It has this effect, however, because our
knowledge of the necessary is mediated by our knowledge of the contingent. The

cosmological argument should instead show that "contingent existence" is something
false. 46 A revised argument reads: "The absolutely necessary exists, not because the
contingent exists, but rather because the contingent is a non-being, only an appearance.
The existence of the contingent is not truly actual. The absolutely necessary is its being
and its truth.',47
Hegel is thus in agreement with the Cartesian-Spinozistic view that ascribes
reality only to God, although he attempts to differentiate his version of this doctrine. If
we say particular things "exist," for both Hegel and the Cartesians, we employ this term
in a different, borrowed sense.48 Unlike the latter, however, Hegel thinks this borrowed
designating the former as representation. ~omet~~ like "one hundred dollars" is "no concept at all, only
a determination of the content of my consciousness Rel. I, 325-6.
%

In reference to Kant's monetary example, Hegel writes: "such an existence is only a disappearing

moment." Suhrkamp 20, pg. 362.
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sense of "exist" is not entirely distinct. "Being" is not a merely equivocal expression;
rather, there is only one "existence," and this is necessary: ''there is only one being, and
this belongs to the absolutely necessary; contingent things (zufaellige Dinge) are only
this, to pass into the absolutely necessary (ihr zuzufallen)." Contingent things should not
be interpreted, as in acosmism (Spinozism), as if they were simply nothing. Rather, they
are appearances of the absolutely necessary.49

C. Metaphysical privilege

The third Cartesian reply to the empirical objection consists in the designation of
a privileged metaphysical viewpoint. In the Fifth Meditation Descartes reminds us that
the ontological argument may appear to be a sophism, but this appearance results only
from the fact that we are accustomed to distinguishing essence from existence in the case
of all other things. 50 It is incumbent upon the arguer to restrain his/ her habits of thought,
and to refrain from hastily applying pre-philosophical distinctions to philosophical
notions. The Principles ofPhilosophy devotes greater attention to this psychological
aspect of the objection. Proposition Sixteen of "Part One" is entitled "Preconceived
opinions prevent the necessity of the existence of God from being clearly recognized by
everyone." 51 Here Descartes associates the ability to distinguish God from all other
entities, i.e., the ability to comprehend the unity of essence and existence, with the

49 " . ••

they are not appearances in general, but appearances of the absolutely necessary." Suhrkamp 17,

pg. 490.
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AT VII 66; CSM II 46.
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ATVIIIA 10-11; CSMI 198.

elimination of preconceived notions. The minor premise of the ontological argument is
thus intelligible only subsequent to the process of methodic doubt that destroys our
previous opinions.
A second psychological difficulty arises in the effort to understand the definition
of God: "and we are also in the habit of making up at will various ideas of things which
do not exist anywhere and have never done so."52 We possess the capacity to think of
things that do not exist, and from this fact we infer the general principle that what is
thought does not, for that matter, exist. Kant's "hundred dollars" are an example of such
an idea, and he intends by this example to illustrate the same general principle.
Descartes, however, does not need to deny this capacity. Like the distinction between
essence and existence, our capacity to form fictitious ideas represents a pre-philosophical
habit. This habit is neither denied nor overlooked, but rather transcended. If we imagine
things that do not exist, we do not do so qua philosophers. The chain of philosophical
truths proceeds independently of any fictitious representations. The minor premise is
intelligible within a context of " meditation" in which not only the unity of thought and
being but also the validity of philosophical ideas has already been demonstrated. 53
The standpoint of Cartesian philosophy is achieved in the first two Meditations, or

in the first seven sections of the Principles. Hegel's philosophy likewise establishes a
privileged standpoint. The presupposition of the system includes, like in the case of the
cogito, awareness of the unity of thought and being, and thus a transcendence of other
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Ibid.
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In the Lectures on the History ofPhilosophy, Hegel quite rightly associates the ontological argument
the :orm of God no other
with the cogito, and thus with the elimination of pre-conceived opinions:
conception is thus here given than that contained in cogito, ergo _sum, wh~rem bemg and thought are
inseparably bound up." Translation E.S. Haldane and Frances Simson (Bison Books, 1995), 231.
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forms of consciousness. The text describing the ascent to the proper standpoint is,
famously, the Phenomenology ofSpirit.54 The system oflogic, and thus the ontological
argument, is intelligible only after the standpoint has been achieved. 55
The first "Remark" in the Logic incorporates a similar point into its discussion of
the ontological argument. Under consideration is the proposition ''being and nothing are
the same," which idea contradicts "common sense." Hegel imagines the Kantian reply
that the being of a hundred dollars is not the same as their non-being. The example,
however, substitutes the being of a particular content for ''being as such," and thus
overlooks the fact that the latter is the same as nothing. The error is the same as that
implied by the empirical objection, namely, the conflation of a particular, finite content
and a universal concept. To this Hegel replies that "man should ascend to the abstractly
universal mood in which it is indeed indifferent to him whether or not the hundred dollars
exist. " 56 Both Christianity and philosophy require this state of transcendent indifference
with regard to matters such as the possession of one hundred dollars.

54

The Phenomenology, although in many respects an unprecedented text, plays essentially the same role as
the first two Meditations or Spinoza' s Treatise on the Emendation ofthe Intellect. Each text leads the
reader through the forms of unscientific/ pre-philosophical consciousness with the intention of removing/
transcending them. In other words, each text is designed to aid the student in reaching the standpoint from
which the subsequent philosophical truths are valid. What is of interest here is simply that such an
endeavor is essential to the ontological argument, since this argument is evidently invalid from an
everyday/ pre-philosophical standpoint.
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Henrich sees this as a shortcoming of the ontological argument, since it implies that the objections to the
argument maintain a certain validity: "the opponents of ontotheology would be dissuaded from their
objections only if they were forced to occupy the standpoint of absolute knowledge" (218). He is perhaps
right to point out that Hegel has no compelling argument for why anyone must seek absolute knowledge.
The decision to philosophize would then be a presupposition of Hegel's systems, as well as of the others.
The passage, however, tacitly implies that the ontological argument is valid from the absolute standpoint,
which Henrich nowhere else admits. It also presupposes that the burden of proof is on the ontotheologian.
Hegel, however, accepts this burden in at least two ways. First, he offers several hypothetical arguments
that suggest that philosophy and/ or religion require a standpoint like his own. Secondly, his more risky
argument derives from an interpretation of history that has made absolute philosophical knowledge its
necessary result.
56
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D. Reason vs. experience

Kant's employment of the empirical objection aims to show that God is not an
object of experience. To the extent that Kant poses this claim as an objection to the
ontological argument, he presupposes that the only objects of knowledge are objects of
experience. As an objection, this assumption begs the decisive question of whether we
have knowledge of an object such as God, i.e., of something that is not an object of
"experience" in the narrow sense of this term. On this question Hegel sides
unambiguously with the Cartesians. "God" is not supposed to be an object of experience,
and the possibility of knowledge of God involves precisely the possibility of a knowledge
of something that does not belong to "experience" or to "the world." To deny that there
is such knowledge would be to deny that there is any such endeavor as philosophy, or at
least to deny that such an endeavor can be successful. 57 The latter is evidently no
''wisdom of the world, but rather cognition of what is not worldly (Erkenntnis des

Nichtweltlichen)." 58
In the preceding chapter the empirical objection was shown to imply a restriction
of the attribution of"existence" to objects of experience. Such a restriction is not itself

57 In his most frequent criticism of Kant, Hegel holds that the limits Kant attempts to set for knowledge
exclude the p ossibility of the philosophical comprehension of the fact of these limits. Put simply, if
knowledge actually were limited in the manner Kant suggests, we could never be aware of that fact.
Hegel's point is usually illuminated by his example of"Scholasticus," who wanted to learn how to swim
before entering the water, j ust as the Critical philosophy wants to set the boundaries to knowledge before
beginning to know. Roed, Hartnack and Kuno Fischer attempt to defend Kant by claiming that
transcendental philosophy is not knowledge of an object, so that it would avoid the vicious circularity that
Hegel attributes to it. See the discussion of this below, Chapter Four.
58
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illogical; the intention ofunivocal ascription could only represent a contribution to
philosophy. Kant's objections become deceptive only when to this is added the
suggestion that what does not possess "existence" in this narrow sense is thereby a mere
"figment of the brain." In other words, Kant's error consists chiefly in limiting
'existence' to 'empirical, sensuous existence' and then proceeding as if it were a
shortcoming of what is "merely'' an idea that it does not possess this existence. Hegel
attacks not so much Kant's assertion that God is an idea, but only the misleading
qualification that God is a mere idea. 59 The "mere" represents a debasement of reason

(Herabsetzung der Vernunft) which, for Hegel, is as unjustified as it is ubiquitous in
Kant's writings.60
Kant's subjugation of reason to experience appears as a frequent theme in Hegel's
unfinished essay on the Kantian critique of the cosmological argument. 61 The critique of
the cosmological as well as of the ontological argument involves the claim that reason
has its only appropriate use in application to experience. The inference from a sequence
of empirical causes to a first cause commits the error, according to Kant, of extending the
use of reason beyond the empirical chain without any reference to experience. Such an
extension certainly occurs, since there is no matter of inferring the existence of a first
cause within the empirical sequence. It is an entirely different question, however,
whether this extension is in fact an error. In Hegel's view, the fact that there can be no
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The essay was a posthumous discovery, and was probably composed in 1829. It is easily the most
thorough and insightful treatment of the proofs for the existence of God in all of Hegel's works. The
misfortune, for this dissertation, is that Hegel did not proceed, as he expressly intended, to discuss the
ontological argument as well.
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first cause as an object of experience implies that reason is justified in extending itself
beyond experience.

62

It is indeed outside of experience that reason is "at home."63

E. The unity of God

Lastly, Kant attacks the concept of God to the extent that this fails to meet one
further empirical requirement: the properties of a subject are always synthetically
combined. Against this the ontotheologians insist that God is essentially simple, or that
his attributes are immediately united and indistinguishable within his essence. Hegel
intervenes first in defense of the proponents of the argument, but in a manner that
ultimately leads to a redefinition of the concept of God. Kant's error on this issue is the
same as in the other points of the empirical objection: he interprets a characteristic of
finitude as belonging to the definition of a thing in general, and then shows that the
metaphysical concept of God does not possess the given characteristic. Hegel's response
is predictable enough: God is supposed to be something different, not belonging to the
class of things analyzed by Kant.
The synthetic connection of attributes, like the difference between concept and
being, belongs to the definition of finitude. Man, for instance, is finite to the extent that
body and soul are separable. Finite things in general are such that their properties possess
an independence from their combination in a given subject, that "the qualities predicated
62

" We certainly cannot infer a first cause within the sensuous world and experience, since in this, the finite
world, there could only be conditioned causes. That is exactly why reason is not only justified but forced to
pass into the intelligible sphere .." Suhrkamp 17, pg. 432.
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for Hegel, the insistence by philosophers such as Kant and Jacobi that reason can only comprehend
conditioned objects implies the paradox that "reason departs where the rational begins." Suhrkamp 17, pg.
432-4

of an actual subject or individual, e.g., color, smell, taste, etc., can be separated as
independent matters." 64 The unity of a set of qualities in a given thing is accidental, and
only because a thing consists of such an accidental unity is it determined as finite. God,
by contrast, is understood to be essentially "one," so that the separation of attributes does
not belong to his nature:

Here the diversity, the separation and plurality of predicates that are only
linked in the unity of the subject, but which are themselves distinct, ...
this diversity proves decisively to be something untrue and the plurality of
determination appears as an inappropriate category. 65

The traditional concept of God is the concept of the most abstract unity. 66 This is
evident not only in the definition of God as simple, but in the further determination of
God as 'being' or the as same as his being. For this reason Hegel associates the concept
of God with the concept of being at the beginning of the Logic, and attempts to show that
the predicates of God, which are designated by the categories of logic such as infinity,
necessity, etc., are not distinct but united with one another. The Logic thus
simultaneously poses a defense and a critique of the concept of God as a unity. In
showing that the many predicates of God ultimately form a unity, Hegel attacks not only
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Kant's objection but also the notion of God as simple, demonstrating this idea of God
instead to imply a unity ofmanifold categories.

III.

The arguments from possibility

Both Kant and Descartes reject Leibniz' claim that the possibility of concept from
which the ontological argument departs demonstration prior to the conclusion that God
exists. Kant argues that the Leibnizian proof contradicts its own commitment to the
analysis of possibility by defining existence into possibility. It is contradictory to at once
consider an entity "merely'' in terms of its possibility and to include existence within this
possibility. Descartes, however, demonstrates God's existence with greater consistency
by limiting the concept of "possible existence" to finite entities.67 Any prior inquiry into
the "possibility'' of the notion of God illicitly transfers a property of finitude (viz.,
possible existence) into the infinite. Hegel raises this same point in reference to the
Leibnizian demonstration of the existence of God.
In the "Seventh Lecture" of the 1829 lecture series on the proofs for the existence

of God, Hegel takes issue with the structure of the Wollfian theologiae naturalis. The
latter begins with an analysis of the concept of God, and then proceeds to prove the
existence of a corresponding entity and, finally, to derive its attributes. Hegel intends to
show this "activity of the understanding" in separating God's nature from his existence,
and these from his attributes, to be an inadequate procedure. The inadequacy of the
division is revealed by the very concept of God. In the proof for God's existence, it is
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"Geometrical Demonstration," AT VII 166; CSM II 117

alleged that this concept must be thought as existing, as is made most explicit in
Spinoza's second definition of substance: "By substance I understand that whose nature
cannot be conceived except as existing."68 Hegel notes that such a concept precludes a
purely logical analysis of "possibility:" "if this is the case, then the concept should not be
thought in isolation from being, since this concept possesses no truth apart from being."69

In other words, the definition of God from which this ontological argument proceeds does
not permit any prior analysis of the concept of God.
The attributes of God that designate his relationship to the world should likewise
not be considered in isolation from the concept or existence of God: "if the understanding
explains the first division that it makes (viz., between concept and existence) to be
spurious, then the subsequent act of division (between the concept and the attributes)
appears groundless." 70 The relevant concept of God is labeled omnitudo realitatis or ens
realissimum; God is understood as the "sum of all realities," and the realities are his
attributes. Since these realities represent the relationship of God to the world, God's
relationships to the world are his attributes; i.e., the relationship to the world belongs to
the very concept of God. In this context "the world" is specified as "a product of (God's)
creative power," since the relationship of God to the world is determined according to the
idea of creation. The world thus possesses content only through the concept of God, so
that it follows from the definition of God that his essence, his existence, his attributes and
his creations together form an indivisible unity.
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The Cartesian and Kantian responses to the possibility argument concentrate on
the misapplication of the category of possibility. Although Hegel agrees that it is
contradictory to speak of God as possible, his own rejection of the Leibnizian/ Wolffian
arguments is not limited to this point. A preliminary proof of God's possibility or noncontradictoriness is unnecessary not only because "God" as a specific object of
investigation is exempt from such a requirement. Any isolated demonstration of
possibility rests, for Hegel, on mistaken assumptions. 71 Prior consideration of a concept
as possible (non-contradictory) presupposes that something contradictory is impossible,
or incapable of existing. Descartes expresses the axiom in question thusly: "all selfcontradictoriness resides solely in our thought .. . it cannot occur in anything which is
outside the intellect."72 Only upon acceptance of this axiom would a proof of a thing as
possible bear any importance in relation to the thing's existence. Hegel rejects the axiom,
which he takes to be common to both Kant and the rationalists, by claiming that every
73

''thing" is an "existing contradiction."

Far from needing to demonstrate that God's nature is non-contradictory, Hegel
criticizes the traditional conception of God for excluding the contradictions implied by
the attributes. In the concept of God as omnitudo realitatis or the "sum of all realities,"
the realities or perfections are understood as simple and thus incapable of contradicting
one another. The "realities" so conceived are not actual determinations of God, since
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"There should be no talk in philosophy of proving that something is possible, or that something else is
possible too; and that something, as people also say, is 'thinkable'." Suhrkamp 8, pg. 282. Translation
Geraets, Suchting and Harris (Encyclopedia Logic, Hackett, 1991) .
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AT VII 152; CSM II 108. See above, Chapter 1 pg. 38-9.

Among Hegel's many discussion of this point, the best occurs in the Logic, where Hegel summarizes his
view by claiming that "all things are in themselves contradictory." Suhrkamp 6, pg. 74.
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determination implies negation. God as the sum of all realities is indeterminate. Hegel's
critique of this definition of God accordingly coincides with his critique of the
indeterminate absolute. In contradistinction to that notion, Hegel conceives of God as a
possessor of manifold, contradictory attributes. In his final lecture on the ontological
argument (1831) he suggests that the characteristics of the metaphysical concept of God
are in fact contradictory:

According to [the requirement of possibility], the realities in God should
be taken only in an affirmative sense .. . so that negation is omitted. It is
easy to show that only the abstraction of self-sameness remains, since if
we speak of realities, this signifies diverse determinations, such as
wisdom, justice, power, omnipotence, and omniscience. These
determinations are attributes that can easily be demonstrated as
contradictory: goodness is not justice; absolute power contradicts wisdom,
since the latter presupposes purposes; power is, by contrast, the
limitlessness of negation and production. If it is required that the concept
not contradict itself, then all determination must be eliminated, since every
distinction proceeds to opposition.
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Rel. ill., 273.
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IV.

The idea of God

Kant's employment of the first three objections is conditioned by an overriding
concern for the origin and utility of the idea of God. This is evident not only from
attention to the systematic argument in the "Dialectic," but also from many formulations
of the other objections. The logical and empirical objections, for instance, are often
expressed with the qualification that the idea in question is arbitrarily constructed. An
example of this can be found, among other places, in Hegel's favorite passage from the

Critique ofPure Reason: ''to attempt to extract (ausklauben) from a purely arbitrary idea
the existence of an object corresponding to it is a quite unnatural procedure and a mere
75

innovation of scholastic subtlety."

Kant suggests the impossibility of a transition from thought to being only under
the condition that the "thought" in question is an arbitrary construction. In attacking the
spurious nature of the concept from which the ontological argument proceeds, Kant once
again appropriates a theme from the argument's history. One of the chief differences
between the Cartesian and Anselmian versions of the proof concerns the fact that the
former attempts to provide a justification for the idea of God.
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Anselm, by contrast,

argues that it is sufficient merely to understand the meaning of the words in the
77

expression ''that than which nothing greater can be conceived."

According to

Descartes, Anselm's argument shows only that what is conveyed by the words is that God
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A 603/ B631. Translation Kemp Smith. The German text is cited above, n. 5.

Rohls expresses the difference between the medieval and modern arguments as determined by the
difference between "a nominal definition and a true idea." Pg. 201.
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exists.
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In other words, Anselm's argument is vulnerable to Thomas' objection, since

from the meaning of a word it cannot follow that something exists.
Descartes responds to the logical objection by including the doctrine of clear and
distinct ideas as a premise of the ontological argument. In so doing he, like Kant,
indicates an intersection between the logical and Critical objections; it is only because the
idea of God is a true idea, or not an arbitrarily constructed concept, that an inference
from thought to existence is possible. Kant is thus correct in attacking this inference
primarily by seeking weaknesses in its epistemological foundations. If the concept of
God as a necessary being is a mere fiction of the mind (the Critical objection), then assent
to the other objections is entirely justified. In other words, without a genuine concept of
God, there would be no exception to the rule that essence and existence are distinct (the
empirical objection), and likewise no basis for an argument from thought to existence
(the logical objection).
The entire problem of the ontological argument hinges upon whether there is a
justifiable concept of God. In Kant's terms, this problem rests on the possibility of
connecting the concepts of ens realissimum and ens necessarium, or in thinking of a
highest being that possesses necessary existence. Descartes offers little more than the
assertion that the mind "clearly perceives" that the ens perfectissimum is an ens

necessarium. 19 Kant, on the other hand, claims that the usefulness of the two constituent
concepts is limited to the regulation of experience. The apparent inference from one to
the other is an operation of "mere" reason and an extension of the concepts beyond their
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See above, Ch. 1 pg. 17.
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Principles I, 14.

permissible application. If Kant were successful in demonstrating this, the other
objections would represent trivialities, and Kant himself would likewise be justified in his
hasty treatment of them.
The assertion that the inference from an ens necessarium to the ens realissimum is
a "merely'' rational one and thus entirely without reference to experience, however, is by
itself insufficient as a critique. The ontological argument is indeed neither an instance of
empirical cognition nor a truth about the conditions of experience. A successful
refutation of the proof would have to convincingly show that a concept such as
"necessary being" can be thought only with reference to experience, so that no properly
rational inquiry is possible. Hegel attempts to eliminate this possibility, and thereby to
demonstrate the reality of non-empirical cognition, by providing a deduction of the
concept of ens necessarium from the concept of omnitudo realitatis entirely without
reference to an experiencing subject or empirical existence. If this venture is successful,
the Cartesian premise that necessary existence belongs to God's nature would decisively
prevail over the Critical objection and thus over all levels of Kantian critique.
Hegel's reformulation of the minor premise in response to the Critical objection,
and thus his defense of the ontological argument, is to be found in the Science ofLogic.
Three basic theses of the Logic constitute this work as ontotheological, and these
represent some of the themes addressed in the following chapters:

A.

Hegel identifies the concept of God as omnitudo realitatis with the

concept of ''being" at the beginning of the Logic. Ens necessarium, or necessary being, is
a designation of the "concept", so that the explicit thesis of the Logic that being is the

concept represents an interpretation of the claim that the omnitudo realitatis is the ens
necessarium. 80

B.

The "inference" that connects these concepts is indeed an operation of

"mere reason" to the extent that the logical deductions proceed independently of
experience. Kant's criticisms of the ontological argument derive from the prejudice that
the concepts that reason employs are valid only with reference to experience, so that even
Hegel's more explicit and detailed deduction appears misled. This criticism, however,
relies on Kant's interpretation of the categories of logic as transcendental, or as categories
of an experiencing subject. If Hegel is successful in demonstrating the categories to be
independent of subjectivity he thereby undermines the basic prejudice which underlies
Kant's criticisms.

C.

Hegel's interpretation of the concept God as omnitudo realitatis suggests

that this concept is likewise ''the sum of all negations," and thereby includes the entire
content of the Logic, viz., the categories.81 The "concept" that comprises the subject
matter of the Logic is thus equivalent to the concept ofGod.82 In developing the idea of
omnitudo realitatis into the concept, Hegel criticizes the traditional understanding of this
as a "mere abstraction," and attempts to show "God" to be something immanently
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Henrich's interpretation of these points is helpful. See pp. 208-217.

81

Suhrkamp 6, pg. 119-122.

82

Suhrkamp 6, pg. 405

intelligible. The restoration of ontotheology thus also includes a partial critique of its
earlier forms.
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Chapter Three: A proof of the minor premise: Hegel's Logic

With the Critical objection Kant uncovered a major flaw in the minor premise of
the Cartesian proof, thereby making the entire argument appear suspect. Descartes'
claim that necessary existence belongs to God's nature had been put forth without

adequate demonstration, although it received the qualification that the insight
presupposes a privileged standpoint. The ontological argument rested upon a vague
appeal to an intuition, and this largely accounts for the fact that the argument' s
proponents and opponents have so badly misunderstood one another. Descartes did
provide a defense of the minor premise that sufficed to reveal the empirical objection to
be question-begging: at issue is not whether existence is a predicate, but rather whether
there is a unique species of existence that is ascribable to one and only one entity. That a
given objection is question-begging does not, however, provide justification for an
argument. The objectors have every right to demand some defense of the premises, and
the strength of the Critical objection is precisely that it exposes the lack of such an
account.
Kant did not confine himself to this negative claim, but he instead added a
positive account of the origin and utility of the constituent concepts. He believed himself
to have discovered, once and for all, the basic flaw in the assertion that necessary
existence belongs to God's nature. That assertion, he maintained, involves the
identification of two concepts that have their appropriate use solely in the regulation of
knowledge of experience. The identification itself arises by means of an operation of
reason that represents an extension of this beyond its rightful boundaries. Kant's thesis
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can be stated in the following concise manner: while reason is partly justified in forming
both the concept of a "necessary existent" and the concept of a "sum of all perfections," it
remains beyond the capacity of human reason to connect these concepts and conclude
that the sum of all perfections necessarily exists.
Although this position has won sympathy from many philosophers, the
underlying claim is as unjustified as the apparently more ambitious claim in the minor
premise of the Cartesian argument. It is far from obvious that it even makes sense for a
human being to determine what the boundaries of human knowledge are. Despite its
superiority in relation to the other objections, the Critical objection thus likewise leads to
an impasse: the claim that human knowledge has definite limits is irreconcilable with the
claim, made by certain human beings, to have exceeded the suggested limits. Hegel's
response to this dilemma takes two forms. He raises, on the one hand, a general critique
of Kant's idea of"critique," claiming that it is absurd to try to demonstrate something
like "the limits of the use of reason." On the other hand, he actually provides what he
takes to be a "proof' of the claim that necessary existence belongs to God's nature. The
purpose of the present chapter is to examine the latter of these responses, the former
being reserved for the following, fourth chapter. Specifically, in this chapter we will
consider the possibility of reading Hegel's Science ofLogic as an interpretation of and
justification for the Cartesian minor premise.
In his 1829 essay on Kant's critique of the cosmological argument, Hegel makes
it clear that he understands the Critical objection to constitute the core of Kant's rejection
of ontotheology. For Kant, reason forms the concept of a necessary being but is unable
to say which being is necessary. In response to this, Hegel states simply that human
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reason is in fact capable of specifying which being is necessary: ''the determination . . . of
the supremely real entity (allerrealstes Wesen, ens realissimum) is easy to derive from
the determination of the absolutely necessary being." 1 The claim that the deduction is an
"easy'' one is perhaps overstated, but it at least accords with the Cartesian conviction that
the relevant insight is obvious. In the case of both Hegel and Descartes, the connection
between God and his necessary existence is presumed to be obvious to the trained

observer, and in Hegel's case this means to anyone who is thoroughly familiar with his

. 2
L ogzc.
To the extent that the Science ofLogic contains a detailed derivation of the
concept of ens realissimum or omnitudo realitatis from the concept of a necessary being,
that text represents an attempt to overcome Kant's formulation of the Critical objection.
Although this objection succeeds in highlighting a weakness in the Cartesian argument,
the objection itself has two glaring shortcomings. First, Kant offers no convincing
argument for the claim that the concept of "necessary being" is valid only in the
regulation of knowledge of "experience" taken in an extremely narrow sense. Kant's
claim is much too strong to be justified by even a complete analysis of this species of
experience, since the claim is not even about this experience or its conditions. Secondly,
the decisive claim that the concepts of"necessary being" and omnitudo realitatis arise
from distinct sources does not receive so much as an explanation, let alone a justifying

1

Suhrkamp 17,427

2

Henrich (pg. 214) writes: "If one has (Hegel's) theory of the concept in mind, it is no longer difficult to
find the determination of 'being' within this and thereby to complete the transition that corresponds to the
traditional ontological argument."
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argument. The Logic purports to provide a derivation of these two concepts from a
single source, thereby refuting this second part of Kant's objection.
The Logic, of course, is not a theological text in its outward terminology. Its
basic claim consists simply in the assertion that "being is a moment of the concept" or
"the concept is being." At no point in the main text does the sentence appear ''therefore
the necessary being is the most real of all beings." Some level of scruple concerning the
interpretation of this text as involving an argument for the existence of God is therefore
justified. The first part of this chapter will accordingly explain Hegel's interpretation of
his own "logic" as ontotheological.

I.

The "concept" and the concept of God

The Logic can be read as a metaphysical text primarily because the "concept" that
comprises its subject matter corresponds in important ways to the concept of God.
Hegel's understanding of the term 'concept', however, differs greatly from what Kant,
Leibniz, and others had understood by this term. It is therefore necessary to begin by
discussing Hegel's concept of the concept (A), and how he took this concept to be
equivalent to the concept of God (B).

3

In any case, Kant presumes that a certain application of the concepts serves as both their justification and
their origin.
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A. The concept of the concept

In the "Seventh Lecture" of the 1829 series Hegel attacks the Leibnizian reform
of the ontological argument. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, Hegel agrees with
both Kant and Descartes that it is absurd to attempt to consider the concept of 'that whose
possibility and actuality are inseparable' merely in terms of its possibility. Hegel goes
farther, however, by rejecting the analysis of possibility universally. In so doing he
criticized a form of reasoning he took to be common to both the ontotheologians and the
objectors, while at the same time he intends to correct a flaw in the form of the
ontological argument that had contributed to its misunderstanding. His predecessors, he
4

claimed, had mistaken the "abstract thought" of God for the concept of God. The first
point involved in reformulating the ontological argument, then, concerns distinguishing
"abstract thoughts" or "formal concepts" from the genuine concept.
The essential difference between a formal concept and the speculative or concrete
concept involves the species of identity that these respectively involve. A formal concept
of a given entity, e.g., of God, requires only that the thing be conceived as possible. If
we say a given thing is possible, this means only that it does not contradict itself. In
other words, a thing is possible to the extent that it is formally self-identical. Formal selfidentity is quite obviously a characteristic only of the form of the concept or thing, and
thus does not concern its determination; i.e., every "thing'' is self-identical in the exact
same manner, so that the property of self-identity does not specify the thing in any way.

Suhrkamp 17, pg. 395: "It can be added that what is here called the concept of God and of his possibility
should only be called a thought, and even an abstract thought."
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Possibility in this sense amounts to what Hegel calls "identity without determination." In
contrast to the formal concept, the speculative concept is concretely identical, which
means that the unity implied by the "concept" is a "unity of determinations" and that "the
unity is nothing without the determinations."5
These abstract considerations have their more comprehensible application in the
analysis of the philosophical proposition. The formal concept corresponds to the
grammatical form of a sentence in which the subject and predicate are sharply
distinguished. The subject term represents a bare unity or substrate, whereas the
predicate term designates the determinations that belong to that substrate. Although a
predicative statement involves the explicit assertion that "the subject is the predicate," the
copula in such a statement is easily distinguished as a predicative, not an identical copula.
The subject term designates some thing whose existence is supposed to be independent of
the possession of the attribute designated in the predicate term. In a typical predicative
statement, the unity of the subject and predicate terms is inessential; both terms have
meaning independently of their relation to each other.
The speculative concept, by contrast, corresponds to the subject term in a
speculative proposition. In a speculative proposition, the subject is not taken to be
independent of the predicate. The subject itself is literally "nothing" without its
predicates.6 It does not represent any identity distinct from the predicates, but rather an
identity of the predicates. Hegel's assumption is that a diversity of predicates is possible
only if the subject is distinct from each of its predicates. The various predicates of a

5

Ibid.

6

Suhrkamp 6, pg. 403: "the subject ... no matter what it is for feeling, intuition and representation, is for
conceptual thinking a mere name."
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speculative concept (e.g., God, substance, the Absolute) are thus, in a certain sense,
identical to one another, as Hegel explains in a passage from the "Seventh Lecture":

. .. such a unity of determinations .. . is not to be taken as a subject to
which many predicates would be attributed, in which case the predicates
would only have their connection in a third, but would otherwise be
opposed to one another. The unity of the predicates is rather essential to
the predicates themselves. In other words, the unity is such that it is
constituted by means of the determinations, and vice versa, and that these
diverse determinations are themselves this: to be inseparable from one
another, to translate themselves into the others and to have no meaning at
all without the others ... 7

In a formal concept, the predicates or determinations are inessential to the subject.
As a result, the predicates relate to each other only in an inessential manner. If I say "this
table is brown" and "this table is rectangular," it is clear that the "table" is something
distinct from each of these attributes. The attributes are accordingly connected only "in a
third," namely, in the substrate "table," whatever that could be; i.e., the predicates
"brown" and "rectangular" bear no essential relation to one another, but are only
coincidentally combined in the table. If we cannot distinguish the subject from its
predicates in such a manner, however, the predicates will likewise not be distinct from
one another. This is supposed to be the case when we are speaking of either God or the

7

Suhrkamp 17, pp. 395-6
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speculative concept. In these cases the subject term is a ''unity of determinations," i.e., it
constitutes itself as a unity only in unifying the determinations.
The concept of God, in this sense of 'concept', is a unity of the many predicates
or determinations of God. The predicates of God are infinity, omniscience, perfection,
necessity, etc. These are not to be taken as distinct "concepts" of God, such as the
"concepts" of an ens necessarium, ens perfectissimum, etc., but rather as "moments of
one and the same concept." 8 There can thus be no problem of showing that the omnitudo

realitatis is the ens necessarium, as if two absolutely distinct concepts were designated
by these terms. What is instead necessary is to show that these two "abstract thoughts"
are moments of a single concept of God. Since the abstract thoughts or predicates of the
subject ' God' correspond to the moments or categories of the Logic, the proof that the
categories oflogic derive from one another and have meaning only in one another also
amounts to a proof that the various determinations of God do in fact constitute a single
concept.

B. The concept of God

Such a description of the concept of the concept is "abstract." As is the case with
every abstract claim, the claim that the traditional notions of God represent
determinations of a single concept, which determinations only appear to be distinct,
demands no greater assent than its contrary. With such predictable and repetitive
statements about what the concept is, then, Hegel does nothing to refute the Kantian

8

ibid., pg. 397

claim that the notions of ens necessarium and omnitudo realitatis arise from two distinct
sources. Hegel admits as much by reminding the reader that such claims represent only a
formal concept of the concept, not the speculative concept itself: "when we say that it is
one and the same concept that is simply further determined, this is a formal expression."9
In the discussion of the proofs for the existence of God, which belongs to the philosophy

of religion, only an indication or assurance that and what the concept is can be given.
"That its form is in and for itself true" is a premise that is "demonstrated in the logical
philosophy." 10
Two requirements have been made of the Logic. First, the so-called speculative
concept must prove to be something ''true." It is not enough to say that a given concept
is such that it is the unity of its determinations, or that its set of (apparently distinct)
determinations "find their truth" only in each other. This abstract claim must receive a
demonstration, and this takes the form of a dialectical "proof' that finitude is infinity,
being is essence, existence is appearance, contingency is necessity, etc. Secondly, the
Logic must provide a similar demonstration for the claim that this "concept" corresponds
to the concept of God. This second requirement, however, collapses into the first. The
analysis of the concept is a proof both that the traditional notions of God are ''true" and
that they inevitably lead to the concept of the concept. Hegel's argument for this takes
the form of an explication of the genesis of the concept, and this constitutes the final
stages of the "Doctrine of Essence." In these passages Hegel intends to prove:

9

Ibid. 397

10

Ibid. 396
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(i)

that the notion of an ens necessarium necessarily follows from the
concept of contingent entities;

. (ii)

that this notion likewise determines itself as causa sui;

(iii)

and finally, that the concept of a self-causing entity is ultimately the
concept of the concept.

(i) ens necessarium

That the determination "necessary being" is an important one is a view shared by
both Kant and Hegel. Both philosophers agree that some formulation of the cosmological
argument is valid. Kant, of course, asserts only that our experience of contingent entities
requires us to think of a necessary being, although we are capable neither of specifying
which being is necessary nor of experiencing such an entity. Hegel goes much farther.
He thinks that the concept of contingency, although it represents an important logical
moment, is in a certain respect spurious. It is not merely the case that the concept of
contingent entities provides evidence that there must be some necessary entity "over and
beyond" any contingent entity. On the contrary, contingency itself proves to be
something illusory, so that what exists is primarily the absolutely necessary entity, or the

ens necessarium.
The category of contingency is closely related to the category of possibility, so
that similarities arise also in the critique of these categories. A contingent entity is an
entity that is possible but also actual.

11

It has the characteristic in common with what is

11

Suhrkamp 6, pp. 205ff.: "the contingent is an actual, which is at the same time determined as only
possible." Cf. Suhrkamp 17, pg. 449; 17, pg. 456; 17, pg. 463;
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merely possible that it is capable both of being and of not being. Just as the possibility of
a thing or concept is manifest only when that thing is viewed apart from its
determinations, so can a thing be recognized as contingent only to the extent that it is
abstracted from its context. A contingent thing is contingent only "in itself," considered
in isolation, but in the context in which it arises it is necessary. In other words, each
contingent thing is necessary in respect to its context. 12 Necessity and contingency are
thus two opposed categories that are nevertheless predicated of the same things, albeit in
different respects.
The intention of Hegel's cosmological argument, like every argument based on
the "Doctrine of Essence," is to show that the difference in question (in this case between
necessity and contingency) is illusory. 13 The difference is illusory primarily because the
concept of contingency is contradictory. On the one hand, a thing is viewed as
contingent only to the extent that we consider it in isolation, as a self-sufficient entity.
On the other hand, to say that a thing is contingent is to say precisely that it is not selfsufficient; that something is contingent means that it is contingent upon other things, or
that it is not self-sufficient. Contingency is thus a category that refers simultaneously to a
thing' s self-sufficiency and to its to its lack thereof. The remainder of the argument
consists in demonstrating this contradiction to be inherent in the notion of contingency

12

Suhrkamp 17, pg. 453: " we place the contingency of a thing in its individuation, or in the lack of
complete context with other things." Cf. 17, pg. 449: "Individuation lends the illusion of self-sufficiency to
contingent things, but context with others distinguishes the individual things as at the same time not selfsufficient. The context reveals them to be conditioned and effected by others as necessary, even if they are
only necessary through others, not through themselves."
13

I use the word "illusion" throughout this section mainly as a translation of" Schein," as Hegel uses this
term in the "Doctrine of Essence."

and in showing the contradiction to also imply that "contingency'' is the same as its
opposite, "necessity."
The contradiction in question is manifest in every finite phenomenon. Each
contingent thing has "a form of immediacy," or it appears simply as itself and thus
distinct from other things. Further consideration of the immediate, contingent thing,
however, demonstrates it to actually possess manifold relations to other things, in the
context of which the apparently contingent thing is actually necessary. In other words,
the immediacy or groundlessness of the contingent is contradicted by the fact that it is
mediated or grounded.

14

The thing that appears to be distinct, and thus contingent, only

appears to be distinct, and this is why it is contingent. It is difficult to distinguish
contingency from necessity at all: the same dependence upon other things that determines
the thing as contingent also establishes that thing as necessary. 15
Hegel has two ways of responding to the insight that the distinction between
' contingent' and ' necessary' is illusory. On the hand, he attempts to conceive of the
''unity" of these categories; that the categories are not distinct from one another implies
that they are, in a sense, one concept, and this concept is that of an "absolute necessity."
On the other hand, there is nevertheless a semblance of a difference between the

14

Suhrkamp 6, pp. 205-6 : "es hat keinen Grund . . . es hat einen Grund." George di Giovanni offers an
enlightening commentary on these passages in ''The Category of Contingency in the Hegelian Logic" in Art
and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy . Ed. Steinkraus and Schmitz. Humanities Press, 1980. Pp. 179-200.
15

In the "Eleventh Lecture" Hegel analyzes the same contradiction as constituting the concept of necessity.
Both categories, in other words, are contradictory in exactly the same way: "We can see that there are two
opposed determinations that ~re ~equired for the necessity ?f s~mething: its s~lf-sufficiency, but in ~ s
respect it is individuated and mdifferent to whether or not 1t exists; and its bemg grounded and contamed
within a complete relation to everything surrounding it, but in this respect it is not self-sufficient."
Suhrkamp 17, pg. 453.
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categories of contingency and necessity, and this difference has its own limited validity
that demands recognition.
A prototypical Hegelian line of reasoning leads from the dialectic of contingency
and necessity to the notion of an absolutely necessary being. Two categories or
"concepts" prove to imply one another, and this mutual implication itself implies a third
category, which is the unity of the first two. In this case, the concepts of necessity and
contingency develop from a critique of the difference between possibility (selfsufficiency) and actuality (the circumstances or context that constitute "real possibility'').
The notions of 'contingency' and 'necessity' imply that there is a conversion of
possibility into actuality and vice versa. Hegel takes the fact that the latter categories
(possibility and actuality) collapse into one another to mean that they form a "positive
unity": "to the extent that (necessity) is the simple conversion of one of these moments
into the other, it is also their simple,positive unity, since each unites with itselfby
collapsing into the other." 16 The removal of the difference between two categories
suggests that there is a "positive unity," and this amounts to something like an "entity'' in
whom the characteristics are united. In this case, "absolute necessity'' is that whose
"possibility is its actuality," which corresponds exactly to the definition of God as ens
.

necessarzum.

16

17

Suhrkamp 6, pg. 214

17 Suhrkamp 6, pg. 215. Strictly speaking, "absolute necessity" is a higher category than "thing" or
"entity," so that the expression ens necessarium is, in a certain sense, inappropriate: "Die absolute
Notwendigkeit ist nicht sowohl das Notwendige, noch weniger ein Notwendiges, sondern Notwendigkeit, -Sein schlecthin als Reflexion." Suhrkamp 6, pg 217. It is nevertheless valid (although superfluous) to
predicate a "lower" category of a "higher" category, since the latter contain the former as abstract
moments. This is why Hegel's lectures speak equally of both "absloute Notwendigkeit'' and "das absolut
notwendige Wesen." Cf. Suhrkamp 17, pg. 455; 17, pg. 487. The latter expression reminds us that the
reflective concept of"absolute necessity'' possesses the "abstract identity'' of essence or being. For Hegel
anything identifiable "is," since being is nothing but the simplest form of identity.
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It still remains to account for the semblance of a difference between the
categories of contingency and necessity. "Contingency" designates both self-sufficiency
and dependence upon others, but it refers to these qualities in different senses. The
contingent thing is necessary only due to its dependence upon others. In other words, the
sense in which it is necessary involves only its placement in a context of other things, or
in a sequence of causes and effects. The necessity of the thing is thus something external
to it, consisting chiefly in the fact that the thing in question is an effect of other things.
The difference between contingency and this "external necessity'' has not disappeared
entirely, but it rather proves to be relative to another distinction. To the extent that the
causes are other things (i.e., to the extent that the thing is an "effect" distinct from its
causes), the sense in which a given thing is necessary is distinct from the sense in which
it is contingent. Contingency and necessity, then, are distinct to the same extent that an
effect is distinct from its cause.

(ii) causa sui

That every cause is something distinct from its effect is a metaphysical dogma,
appeal to which has been employed in the rejection of the ontological argument. When
in his Nova dilucidatio Kant cites this maxim in criticism of the notion that God contains
the reason for his own existence, he is merely aligning himself with a tradition that
includes several of Descartes' interlocutors. In agreement with the latter, Kant's chief
objection to the concept of causa sui was based on the rule that every cause precedes its
effect in time. If God causes himself, then according to this rule he must precede himself
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in time, which is absurd.

18

The Cartesian reply is predictable enough: there is manifestly

a different sense of"cause" intended in the expression "cause of itself." 19
Such spurious and irresolvable conflicts over words are commonplace in
metaphysical debates. In this case the objectors proceed sophistically; it does not suffice
as a refutation of any argument to simply define the sense of a term narrowly and thereby
to demonstrate the absurdity of a use of that term that does not adhere to the given
definition. The equivocal nature of statements about God, along with the analogical
nature of reasoning about him, may well be problematic, but this itself requires
elaboration. The Cartesian reply, on the other hand, though less sophistical, is no more
enlightenirtg than the objection; the notion of a self-causing entity is in no way explained
by the observation that the term 'cause' is not applied univocally.
Although Hegel reveals a tendency to reply in the same manner as Descartes,20 he
also offers a defense of the concept of causa sui that does not limit itself to an
equivocation. The defense stems from a more thorough rejection of the rule in question.
Descartes accepts the rule that a cause is something different from its effect; his only

18 Kant (Werke I, 430-1) provides exactly the same argument as Arnauld (AT VII 210; CSM 147). Kant:
"The concept of the cause is by nature prior to the concept of the caused, and the latter is posterior to the
former: the causa sui would thus be both prior and posterior to itself, which is absurd." Arnauld: " it is
absurd to think of a thing' s receiving existence yet at the same time possessing that existence prior to the
time when we conceive that it received it. Yet this is just what would happen if we were to apply the
notion of cause and effect of the same thing in respect to itself ... The notion of a cause is essentially prior
to the notion of an effect."
19 See especially AT VII 107-112; CSM II 77-80, but also AT 238-245; CSM II 166-171. In the formerof
these texts, Descartes anticipates Hegel's more detailed argument: "the concept of a cause is, strictly
speaking, applicable only for as long as the cause is producing its effect, and so it is not prior to it."

20An analogous reply is offered in the context of a charge, which Hegel imagines to be voiced by both Kant
and Jacobi, that the concept of an absolute or unconditioned necessity is spurious, since a given thing is
necessary only by virtue of having certain conditions. Hegel, as Descartes would do, replies that there is a
second form of necessity, although he elaborates this in a manner unique to his own philosophy. An
unconditioned necessity "contains its conditions within itself." Suhrkamp 17, pg. 432-3.
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hesitation is that he reserves an additional use of the term "cause," and this additional use
supplies what appears to be an exception to the rule. Hegel, by contrast, attacks the rule
itself. The difference, he argues, between cause and effect is illusory, so that every cause
is ultimately the cause of itself.
Hegel contends that every relation of cause to effect contains a unified content,
and he takes advantage of a manifest ambiguity in the word "cause" to illustrate his point.
In the rule "every cause is something distinct from its effect," the terms "cause" and

"effect" evidently do not refer to the activities of causing and being effected. To state the
rule more precisely, then, we should say that for every relation of cause and effect, the
thing that causes is a different thing than the thing that is an effect. The causing and
being effected, however, are one and the same act and include only a single content.
Hegel makes a similar point in the Encyclopedia with an amusing example: "the rain,
which is the cause, and the wetness, which is the effect, are one and the same existing
water."21
The thing or substance that serves as cause is only a cause to the extent that it
brings about an effect, and the bringing about of an effect is the same activity as the
causing. In other words, this one activity is both "cause" and "effect," and these terms
are indistinguishable. 22 The sense in which "cause" and "effect" are supposed to be
distinct pertains only to the fact that two different things or substances enter into the
causal relation. As cause, however, the thing that causes is the same as the effect. That

21

Encyclopedia Logic pg. 228. The same example is used in the Logic, Suhrkamp 6, 226.

22

Suhrkamp 6, pp. 224-5: "The effect contains nothing that the cause does not also contain. The cause
likewise contains nothing that the effect does not contain. The cause is only cause to the extent that it
produces an effect, and the cause is..nothing other than this determination, to have an effect, and the effect
is nothing but this, to have a cause.
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thing is thus distinct from the thing that is an effect only to the extent that the first thing
is distinct from its own activity as cause.
Just like the distinction between contingency and necessity, the distinction
between cause and effect proves to be relative to another distinction. Each instance of a
cause-effect relation is a single activity, and the semblance of a difference between
"cause" and "effect" results only from the fact that two distinct substances are involved.
The difference between cause and effect is thus traced back to the difference between two
"substances." These substances, however, are distinct only to the extent that they are
indifferent to the given causal relation.23 One substance is not in itself a "cause," while
the other would be an "effect." On the contrary, each substance serves as both cause and
effect, even if it is not both cause and effect in the same relation.24 The difference
changes forms yet again: the difference between "cause" and "effect" now refers only to
the different relations in which a given substance stands to other substances.
A given "substance" appears as an effect of certain other substances, and it
likewise stands in relation to some others as cause, so that each distinct substance
belongs to a sequence of causes and effects. Whatever is posited within a substance as
"effect," though, is just as much "cause," since it causes the same "effect" in another
substance; e.g., the same motion of a billiard ball that is an "effect" of the motion of a
first ball is also the "cause" of the motion of a third ball. The same content within the
same substance is both " cause" and "effect," and the only difference lies in that each
substance stands in relation to various different substances.

Ibid. , 229-230. Cf. Suhrkamp 8, 298: Cause and effect are "distinct, self-sufficient existents ... only to
the extent that the causal relation is abstracted from them."

23

24

Suhrkamp 6, pg. 233
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The differences among substances, however, correspond only to a limited aspect
of causality. "Cause" and "effect" are conceived distinctly because in each relation
between two substances, one substance is considered a cause, while the other is
considered an effect; this is only possible to the extent that we distinguish between
passive and active substances. The first substance is active, while the other is merely
passive. This represents only a superficial analysis of the relation, since causality
involves not only an action, but also a reaction. In other words, neither "substance" is
merely passive; the substances in a given relation act upon one another, so that both are
"cause" and both are "effect." If the substances are nevertheless considered to be
distinct, we would isolate certain properties of each that serve as "effect" within that
relation, and certain others that serve as "cause" (in that case the difference would be
deferred once more). This implies, however, that the "substance" is in certain respects
merely passive, while in other respects it is purely active.
Hegel's intention here is to eliminate the final semblance of distinction among
"substances." The isolation of any cause-effect relation between substances is, in any
case, an abstraction, and one that presupposes the spurious concept of a "passive
substance." The substance that receives an effect is passive. It is supposed to be acted
on only by a foreign substance, so that it receives its determination from that substance.
In being acted upon, however, the "passive substance" becomes what it is already
presupposed to be, which is merely "to be acted upon." In receiving an "effect" the
substance becomes what it already is in itself (a "passive substance"), and Hegel takes
this to mean that its being acted upon is its own action; its effect is effectus sui.
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If the notion of a passive substance is spurious, the notion of an active substance
should fare no better. The same kind of inference that reveals the effect to be an effect of
itself likewise shows the cause to be cause of itself. The active substance presupposes a
foreign substance upon which it produces an effect, but only in acting on the foreign
substance does it make itself into a cause. The cause is, so to speak, cause of its own
causality. 25 To the extent that any substance serves as cause it is, in a perhaps perverse
sense, causa sui.
Hegel's analysis of the notion of "reciprocal action" provides a slightly more
convincing take on the distinctness of substances. If two substances are considered to be
distinct yet related to one another, this relation is inevitably explained as action and thus
as causal action. To conceive of the distinction, then, one substance will have to be
considered "active," the other as merely passive. The reciprocity of action, however,
proves each to be both passive and active, and the separation of the activity of a
substance from its passivity is an arbitrary abstraction; the attempt to specify the
distinction between the substances ultimately fails. Hegel concludes from this that there
is no way left to distinguish the two substances:

... each substance is at the same time active and passive in relation to the
other. Since each (substance) is both passive and active, every distinction
between them is eliminated.

26

25

Ibid., pg. 23 8: " the cause not only has an effect, but in the effect it stands in relation to itself as cause."

26

Ibid.
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With respect to finite phenomena, however, two "substances" are in fact distinct,
despite the fact that both are determined in the same manner as both active and passive.
The result of Hegel's argument is thus that there is nothing conceptual to distinguish
among the substances. Whatever can be isolated as a cause is also an effect, and it can be
shown to be an effect in the very same relation in which it is a cause. We cannot
properly think of one "thing" as active in relation to another; rather, we must think of
both "things" as a unity of activity and passivity. 27 The differences among substances are
restricted to those aspects of the content that elude conceptualization.
The process of criticizing the distinction between cause and effect leads to the
concept of causality. This is the notion of the relation of distinct substances within which
relation every determinate difference is nullified. Hegel's final move, just as in the
previous section, is to reify the "concept" in question. The "absolute concept" of
causality is the notion of that which posits itself as a difference ("effect") which
difference is, at a deeper level, no difference at all.

(iii) The concept of the concept

Descartes and Spinoza had already identified the concepts of ens necessarium
and causa sui. Hegel's innovation, apart from the fact that he is the first to attempt to
actually explain these notions, is to have equated these definitions of God with ''the
concept." The notion of a causa sui is a convenient tool for expressing what the concept
is supposed to be. The latter expresses the concrete unity of distinct qualities or

27

Ibid.: ''They are substances only to the extent that they are the identity of the active and the passive."
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determinations. "Causality'' designates something similar: causality represents the
relationship of"distinct substances" in such a way that the distinctions (cause-effect,
activity-passivity) are illusory. The notion of a causa sui expresses this concept of
causality in general as an entity. An effect is substantially distinct from its cause; if
something is the cause of itself, then, that thing is substantially distinct from itself. To
the extent that it possesses "identity-with-self," however, it (the causa sui) is the identity
of substantial distinction, which is what Hegel wishes to express with the term "concept."

II. The minor premise reformulated.

A. The meaning of reality

The preceding analysis of the concept was intended to show that this is roughly
equivalent to the notion of God as causa sui or ens necessarium. According to Kant' s
formulation of the Critical objection, the problem involved in the Cartesian minor
premise concerns the identification of these notions with the representation of God as an

ens realissimum or omnitudo realitatis. An elaboration of the premise should thus read
"the omnitudo realitatis is the ens necessarium" or, in English, "the sum of all realities
necessarily exists." If the necessary being is the concept as such, the premise reads ''the
sum of all realities is the concept." One final equivalence completes the restatement of
the minor premise: the notion of a 'sum of all realities' or omnitudo realitatis is the
abstract thought of ' being'. The assertion that ''the sum of all realities is the concept" can
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thus be stated: being is the concept. This last claim is the explicit thesis of the Logic, so
that that text comprises one large argument for the Cartesian minor premise.28
The identification of omnitudo realitatis with 'being as such' requires much less
detail than the argument concerning the concept. Hegel deals with this matter in a
"Remark" entitled "Reality and Negation," which is inserted in the second chapter of the

Logic. The purpose of the remark within the context of the "Doctrine of Being" is to
clarify the meaning of the term "reality." This term designates a characteristic of
"Dasein" or "determinate being" as specific. "Dasein" differs from "being" by virtue of
its being determined or specified, and "reality" is a term that denotes any given
determination. The notion of God as the sum of all realities or perfections thus implies
that God contains every determination or quality.
Occasion for the Logic's second discussion of the ontological argument arises in
this context, and Hegel considers a version of the argument posed by the young Leibniz.
At issue, for both Leibniz and Hegel, is not the tautological inference from the
assumption that existence is a perfection or reality to the conclusion that the sum of all
realities (God) contains existence; nor is the truth of the assumption (that existence is a
perfection) in question. The concern is rather with the relation of the realities within
God' s nature. Leibniz alleged to have proved God's non-contradictoriness by defining
realities or perfections as simple and thus as purely affirmative. Since the realities are
purely affirmative, they can bear no negative relation to one another, and so cannot
contradict one another.

28

29

Cf. Henrich, pg. 2 14-16.

29

Hegel, as he often does, omits the reference, but his summary at Suhrkamp 5, pg. 119 corresponds
accurately to Leibniz' argument in "That a most perfect being exists."
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Hegel's concern lies with an immediate consequence ofthis view: if the realities
as God possesses them are simple, then God does not possess these in the same sense in
which we otherwise understand them. God, for Leibniz, does not possess the realities in
the usual sense, but rather in an "eminent" sense. God's goodness cannot contradict his
justice, since these otherwise distinct qualities are "tempered" by one another. In that
case, Hegel objects, " goodness is no longer goodness, and justice is not justice."30 God
possesses these attributes only in an equivocal sense, so that "goodness" as God
possesses it has nothing in common with goodness in the ordinary sense.
"Reality" in the sense intended in the notion of God as omnitudo realitatis thus
does not correspond to ''reality'' in the sense employed in Hegel's Logic. The latter
denotes specificity, and this implies negation, since every determination is a negation.
The definition of God as a sum of all "realities", however, implies that these realities are
not distinct from one another, so that this definition designates God as, in Hegel's terms,
"indeterminate" or unspecified. The so-called "sum of all realities" in fact possesses no
realities, since it possesses no definite determinations:

Reality, if it is taken in the same manner as in this definition of God, as
transcending its determination, ceases to be reality; it is transformed into
abstract being. God as the purely real in every real thing or as the sum of

30

Subrkamp 5, pg. 120.
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all realities is the same indeterminate, formless entity as the absolute in
which all is one. 31

If "reality" is taken in its intended sense as determination, i.e., as denoting a
specific quality, then the definition of God as "sum of all realities" is transformed into the
"sum of all negations" and thereby into "the sum of all contradictions." The Logic serves
as an explication of this point; the indeterminate beginning ("the sum of all realities" or
being) determines itself progressively into a sum of contradictory determinations (the
concept).

B. Hegel's argument in syllogistic form

The thesis of the Logic that being is the concept, or that the concept possesses
being, corresponds to the Cartesian claim that the most perfect or most real being
necessarily exists. Another abstract formulation of the claim suggests that the concept of
God is the concept of his unity with his existence, and this idea is expressed in Spinoza's
32

definition of God or substance as ''that which can only be thought as existing."

abstract concept of God is thus the concept of the unity of "concept" and being.

33

The
If the

31

ibid. The subsequent paragraph reiterates the point: "this reality in every real thing, the being (Sein) in
every being (Dasein), that the notion of God purports to express, is nothing other than the abstract being
which is the same as nothing." Cf. Suhrkamp 6, pp. 284-5; Rel. ill 196.
32

Ethics, Part I, Definition 1.

Hegel provides an interesting alteration of the point: "being" is "the abstract moment of the concept."
Suhrkamp 6, pg. 404.
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Logic proposes a proof of this observation (that being is united with the concept), this
proof is summarized as follows:

It is easy to see that (the concept) in its completely abstract sense includes
being within itself. The concept, however it is otherwise determined, is at
the very least the immediate relation to itself that arises by means of the
cancellation of mediation. Being is nothing other than this (immediate
relation to itselt).

34

Hegel's thus presents his argument for the Cartesian minor premise in the
following manner:

Pl: The concept is immediate relation to itself.
P2: Being is immediate relation to itself.
Conclusion: Therefore the concept is being.

This admittedly unfortunate inference represents a common form of exposition in
Hegel's works. Some qualification of the status ofthis as an "argument" should precede
our discussion of the two "premises." The primary problem consists in the resemblance
this formulation bears to an invalid form of categorical syllogism:

All A are B.

34

Suhrkamp 8, pg. 136.
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All Care B.
Therefore all A are C.

The invalidity of this argument form is a trivial matter that is entirely irrelevant to
Hegel's claim, since his argument contains no categorical statements. 35 The resemblance
between Hegel's argument and this form, however, represents an awkwardness of
expression involved in formal considerations of arguments that are not intended to be
formal. This awkwardness certainly contributes to the impression that Hegel makes
elementary logical errors. This impression, however, derives only from the inadequacy of
the exposition of a given point, and does not concern the ultimate truth of the point itself.
Hegel himself consistently warns against mistaking such simplistic accounts for the
genuine argument. In this case, the mediation between being and the concept receives its
most complete description in the Logic, where the "immediate self-relation" that being is
develops into the self-relating concept. An infamous disclaimer tacitly accompanies any
general, syllogistic formulation such as the one cited above from the "Introduction" to the

Encyclopedia: these are unscientific expressions and as such are inappropriate to the
subject matter that they express.

III.

Hegel's first premise: being is immediate self-relation.

It is well-known that Hegel begins his Logic with the category entitled "being,"
and that this term is said to designate the same as "nothing." Analysis of these categories

35

Hegel's criticism of the categorical statement culminates in his own concept of the ''universal judgment,"
in which "instead of 'all men' we rather say 'man'." Suhrkamp 6, 333.
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leads to further ones such as ''becoming," "determinate being," etc. In each case the
previous categories (being, nothing, etc.) are contained or preserved in the subsequent
categories. Every category oflogic thus possesses ''being," and this observation is in
most cases uncontroversial. Determinate being (Dasein), for instance, is obviously a kind
of being. When discussing the category "something," it likewise seems reasonable to
attribute being to this, which can be expressed by the trivial claim "something is."
The conclusion of the ontological argument, that ''the concept is", expresses the
same phenomenon. The concept "is" simply because being determines itself into
essence, which subsequently determines itself into the concept. If the inferences from
one category to the next are all valid, in which case the dialectical progression from
' 'being" to the "idea" is justified, then the claim that the concept as the ' absolutely
necessary entity' is or exists is not only inevitable and correct, it is also a trivial
observation. To say that God "is" would be to say very little about God.
Hegel consistently attributes ''being" in such a broad and trivial fashion. Nothing
less could be said of a thing than that it "is," and everything that could be talked about
possesses being:

That a given thing is constitutes the very least and the most abstract thing
that could be said of it. Even if it is only something subjective like
knowledge or belief, being nevertheless belongs to it. The objects as
well, that only are in belief or knowledge, possess a kind ofbeing. 36

36

Suhrkamp 17, pg. 369
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If it is permissible to predicate a kind of"being" even to objects of fantasy, then
it would seem uncontroversial to predicate a kind of being to God:

We might well say that it would be very odd if spirit's innermost core, the
concept, or even if I, or above all the concrete totality that God is, were
not rich enough to contain within itself even so poor a determination as
being is --- for being is the poorest and most abstract one of all.37

An obvious objection arises in the context of this part of Hegel's reformulation of
the ontological argument: "being" in the sense employed in Hegel's Logic does not seem
to correspond to "real being," or to what we (the objectors) otherwise understand to be
implied in the conclusion "God exists." This objection represents an application of one
of the more common objections to Hegel's philosophy, and specifically to his Logic:
Hegel seems to confuse the concept of being with being itself. The apparent conflation,
however, is not an error but a thesis, and it signals the very point at stake in the
ontological argument. In other words, the ontological argument involves an attack on the
difference between existence in rerum natura and existence "in the apprehension of the
intellect." The logician and the empiricist, just like the metaphysician, must forfeit the
pretense of novelty and recognize that they are adopting ancient and contested prejudices.
Toe relevant points here have already been discussed in the sections on the
empirical and Thomistic objections. It remains only to indicate, in the context of Hegel's
reformulation of the argument, the dependence of these objections on the Critical

37

Suhrkamp 8, pg. 136; trans. Geraets, Suchting and Harris, Encyclopedia Logic pg. 99.
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objection. The empiricist and the logician are concerned with a specific notion of
"existence," and they rightly object that the ontological argument fails to show that God
possesses this existence. "Existence" in the intended sense is something distinct from the
concept (the Thomistic objection) and is manifest specifically in the context of external
experience or sense perception (the empirical objection). Hegel understands himself to
overcome both objections with the observation that existence is external only to the finite
concept, not to the speculative. If the concept is genuinely grasped as infinite, then being
is not something over and beyond this. The empirical and Thomistic objectors
understand the concept as finite, and they are thus engaged only in a formal thinking, not
the speculative thinking required by the "concept" as such:

If a philosophy fails to elevate itself above the senses concerning being,

this failure is accompanied by the fact that concerning the concept it
never departs from merely abstract thoughts. The latter are in fact distinct
from being. 38

Hegel understands the Thomistic opposition between thought and being to pertain
to a specific kind of thought as well as to a specific kind of being. Kant was right to
consider formal thinking to be something distinct from sensuous existence. The task
suggested by the ontological argument, however, is that thought should remove its own
"one-sidedness" or "subjectivity," and this means that philosophers overcome the

38

Suhrkamp 6, pg. 404
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tendency to think in a merely "formal" manner.39 In other words, the opposition of
thought and being is a limitation not only on being, but also on thought. If thought can
overcome its limitation, then it eo ipso overcomes its opposition to being.

IV. Hegel' s second premise: the concept and the Critical objection.

The Critical objection expresses the notion that the idea of God from which the
ontological argument begins is an arbitrary, subjective construction. The connection
between God and his existence, the objector alleges, is a mere fabrication of thought.
Both Descartes and Hegel respond to the objection in a manner that partly concedes its
point: the idea of God, and specifically the incorporation of existence within this, is
indeed a matter that pertains only to thought. Hegel's more complete response consists
in a development of Descartes' two primary concerns: God possesses an "existence"
other than empirical existence; and from the fact that something occurs only in thought it
does not follow that it is arbitrary or fictional.
Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of religion develop several themes that
elaborate Kant's contention that the metaphysical proofs are merely subjective. Among
these themes is Hegel's defense of the idea that rationalism presupposes an antecedent
relation between the human and divine intellects, and this provides the groundwork for
his response to Kant' s revision of the Thomistic objection. A similar theme furthers the
defense of ontotheology in the face of the Critical objection: what the proofs for the

In his last (183 1) lecture on the ontological argument, Hegel emphasizes this point in response to the
empirical objection: " It can be granted that being is not a determination of the content; but nothing is
supposed to be added to the concept ... rather we must only remove the shortcoming that it (the concept) is
only something subjective and not the Idea." Rel. III, 273.
39
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existence of God ultimately express is a subjective movement that Hegel calls "the
elevation of the mind to God. ,,4o The structure of the Logi.c provides a glimpse into this
movement: in mediating between God (the sum of all realities) and his necessary
existence (the concept) the Logic moves from an abstract thought to the divine concept.
That God's existence is designated by the term "concept" already implies that
God does not possess an existence apart from thought. The objection that the
metaphysical proofs do not demonstrate anything beyond an operation of reason is thus
both correct and irrelevant; in dealing with "God" we are essentially concerned with a
rational entity: "the object, with which (metaphysical proof) is concerned, is essentially
in thinking.',4 1 The concept is grasped only by thought, and in proving God's existence
we are supposed to be doing nothing other than grasping the concept.
If we were to apply the Critical objection to religion, we would arrive at the
claim, to which Hegel assents, that God is only in religi.on. That there is no God apart
from religion, however, does not imply that religion is an empty pursuit with no object.
On the contrary, Hegel's point is that it belongs to God's nature to reveal himself to the
human intellect through religion, and this distinguishes Hegel's claim from the
contention that God is a mere postulate or belief:

. .. that God is only in religi.on has the weighty and true meaning that it

belongs to God' s perfect self-sufficiency . . . to exist/or the human
intellect . . . this is a completely other sense (of the expression) than the
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one previously discussed, according to which God is only a postulate or
belief.42

Similarly, to object that the metaphysical arguments establish their truths only
within the rational is to state something both correct and trivial. Error ensues, on the part
of the objector, only to the extent that something "merely rational" is assumed to be eo
ipso untrue. On these points Hegel reverts to the same distinctions anticipated by

Descartes. The latter asserted that an "idea" differs from a fictitious construction. The
fact that I can imagine a "necessarily existing lion" does not imply that my idea of a
"necessarily existing God" is equally fictional. Everything hinges on distinguishing "true
ideas" like the latter from fictions like the former. This same process of distinguishing
true from fictitious thought carries over into the process of"elevation" that Hegel intends
to inspire with his dialectic. Since there are manifestly forms of thought or "internal
experience" that are entirely arbitrary and contingent,

there is a pressing yet externally imposed need to examine this elevation
and to bring to consciousness the various acts and determinations that are
contained within it. This is done in order to purify the elevation of every
contingency and especially of the contingencies of thought.

42

Ibid., 383.
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Ibid., 391.
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V. The manner in which ontotheology is demonstrable: the experience of
elevation.

Hegel is successful in reducing the proof of the necessary existence of a certain
entity to a proof of the necessity of a certain train of thought; God's existence is nothing
but "the elevation of the mind to God." The elevation is an "internal experience" and is
thus capable only of the same kind of demonstration as any other experience: it is
justified only in actually having the experience. The fate of the ontological proof hinges
upon the reality of a certain kind of cognition, or of a certain cognitive experience. On
this point Hegel once again opposes himself to Kantian "Criticism," and specifically to
the claim that knowledge of "experience" (in the narrow sense) is the only kind of
knowledge. Aside from the value of any positive claim on the part of Kant, the claim
that a given species of knowledge is beyond human capacity seems indefensible. At any
rate, the actuality of the cognition in question would serve as a decisive disproof of
Kant's or any analogous claim. Hegel thus alleges to refute Kant "through the very fact"
of the experience of "elevation":

Assurance has been granted to the claim that this form of cognition,
which is incapable of higher truth, is the single, exclusive manner of
cognition . .. (however) what we intend to observe is the liberation of this
cognition from its one-sidedness and thereby to demonstrate by our very
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act (durch die Tat zu zeigen) that there exists a kind of cognition other
than the one that is considered to be the only kind.44

On Hegel's view, then, it is incumbent upon each philosopher who engages in the
inquiry concerning the ontological argument to enact the elevation to the mind of God,
from which standpoint the premise predicating necessary existence of God should appear
as an obvious truth. It remains here to indicate the nature of this elevation more
precisely. By "elevation" Hegel intends nothing more than the subjective act involved in
the comprehension of the inferences that comprise the transitions from one category to
the next. The major assumption of Hegel' s works, specifically of the Logic, is that the
categories and sub-headings constitute a synthetic identity. A given category is, on some
level, identical to the preceding and following categories. Contingency, for example, is
the same as necessity. This particular claim results from Hegel's very insightful analysis
of these concepts, and he more commonly expresses this conclusion by saying that the
difference between these and other categories is "illusory" or a mere "Schein." The
difference between these concepts, however, is not reduced to nothing. It often makes
perfect sense to contrast "contingent" and "necessary," and this corresponds to the
positive meaning of "Schein." Hegel's point is that the difference between these
concepts, like every difference, is determinate and thus not absolute. Both concepts are
dialectical and imply one another, as demonstrated in the summary of Hegel's argument
above.45 The more obscure claim is that the mutual implication of these categories
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Ibid., pg. 365.

45

See above, pp. 100-104.
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constitutes a positive identity, which, in this case, is called "absolute necessity." The
purpose of labeling the identity is to distinguish the two senses of "necessity'' that the
dialectical analysis reveals: there is a sense in which necessity is the same as
contingency, and a sense in which these two categories differ. Necessity that differs from
contingency is "external necessity," since "necessity'' designates what appears to be
external (the context, the chain of causes, etc.) to a contingent thing.46 To the extent that
necessity is the same as contingency, Hegel calls it "absolute necessity." This latter term
does not refer to any content beyond what is already present in the notions of
' contingency' and 'necessity'. "Absolute necessity'' refers only to the persistent
"conversion" of one concept determination into the other, in this case, from contingency
into necessity and vice versa. The perception, if you will, of this conversion involves an
elevation beyond finite consciousness, since that consciousness deals only with
oppositions and since for it distinctions are always fixed.

It is only by virtue of concepts such as "absolute necessity," "absolute causality"
and the "concept" that Hegel can claim that the categories of logic constitute a unified
development, which claim is central to the proof of God's existence. Without these
concepts, his arguments demonstrate only the relativity of distinctions, and his
conclusions read: contingency is distinct from necessity to the extent that cause differs
from effect, and this only to the extent that one thing differs from its context, i.e., that
47

there are diverse substances, etc.

According to a conclusion like this, our concepts are

inextricably linked to one another and to the experience of a world of diverse objects.

46

See above, pp. 103-4.

47

See above, pp. 103-8.

131

The unifying concepts, however, which correspond to the traditional notions of God, are
supposed to show that our concepts are not merely relative to one another, but rather that
they form one concept. By describing such (unifying) concepts Hegel wants to show
that, e.g., contingency is not distinct from necessity, cause is not different from effect,
and one substance does not differ from another. The comprehension of these concepts is
a "proof' that the logical categories are moments of one concept and likewise that
" substances," "things," etc. do not differ from one another, or are moments ("modes") of
one thing, which is a "concept" or "idea."
Hegel' s demand upon his reader is that the latter grasp the conversion of the
thought-moments into one another, and this conversion is supposed to correspond to the
unity of all concepts in the logical idea, and likewise to the unity of all "things" in the
absolute. The reader can grasp the "conversions" or inferences, however, only to the
extent that he or she elevates him/herself above finite consciousness. This doctrine of
" elevation" thus signals a striking admission on Hegel's part: the reader cannot be
persuaded by Hegel's claims in the manner in which one is persuaded by an argument
that proceeds according to antecedently accepted laws of inference. In other words,
Hegel cannot demonstrate the existence of God in any normal sense of"demonstrate;" he
cannot show that anyone who disagrees is in error. What his arguments actually prove is
considerably less than one might hope. In the end, he can do nothing but leave it to each
philosopher to "elevate" his or her own mind, grasp the unity of the categories, and
thereby to prove "durch die Tat" for him or herselfthat God exists.
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Chapter Four: Some criticisms of the idea of"critique"

In the preceding chapter we considered Hegel's positive response to the Critical

objection, and this response assumes the form of an attempt to substantiate the claim that
necessary existence belongs to God's nature. Hegel's Logic indeed provides an
elaboration of this fundamental premise ofrationalist metaphysics. In that work, the
basic notions of causa sui, ens necessarium, and the alleged connection of essence and
existence within God's nature are subjected to painstaking dialectical arguments that far
surpass the merely verbal definitions of Descartes, Spinoza, et al. Hegel's elaboration of
the claims of metaphysics, however, possesses conspicuous remnants of Cartesian
philosophy, and there is an important sense in which he fails to make its basic
assumptions convincing. An irreparable flaw hampers even the reformulated ontological
argument: the kind of knowing involved in the process through which Hegel professes to
reestablish the truth of the Cartesian minor premise is disallowed by the objectors and
considered by them to be fanciful and impossible. To the extent that the Logic does
succeed in rectifying the premise in light of the Critical objection, this results only from
this controversial claim to a species of transcendent knowledge at which (knowledge)
Hegel purports to arrive by means of an obscurely indicated "elevation."
The notion of elevation signals a difficulty that is, perhaps, intrinsic to
ontotheology. Hegel intends the arguments cited in support of the minor premise to be
valid only when considered from a certain standpoint, and the achieving of this
standpoint is termed, in his philosophy of religion, the "elevation of the mind to God."
God exists only for him or her who engages in the experience of this elevation, and God's
existence is nothing other than this act of elevation. If there is any burden of proof on the
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ontotheologian, then, this burden remains unfulfilled. The latter can appeal to an
experience, but there is nothing preventing the critic from imagining that the
ontotheologian misunderstands what, from the standpoint of the critic, is the
ontotheologian's merely private experience. With this the tendency for ad hominem
argumentation, which Descartes' exposition of the ontological argument exemplifies,
talces its final form. The ontotheologian can accuse the critic of being incapable of
philosophical knowledge, i.e., of failing to elevate himself above an "everyday"
standpoint, whereas the latter can dub the former a charlatan. One can easily adopt either
of these prejudices without having resolved the problems involved.
The ad hominem on the part of the critic, however, is more than an empty insult.
The Critical philosophy rests its accusations on its faith in its own accomplishments, and
these include a demonstration of the limits of human cognition. If human cognition
indeed has definable and cognizable limitations, then any claim to have exceeded those is
rightfully labeled charlatanism. Kant attempts to delineate exactly such limitations in his

Critique ofPure Reason, so that his disdain for ontotheology is, if not justifiable,
understandable. A further requirement thus arises for the post-Kantian ontotheologian,
one not satisfied by an appeal to the "elevation of the mind to God": some reply to the
attempt to provide a critique of the faculty of reason is necessary. In response to this
situation, Hegel launches frequent attacks on the idea of demonstrating the limits of
cognition, and the purpose of this chapter will be to assess these attacks.
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I.

Learning how to swim: Is Criticism self-defeating?

According to Hegel, Kant's Critical project is open to a number of objections of
principle, chief among which is the charge that there is some vicious circle implied by the
idea of a "critique of pure reason." Hegel agrees with Kant that reason should engage in
a thorough criticism of itself; he disagrees, however, with the manner in which the latter
pursues this idea. The critique of reason, Hegel insists, is itself a rational activity;
knowledge may indeed have certain limits, but the assertion of this fact is overtly a
knowledge claim. Consistency thus requires that the "critical" account of knowledge
include an explanation of how reason acquires knowledge of its own limits. Kant,
however, famously limits "knowledge" to "objects of experience," this latter expression
being understood in a sense that precludes not only metaphysical knowledge but also that
knowledge which Kant himself is implicitly enacting. To put the point simply, the
suggestion that knowledge is limited to "experience" is self-refuting, since that very
suggestion, if true, would constitute an instance of knowledge that is not ofexperience in
the intended sense of "experience." If the suggestion is true, it is also false.
Hegel expresses this criticism less exactly, but more entertainingly. He
understands Kant's project to imply that a critique ofreason is a preliminary to actual
knowledge. Such a project would thus amount to something like determining whether we
can swim without getting into water. It is worth citing one of Hegel's attempts to
formulate this criticism:
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It is one of the basic principles of the Critical philosophy that the capacity
for knowledge is to be investigated prior to the attempt to know God, the
essence of things, etc., in order to see whether our capacity is fit for such
tasks. One must acquaint oneself with the instrument prior to undertaking
the work for which that instrument is employed . .. It is easy to see that
other instruments can be investigated and examined in manner distinct
from the appropriate use of those instruments. The investigation of
knowledge, however, can occur only by means ofan act ofknowledge . ..
To want to know prior to actually knowing is just as absurd as
Scholasticus' wise resolution to learn to swim prior to getting in the
water.1

Hegel's frequent repetition of this joke has inspired much commentary from
philosophers who are sympathetic to Kant's philosophy, many of whom have insisted
that the criticism is unfairly polemical. In this section we will consider what some
defenders of Kant have had to say concerning this objection. The primary defense
consists in offering some characterization of the distinction between the knowledge of
which the Critique ofPure Reason provides a description and the knowledge of which
criticism is an instance. The Kantians contend that Hegel overlooks the distinction
between these two, and this contention has taken a variety of forms. According to Kuno
Fischer, the shortcoming of Hegel's objection lies in that it overlooks the distinction

1

Suhrkamp 8, pg. 53-4
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between "knowledge of things" and "self-knowledge."2 Wolfgang Roed reiterates this
point, concurring that Critique is not an instance of "knowledge of an object."3 Justus
Hartnack provides a more liberal interpretation of Kantian criticism, but one that accords
with these same claims. According to him, "criticism is therapy not knowledge.',4
The point common to these replies involves a denial of Hegel' s claim that "the
investigation of knowledge can occur only by means of an act of knowledge.'' Criticism,
for Kant, is indeed something distinct from "knowledge of objects" or "knowledge of
things." It remains, however, to provide an account of this distinction, to see whether it is
absolute, and whether Hegel merely overlooks it. Concerning this last point, the problem
is the same as in any case in which Hegel is accused of overlooking a distinction: what
typically occurs is not a mere oversight on Hegel's part, but rather an assumption based
on his claim to have demonstrated the limits of the distinction in question. This is most
obvious with respect to the distinction as Fischer draws it, which accuses Hegel of failing
to distinguish "knowledge of things" from "self-observation," or, to couch the distinction
in a related terminology, consciousness of things from self-consciousness. It is easy to
abstract a passage of Hegel and accuse him of overlooking this and other elementary
2

Concerning the Scholasticus joke Fischer writes: "Hegel took great liberty in allowing himself this cheap
joke, which he loved to repeat. The joke, however, is completely worthless if considered as a polemic,
since it would be just as valid as a criticism of any epistemology, and it could have been raised against
Locke just as easily as it was against Kant. Apart from that, it completely overlooks the distinction
between knowledge of things and self-knowledge or self-observation." Hegels Leben, Werke und Lehre, 2te
Teil 1142. The error in the first part of this passage is easy to uncover: Hegel would indeed agree that the
problem of self-refutation to which the Critical philosophy falls victim is merely a version of a problem
inherent to empiricist epistemology. In other words, a similar objection could be made to Locke, without
this affecting the force of the objection to Kant. In Faith and Knowledge Hegel even cites a relevant
passage from Locke, after which he notes how the passage could be mistaken for a Kantian explanation of
Criticism. See Suhrkamp 2, 303-4.
3

Roed, 172

"Categories and Things-in-Themselves" in Priest, Stephen ed. Hegel's Critique ofKant. Oxford,
Clarendon Press. 1987. Pg. 77-86.
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distinctions. The problem will always be the same: Hegel understands himself to have
proved that consciousness of things is in some sense identical to self-consciousness. In
other words, for Hegel "knowledge of things" is not a species of knowledge distinct from
"self-knowledge." Rather, the former is a disguised version of the latter, and this is a
basic point of his philosophy for which he provides extensive arguments.
The disagreement between Kant and Hegel on this point cannot be reduced to one
or the other overlooking a simple distinction. Kant indeed does not think that criticism is
a kind of "knowledge," since he uses this word (Erkenntnis) in a restricted sense. Hegel,
on the other hand, claims that Critical or other self-directed cognition is not of a species
altogether separate from empirical or other "first-order'' cognition. The controversy
should be resolved by an examination of how and to what extent Kant establishes the

distinction in question (between "Criticism" and "knowledge"). The problem, however,
is that Kant does not argue for this distinction, but instead "mostly speaks as if the
problem did not exist."5 It is a de facto shortcoming of Kant's work that he never
elaborates the problem of the type of knowledge involved in philosophical criticism.
A second line of defense of Kant is possible, although it leads to results that are
no more satisfactory. There is a sense in which Kantian critique does not require the

5

W.H. Walsh in "The Idea of a Critique of Pure Reason" in Priest, 126. Walsh provides an insightful
dismissal of the view expressed by Hartnack, Fischer and Roed: ''Kant might reply that . . . the reason that
functions in (criticism) is very different from the reason that functions in (first-order investigation). But
this of course presumes that a sharp distinction can be drawn, contrary to Hegel's belief, between what
happens when one tackles a problem in some first-order study ... ~d what _happens when one engages in
reflective philosophical activity.. . It also presumes that Kant can give a satisfactory account of the
know ledge involved in critical philosophy. The fact is, of course, that he did not offer any clear account of
this subject but rather confused the issue by failing to distinguish between the principles the critique
purports to ~stablish and the basic tru~ on whi~h it ~ests .. . it is e~y to_see w?}'. (Hegel) believed that the
critical philosophy was openly inconsistent at this pomt. My own view is that it is not, though I have to
admit that Kant gives little help in establi~hing the point, and ind_eed mos~y spe~ as if ~e problem did
not exist." Walsh does not, however, indicate how he would assist Kant m escapmg the dilemma.
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suspension of all knowledge claims, but rather constructs its own claims based on certain
instances of"first-order'' knowledge that are accepted as indubitable. For Kant, several
examples of a priori knowledge are available to us, e.g., geometrical knowledge, and
these are immune to philosophical skepticism. "Criticism" amounts to an explanation of
the possibility of these fields of knowledge, with the additional assertion that the
capacities summoned for this explanation are the only capacities of which we can become
aware. Knowledge claims not explicable by appeal to these capacities transcend the
boundaries of human cognition.6
If this is Kant's procedure, then there are several reasons why it is unsuitable for a
critique of metaphysical arguments. First, there is no good reason why criticism of the
faculty of knowledge should accept any claims as indubitable, i.e., as not also subject to
criticism. A metaphysician would certainly wonder why Kant does not treat mathematics
and physics with the same rigor that he treats metaphysics. 7 Secondly, and more
importantly, there is a serious problem with the assumption that any additional attempts
at knowledge are beyond human limitation. Even ifwe accept the indubitability of
certain sciences such as (Newtonian) physics and (Euclidean) geometry, and construct an
outline of the capacities necessary to explain these fields of knowledge, it by no means
follows that there are no further justifiable knowledge claims. Any claim not explicable

6

This response to Hegel' s Scholasticus objection is voiced by both Karl Ameriks and Paul Guyer. See the
former's "Hegel's critique of Kant's theoretical philosophy'' in Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, v. 46, no.I (1985) pp. 1-35 and the latter' s "Thought and being: Hegel's critique of Kant's
theoretical philosophy" in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pp.
171-210.
7An

interesting passage from the Critique (B 19-20) hypothetically (and perhaps wrongly) imputes the
same double standard on Hume. After noting that Hume' s doctrine of the synthetic connection of cause
and effect serves equally as an attack on "pure mathematics" as it does on "pure philosophy," Kant
imagines that Hume's "sound understanding" would have discouraged his advocation of the principle, had
he recognized that it does not endanger only philosophy.
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by the relevant capacities would simply require a separate explanation. Kant's argument
(on the reading in question) instead presumes that because metaphysical knowledge does
not fit the cognitive model of physical and geometrical knowledge, it should be
abandoned. He offers no argument, however, for the presumption that the limitations of
the capacities necessary for geometrical and/ or physical knowledge are the absolute
limitations for human knowledge. 8

IL

Idealism and Criticism

The foregoing reflections suggest that the Kantian conception of a critique of
reason contains a fundamental inconsistency and/ or an argumentative shortcoming. In
other words, it is either the case (and perhaps both) that Critique is an activity distinct
from any actual cognition, in which case it denies itself any possibility of constituting a
form of knowledge (i.e., of expressing truth), or it consists merely in an explanation of
certain forms of knowledge that are presumed in advance to be valid. If the latter is the
case, Critique is not an activity that demarcates the limits of human cognition in general,
but only the limits of the particular forms of cognition assumed as its starting point. That
there are no other actual forms of knowledge is a thesis for which no analysis of
"experience" or its conditions can provide a basis. The opinion that the Critique ofPure

Reason offers a definitive critique of ontotheology is a nonstarter.

Ameriks (pg. 2) suggests that the Antinomy provides the argument for what he aptly calls the "restriction
thesis." In his analysis of the Antinomy, however, he attributes to Kant only a more modest claim that begs
the restriction question: "the chapter is about how the infinite or unconditional (supposedly) cannot be
determined to be present in the empirical realm." Pg. 26.

8

140

Such a worry, however, is one with which we have long since dispensed. The
problem under current consideration concerns rather whether an Hegelian version of the
ontological argument can be construed as thoroughly convincing relative to Kantian
Criticism, or whether the two sides of the argument must remain at an impasse. Hegel
certainly intends to provide a devastating critique of Kant's metaphysics, one that shows
that the adoption of the Critical standpoint eventually leads to Hegelian metaphysics.
The Scholasticus remarks alone would be adequate to highlight an inconsistency in the
Critical philosophy that should prove destructive to it. Hegel's joke, though, suffers from
the same limitation as every accusation of self-refutation: it relies on a generally
unsympathetic view of its opponent. In the case in question, the objection undoubtedly
serves to indicate a shortcoming in Kant's exposition. I.e., Kant simply did not provide a
"critical" foundation for the possibility of Critical knowledge. That such a foundation is
impossible on Kant's own principles, however, is a stronger thesis that Hegel's joke does
not necessarily support. It is possible to appreciate the joke while imagining that some
reply is feasible.
A closer look at Kant's view on metaphysics, specifically at his assertions
concerning the limits of human knowledge, is thus in order. Hegel does not limit his
charge of inconsistency to the Scholasticus joke. Rather, he believes that certain insights
of Kant's were profound enough to provide the foundations for an idealistic philosophy,
but that the specifically Critical aspects of the latter's philosophy were inconsistent with
those insights. In this section we will focus on a second attempt to charge Kant with an
inconsistency, one in which Hegel contends that the notion that metaphysical knowledge
is beyond our capacity contradicts Kant's own principles. The objection concerns
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Hegel's interpretation of the Kantian doctrine of the "original-synthetic unity of
apperception." Hegel opens his discussion of Kant in the "Doctrine of the Concept" by
citing the following passage from the Critique:

An object, however, is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given
intuition is united. Now, however, all unification of representations
requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently the
unity of consciousness is that which alone constitutes the relation of
representations to an object, thus their objective validity, and consequently
is that which makes them into cognitions and on which even the
possibility of the understanding rests.

9

According to Hegel, Kant's notion of"object" implies that "the objective
determination of representations can be derived only from the doctrine of the

transcendental unity ofapperception." 10 Hegel also understands the "I" or "pure selfconsciousness" that this last notion expresses to be equivalent to his own concept of
'concept', "to the extent that this (the concept) has achieved a free existence."

11

He thus

concludes that, for Kant, "it is the unity of the concept through which something is no
longer merely a determination of feeling, an intuition or a mere representation, but rather

9

KrV B 137, translation Guyer and Wood.

10

Suhrkamp 6, pg. 254-5

11

Ibid., pg. 253
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an object." 12 In other words, the unity of a given object derives from the concept or from
the "I," the unity of consciousness.
It is easy to see why this idea appeals to Hegel: through it a (perhaps limited)
unity of "concept" and "object" finds expression. "Objectivity'' is a characteristic that
belongs to an "object" by virtue of its relation to consciousness. In Hegel's terminology,
the ''being in and for itself' of the object is its "positedness." The concept is not
something merely subjective, but rather it is that which constitutes the objectivity of
objects. Hegel understands the rejection of the ontological argument, to which he alludes
by use of the code word herausklauben, to be entirely inconsistent with this notion of
objectivity:

On the other hand, however, (the concept) is taken for something merely
subjective, from which reality ... cannot be plucked.

13

Hegel's intention is to separate the idealistic aspects of Kant's philosophy from
the Critical aspects, in order to make the latter appear inconsistent with the former. He
contends, in the above discussion, that the doctrine of the "original-synthetic unity of
apperception" is inconsistent with the logical objection. This inconsistency, however, is
attributable primarily to his projecting too much of his own view onto Kant's doctrine.

12

14

Ibid., pg. 255

Ibid, pg. 256. Cf., pg. 261: "The further development (of Kant' s philosophy) hardly corresponds to its
beginning."
13

14 Guyer thus rightly claims that Hegel misunderstands the doctrine in question: ''For Kant, the unity of
apperception is a synthetic unity among one's own representations. The task of empirical judgment may be
conceived of as that of placing a dual interpretation on these representations, using the forms of judgment
to interpret them as both representations of the successive states in the history of the self and
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Specifically, Hegel seems to ignore the fact that, for Kant, the unity of apperception is
"transcendental," i.e., that this unity is not to be conflated with the concrete, psychical
representations from which reality cannot be plucked. The distinction between
transcendental and empirical subjectivity may be problematic, but it does serve to rescue
Kant from the inconsistency that Hegel here attributes to him.
The doctrine of apperception appears to Hegel to be inconsistent also with the
idea that we cannot know things-in-themselves. 15 The latter claim understandably strikes
Kantians as peculiar, since the doctrine of apperception is intricately tied to Kant's claim
that the objects of our knowledge are mere appearances, viz. not things-in-themselves.
Kant concludes that since objectivity is determined relative to consciousness, the objects
of consciousness are specific to consciousness and therefore are not things-in-themselves,
but rather nothing more than objects of our experience. Hegel's spin on this idea is
perhaps little more than linguistic: the in-itself of the object is its relation to
consciousness.
The aspect of Kant's subjective idealism to which Hegel is objecting here is not
the determination of objects of experience as "appearances," but rather the notion that
appearances are mere appearances. In other words, Hegel's malaise concerns the
representation of a ''thing-in-itself' that would be inaccessible to human cognition, and
he instead asserts that the "in-itself' of things is precisely "appearance," so that the

representations of the successive states in the history of the world of objects external to the self; but there is
no hint of any identity between the self and its objects themselves. For Kant, apperception, like judgment,
remains confined within the sphere of thought. It may require us to represent a world ofunified objects,
but it is by no means identical with such a world." Pg. 183.
Ibid., 262-3.: "The objectivity of thinking is here expressed with definiteness ... On the other hand, it is
added that we are incapable ofknowing things as they are in and for themselves, and that truth is
inaccessible for cognizing reason."
15
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former is indeed accessible to us. His complaint is thus limited to the suggestion that
since what we know are appearances, our knowledge thereby falls short of the truth. To
be fair to Kant, however, the latter does not intend to represent our knowledge of
appearances as deficient in any strong sense. Kantians have insisted on this point
emphatically: the notion that the "appearances" possess, for Kant, a secondary
ontological status is misleading. Kant's idealism is thus not a form of skepticism for
which ''the cognition of appearances of which we are capable is merely a pale substitute
for genuine knowledge." 16 On the contrary, Kant's intention was to explain the validity
of our knowledge of objects of experience.
However inappropriate the suggestion may be that Kant's philosophy denies our
capacity for knowing the truth, there is nonetheless something very misleading about
Kant' s manner of expressing his view. The claim that what we know are "mere
appearances" at least suggests that there are ''things-in-themselves" that we do not know,
and this understandably leads Hegel to conclude that Kant simultaneously both asserts
and denies the objectivity of knowledge. Whether Kant is actually committed to the
existence of things-in-themselves is immaterial.

17

It is clear enough that if there are

things-in-themselves, then we know nothing about them, and cannot even properly
contrast them with "appearances." 18 "Appearance" in Kant's sense is thus not

16

Henry Allison, ' We can only act under the idea of freedom,' Pacific Division APA Presidential Address
in Proceedings and Addresses ofthe APA, No. 2, pp.39-50. Cited in Sally Sedgwick, "Hegel, McDowell
and recent defenses of Kant," Journal for the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 31, No. 3, October
2000. Pp. 229-247.
17

It is fashionable to explain the thing-in-itself as a "limiting concept." Allison, Hartnack and others

pursue this line.
18

Sedgwick writes that Kant must rule out any claims about things-in-themselves, "including the claim that
they are more real than appearances." Pg. 235.
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distinguished from "reality'' in an empirical sense. To put it differently, if we distinguish
"appearance" from "reality," we must also distinguish two senses of the distinction.
There is an empirical sense to the distinction and a transcendental one, and the concern
here lies with the latter. If that is the case, however, then it makes little sense to use the
word "appearance." This is a term that is inappropriate for what Kant wishes to
express. 19

III. Intellectual intuition

Hegel consistently treats two notions from Kant's theoretical philosophy with
approval. The first idea, that of the "original-synthetic unity" of apperception,
contributes to the determination of objects of our knowledge as "appearances." The
meaning of this last expression, however, is not to be contrasted with a "reality'' beyond
those appearances, but it instead characterizes the objects of our knowledge as (in part)
constituted by our consciousness. Kant's use of the word "appearance," interestingly
enough, possesses an affinity to the notion of appearance as this develops in the
"Doctrine of Essence." For Hegel, it belongs to the concept of 'essence' that it appear.
' Essence' and 'appearance' are not mere opposites; rather, the latter category is a
development of the former. Similarly, Kant holds that what an object is in itself is an
appearance, i.e., the essence of objectivity is appearance. The notion of a "thing-initself' serves only to obscure this idea.
19 w alsh' s commentary on this point is helpful: "If it is the case that our actual equipment suffices for
achieving an understanding of the world of experience which is fully satisfactory at its own level, why must
such understanding be written down by being said to be only of appearances? The contrast of appearance
and reality here is not that of less and more real." Pg. 133.

There is nevertheless an important difference between Kant and Hegel on this
issue, and this difference manifests itself in the proper sense of Kant's distinction
between "appearance" and "thing-itself." As explained above, this distinction is not the
same as the empirical version of the appearance/ reality distinction. The transcendental
sense of the distinction instead indicates only the difference between what the objects of
our cognitive faculties are (appearances) and what they could be if our faculties were
different than what they are (things-in-themselves).

20

This reflection introduces the

second notion of Kant's to which Hegel expresses approval: the notion of an intuitive
intellect.
At several points in the Critique ofPure Reason, Kant refers to the idea of an
"intuitive intellect," which he describes as an understanding whose representations of
objects would at the same time either constitute or produce the existence of those objects.
Kant's use of the notion is pedagogic: his intention is to explain a peculiarity of human
cognition, namely that our conceiving an object is not equivalent to intuiting its presence.
Our capacity is explained by contrast with an intellect for which these activities
(conceiving and intuiting) are not distinct. We can think of (re: imagine) such an
intellect, but the idea of it is essentially inaccessible to us.

21

In the Critique ofJudgment Kant elaborates the idea of an intuitive intellect,
although it appears only in a comment and plays no crucial role in any of the main
arguments of that work. He arrives at the notion by means of a consideration of the

Walsh writes (continuation of previous note): "the relation is rather between the reality we arrive at when
we judge as best we can and the reality we might arrive at were our cognitive faculties wholly different
from what they are."

20

21

At KrV B 149 Kant writes that we can think of such an understanding only negatively.
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subjective necessity of the distinction between "necessity'' and "possibility." This
distinction, he claims, is indispensable for human cognition. Indispensability for us,
however, does not imply objectivity. On the contrary, there is no reason to assume that
the distinction holds objectively, since our only reason for recognizing it consists in the
fact that our conception of an object (of its possibility) is an activity distinct from our
intuiting its actuality. 22 The idea of an intuitive intellect appears as a result of the insight
into the subjective nature of the modal distinctions: since the distinction of possibility and
necessity is only necessary for us, we can also imagine an intellect for which this
distinction would not hold.
Kant's central claim here is that the distinction between possibility and necessity
is necessary for human understanding. The basis for this claim is our ability to imagine,
i.e., to think of things that do not exist.23 Kant assumes that the only way to explain this
capacity for imagining things is to assert that our thinking about things is something

utterly distinct from the existence of those things (or from our intuiting that existence).
With this we are treading on old turf, as Kant's exposition here tacitly assumes both the
logical and empirical objections. As far as our capacity for imagining things is
concerned, it is important to remember what Descartes writes about the effect of this
capacity on our ability to comprehend the ontological argument:

we are in the habit of making up at will various ideas of things which do
not exist anywhere and have never done so. Hence, at times when we are
Section 76: "this does not prove that the distinction lies in things themselves." Translation Werner
Pluhar, Critique ofJudgment, Hackett 1987. Pg. 285. All citations from the Third Critique, unless
otherwise indicated, are from this edition.
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not intent on the contemplation of the supremely perfect being, a doubt
may easily arise as to whether the idea of God is not one of those which
we made up at will. 24

The relevance of our capacity for imagining non-existent entities to the
ontological argument is obvious to Kant as well. The passage of the Critique of
Judgment that refers to this capacity thus also concludes with a discussion of the idea of

God. Kant's argument in this passage is not consistent with the structure of the Critique
ofPure Reason, but he assents again here to the three primary objections to the

ontological argument. Beginning from our awareness of our capacity for imagining, he
infers that possibility (i.e., thought) is different from actuality (the logical objection).
From that he infers that our conceiving of something cannot produce its existence, and
that the latter is manifest only in a distinct intuition not derivable (not "pluckable" we
could say) from our conception (the empirical objection). Finally he concludes that since
existence cannot result from our concepts ''the concept of an absolutely necessary being .
25

. . is for human understanding an unattainable problematic concept."

In other words,

since existence is distinct from thought, we are incapable of specifying the concept of a
necessary being (the Critical objection).
The error in this argument is also quite familiar to us, and it manifests itself most
vividly if we recall the arguments of the proponents of the ontological proof. The latter
clearly recognize our imagining non-existent entities to be an obstacle to philosophical
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Principles I, 16. AT VIIIA 10-11, CSM I 198
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Critique ofJudgment, pg. 285
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comprehension. This is why Descartes writes that our tendency for imagining things is
what prevents most people from understanding the precepts of metaphysics, and why
Spinoza prefaces his philosophy with an exercise intended to assist the student in
correcting/ eliminating the habit of imagining. 26 Hegel rightly defends the rationalists in
his Encyclopedia when he claims that the empirical objection, which arises almost
exclusively with reference to imagining, proposes nothing that the proponents of the
ontological argument wish to deny. This is why he concludes his discussion of Kant's
"hundred dollars" example with the retort that the objectors "should finally realize that
this (the empirical objection) is not something with which the philosophers are
unfamiliar."27 Hegel's reply to the same objection in the Lectures on the History of

Philosophy echoes the sentiment of the philosophers whom he is defending in the
Encyclopedia: "one can just as well assert that imagining should be left alone." 28
The disagreement between Kant and the ontotheologians concerning what is to be
concluded from our ability to think of non-existent things results chiefly from the fact
that Kant attempts to draw too much from the thought of this capacity. Kant claims that
the capacity implies that the distinction between possibility and necessity is necessary for
our understanding. This implication, however, is by no means obvious. It is indeed
obvious that we are capable of imagining things, and this entails that distinguishing
between possibility and actuality is possible. That there are no limits to the domain of
this distinction, and thus that it is to be applied without exception, is an assumption that

See Principles I 16 and Spinoza's Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, #58 - #65, Curley pp. 2630.
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Kant does nothing to justify. To put the point differently, Kant assumes that since we can
imagine non-existents, the cognitive structure necessary to explain this ability, viz. the
distinction between possibility and necessity, must be constitutive of our thinking as

such. This is a repetition of a basic fallacy of his: he mistakes certain of our capacities to
be necessary constituents of our intellectual activities in their entirety.
Although Kant is unsuccessful in establishing the impossibility of intellectual
intuition, Hegel's reflections on this concept are no more compelling. He understands
Kant's recognition of the idea of an intuitive intellect to comprise a second instance of
the "speculative" element in Kant's philosophy, one that is as incompatible with the
rejection of ontotheology as the first instance is. In the introduction to the "Doctrine of
the Concept," Hegel appeals to the notion of an intuitive intellect in another effort to
highlight incompatible tendencies within the Critical philosophy. Kant, he reminds us,
holds the distinction between thinking and sensuous existence to be absolute, despite the
fact that he occasionally recognizes a "higher unity'' of the two, the notion of an intuitive
intellect serving as an example of this unity. Hegel finds this tension in Kant to be
"worthy of astonishment," and suggests that the latter should have drawn conclusions

. ·1 ar to his own.29
more s1rru
In the ensuing pages Hegel attempts to justify the idea of an intuitive intellect by

appeal to the definition of truth. He cites Kant's version of the traditional definition,
30

which reads ''the agreement of knowledge with its object."

Hegel understands this

definition to imply that reality cannot lie utterly apart from the concept, since in that case

29

Suhrkamp 6, pg. 264: "Es wird immer als etwas Verwundernswuerdiges ausgezeichnet werden ..."

KrV A 58/ B 82: "die Uebereinstimmung der Erkenntnis mit ihrem Gegestande." Hegel cites this
passage at Suhrkamp 6, 265-266.
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the knowledge would not be thoroughly in agreement with its object. In other words,
Kant's maxim that we cannot know things-in-themselves implies that we have no ''true"
knowledge, since the definition of truth implies that the things are in "agreement" with
knowledge. The idea of an intuitive intellect, however, fulfills what the definition of
truth requires:

If Kant had considered the idea of an intuitive intellect in light of the
definition of truth, he would have regarded this idea, since it expresses the
required agreement, as itself true, rather than as a mere product of
thought. 31

Instead Kant regards the idea as useful only insofar as it draws attention to a basic
limitation of our thinking, namely, that conception and intuition are always distinct.
Contrary to Hegel's insistence, there seems to be nothing inconsistent about this position.
With the idea of an intuitive intellect, Kant does not recognize a "higher unity" of thought
and sensuous existence, except insofar as he claims to recognize that we could not
understand such a unity. Hegel' s argument from the definition of truth does nothing to
assist him; the objects of knowledge, for Kant, are "appearances," and these are indeed in
agreement with that knowledge. It is thus very misleading to say that Kant denies our
capacity to know the truth.

31

Suhrkamp 6, pg. 266
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,
IV.

The heterogeneity of the faculties

Hegel's efforts at demonstrating Kant to be inconsistent in his commitment to the
notion of an intuitive intellect are thoroughly unconvincing. In the relevant passages,
Hegel likewise does nothing to establish the ''truth" of the idea in question, just as Kant
offers little in support of his claim that the notion is a mere idea that has only "regulative"
value. To his credit, however, Hegel seems to be quite aware that the disparity between
Kant's position and his own concerns chiefly a prejudice about the relationship between
thought and sensuous existence. This explains why the discussion of Kant in the
introduction to the third book of the Logic contains a plethora of ad hominem remarks as
well as ironically posed rhetorical questions. The purpose of these is to highlight the
arbitrary nature of a common yet distinctly unphilosophical set of assumptions, from
which, Hegel maintains, Kant fails to free himself. The basic point in question, of course,
is that "existence" denotes something utterly and irreconcilably distinct from thought,
with the additional tendency to suggest that thought somehow falls short of existence.
Hegel pokes fun of the latter tendency in passages like the following:

It is commonly said that "it is only a concept," and with this it is suggested

that .. . existence that is sensuous, temporal, spatial and that can be
grabbed with the hands is something more excellent than the concept.

32
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As a positive claim, the notion that sensuous existence is "more excellent" than
thought appears senseless, but this claim is certainly presupposed in the assertion that
ideas like that of an intuitive intellect, a necessary being, etc., are ''mere" ideas. The
"mere" suggests that we are dealing with something less than the "reality'' that is ascribed
only to pencils, chairs, or even to money. Hegel strengthens his rhetoric by employing
the word ''true" in this context, and suggests that, for Kant, the ideas in question are
''untrue." Kant certainly does not go so far as to deny them ''truth," since he applies this
term in a more careful manner, but the deflationary tone in his assertion that such ideas
are of "merely regulative" use carries a certain sentiment, the thoughtlessness of which it
is Hegel's intention to underline. The reason for Kant's tone is that the ideas do not
correspond to anything that "exists" in the sense of"objects of possible experience."
Considered apart from any critical context, Kant's position consists in truisms to which
no modem philosopher would object, e.g., "God is not in time and space." Kant's
intention, however, is quite clearly to refute philosophical positions, as is evidenced by
the fact that he imagines his position to pose a threat to the ontological argument. Hegel
wishes to do little more than draw attention to the irrelevance of Kant's position as a

critique, although he executes this only with awful ironic gestures:

The concepts of reason ... are mere ideas. The employment of them is
certainly permissible, but nothing more than hypotheses are expressed by
(the ideas of) these intelligible entities, from which all truth is completely
excluded ... because they- do not appear in any experience. - Could we
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have ever imagined that philosophy would deny all truth to the intelligible
entities because they lack the spatio-temporal matter of sensation?33

The disparity in sentiment between Kant and Hegel that reveals itself through
occasional insults and the placement of words like "mere" nevertheless corresponds to
matters of philosophical doctrine. Kant's hesitance towards ideas such as those of an ens
necessarium or an intuitive intellect derives partly from his insistence on the "completely
heterogeneous" nature of the constituents of our cognitive faculties. 34 The idea that
concepts and intuitions are utterly and without exception distinct is one of the principal
claims/ assumptions of the Critique ofPure Reason. If Kant were to propose any good
(non question-begging) reason for accepting this claim, then he would do much to
undermine the principles of metaphysics, since in that case there would be an important
sense to the claim that ''thought" and "existence" are entirely distinct. In his magnum

opus, however, Kant neglects to offer any argument at all for the distinction.
Interestingly enough, the motivation for the distinction, according to some Kantians, is
35

precisely "to avoid some of the most pervasive errors of traditional metaphysics."

This

unfortunately stands the dilemma on its head; even if we were to admit that the
metaphysics of, e.g., the monadology, is "fanciful,"36 philosophical conscience would
require us to determine precisely what is wrong with that system. It is unlikely, however,
that the defenders of Kant think of anything when using expressions like "the major

33

Ibid., pg. 262

34
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errors of previous metaphysics,"37 unless they merely remind themselves that Leibniz and
his predecessors fail to distinguish between concepts and intuitions. In other words, the
Kantians distinguish between concepts and intuitions in order to avoid the error of not
distinguishing between concepts and intuitions.
In the Critique ofJudgment Kant arrives at this distinction in the context of a

reflection on the distinction between possibility and necessity. The latter distinction is
necessary for imagining non-existents, so that the "fundamental premise" of the
heterogeneity of the faculties serves partly to explain our ability to imagine. The errors in
this line of argument (if it is taken as an argument) are evident enough at this point. First,
the fact that we imagine non-existents does not imply that the ability to do so defines our
entire cognitive constitution as such. Secondly, the unjust emphasis on imagining
obscures the distinction between true and imaginative ideas, and culminates in the tacit
incorporation of all ideas under the latter category. This tendency is only strengthened
rhetorically by the frequent and misleading employment of the word "mere." In defense
of Kant, however, he does not intend to put forth arguments in the "Remark" in the
middle of the "Critique of Teleological Judgment," so that he would admit that reference
38

to these basic doctrines should amount to no more than a restatement of his prejudices.

The absoluteness of the distinction between concepts and intuitions is indeed the
fundamental premise of Kant's theoretical philosophy. The distinction underlies the
division of the "Doctrine of elements" into an "Aesthetic" and a "Logic." It thus
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determines the structure of the Critique, and serves to justify that work without itself
being justified by it. If the distinction is accepted as absolute, or as valid without
exception, then the fundamental premise of rationalist metaphysics, namely, that
existence belongs necessarily to God's nature, appears to contain a basic error. If the
latter premise, however, is accepted, then Kant's premise appears in an equally
unflattering light, and the ontological argument appears to involve only the most simple
and indubitable of inferences. The acceptance or rejection of the ontological argument
thus depends on the assumption of one of these fundamental premises.39
In the previous chapter, we discussed Hegel's attempt to prove the Cartesian
premise, and concluded that he meets with only moderate success. Hegel is capable only
of elaborating the premise, and the method of his elaboration remains entirely
inaccessible to the stubborn critic. Kant, on the other hand, does considerably less in this
regard. The absoluteness of the distinction between concepts and intuitions is for him
nothing more than an unelaborated first principle. It is an historical fact that Kant's

Critique offers a contribution to the problem of the ontological argument whose value is
roughly equivalent to that of Spinoza's Ethics. In other words, Kant cannot be said to
have done more than consistently draw the consequences (ifhe is consistent) of a basic
prejudice (or set of prejudices), without attempting to explain why that prejudice is
adopted.
It is more difficult to determine whether this fact is to be represented as a

shortcoming. In other words, it is possible that the notion that concepts and intuitions are

At least in the cases of Kant and Hegel these are the key premises. It is possible, however, to reject both
the definition of God as necessarily existing and the heterogeneity of the faculties, as is the case in classical
(Humean) empiricism.

39
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"entirely heterogeneous" is simply incapable of elaboration. At any rate, the epistemic
value ofthis claim is either null or very low. The premise does not appear, at first glance,
to be something that could be known; the problem of how anybody could know such a
thing, viz., that thinking is absolutely different from intuiting, seems to be at the very
least unexplained, and it is probably inexplicable. It would thus be very misleading to
represent the premise as an "insight," as is often the case in dismissals of the ontological
argument.

V. "Critical" philosophy or "genuine" criticism

40

It is possible to represent what we have called the "fundamental premise" of the
Critical philosophy as derivative from another "insight" or prejudice. The difference
between concepts and intuitions appears necessary upon recognition of the "insight" into
the fundamentally judgmental nature of all knowledge. In other words, if we begin with
the notion that knowledge must be expressed in judgments, then it is easy to arrive at the
conclusion that concepts and intuitions must be distinct. Judgments express only the
connection of concepts, and the truth-value of most judgments depends on some intuition
not incorporated into the judgment. An analysis of the conditions of judgmental or
discursive knowledge should thus distinguish concepts from intuitions, and the assertion
that this distinction holds absolutely follows from the assumption that all knowledge is
discursive.

40
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Hegel concludes his introduction to the "Doctrine of the Concept" with some
objections to this assumption. Kant indeed insists that knowledge is essentially
judgmental; an analysis of the forms of judgment thus yields an exhaustive list of"pure
concepts," and these require application to possible intuitions in order to yield
meaningful knowledge claims. Kant's belief that knowledge is discursive involves the
assumption that the forms of judgment are "in themselves" valid, i.e., that they are
adequate for expressing truth. Hegel attacks this assumption in the interest of
formulating a very different notion of a critique of knowledge: rather than assume that
truth is expressed in judgments, criticism should examine the form ofjudgments to
determine whether these forms are "true."4 1
The early chapters of the "Doctrine of the Concept" execute this plan in great
detail, and the chapter on "Judgment" contains the criticism of discursive knowledge that
Kant neglects to provide. Hegel's conclusion is predictable enough: the forms of
judgment prove to be ultimately inadequate. Our interest here requires only a superficial
reflection on this conclusion in comparison to Kant's prejudice. Kant's "Critical"
philosophy begins with the assumption that knowledge is discursive, and subsequently
manages to exclude certain objects from the realm of possible (discursive) knowledge.
Hegel, by contrast, aims at knowledge of the "absolute" and concludes that this cannot be
expressed in judgments. The disparity between these views thus results not from any
substantive disagreement, but rather only from divergent conceptions of how and to what
extent reason is subject to criticism.

41
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A number of considerations lead us to the insight that "Criticism" as Kant
espouses this fails to pose a formidable challenge to the ontological argument. First,
Kant simply neglects to argue for the basic assumptions upon which his arguments rest.
Secondly, where Kant does make explicit claims concerning the justification of
metaphysical knowledge, these claims exceed what his analyses of"experience" and
discursive knowledge can adequately support. The Critical philosophy is thus left emptyhanded in its battle with ontotheology.
Our original question, however, concerned not only whether Hegel sufficiently
responds to Kantian claims about the limitations of knowledge, but also whether he can
decisively prove to the "critic" that the latter's position should be abandoned. In other
words, if the ontological argument were to be established as expressing something ''true,"
the standpoint of the critic should be shown to be inconsistent and untenable as well as
arbitrary. Hegel' s achievements in this regard are considerably more problematic. His
attempts at demonstrating the "speculative element" in Kant's philosophy to be
inconsistent with the rejection of ontotheology are less than convincing. His appeal to
the definition of truth is equally unsatisfactory. Hegel at times suggests that the logical
and empirical objections are inconsistent with the idea of truth as "agreement," since the
latter demands that thought and existence possess some kind of unity. Kant's
subjectivism, however, accounts for precisely such an agreement in the case of empirical
truth, so that Hegel's tendency to portray Kant as a skeptic is misleading.
Hegel is left rather with his own problem in connection with the notion of truth.
His conviction that Criticism should investigate the forms ofjudgment in the interest of
determining their ''truth" should appear strange to some philosophers. A judgment, e.g.,

160

the positive judgment ''the rose is red," expresses either truth or falsity, and this can be
determined only in accordance with a corresponding intuition. Hegel's concern with the
truth of the form of the judgment equivocates on the meaning of''truth," since the form
could possess only a kind of truth quite different from the kind that depends on the
intuition. He makes the novel observation that the form of the positive judgment
suggests that ''the individual is a universal," and that this claim is "inherently
dialectical."42 The dialectical ''truth" of this claim, however, differs entirely from the
"truth" of the original positive judgment, so that inquiry into the former cannot be
motivated by any inconsistency regarding the "criticism" of the latter.
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Chapter Five: Metaphysics and Critique: two approaches to the existence of God

In the conclusion to his discussion of the empirical objection, Gassendi underlines
the basic shortcoming of the Cartesian ontological argument: Descartes neglects to
provide a demonstration for the premise that, as Gassendi abbreviates it, "existence
belongs to God." The analogy to the Pythagorean Theorem falters as a result of this
omission, since that theorem is indeed accompanied by a demonstration. Gassendi
rightly indicates that the minor premise of Descartes' argument is thereby shown to be

arbitrary, since we can predicate any property of any thing in a manner that is at least
formally similar to that premise: "I shall easily be able to establish that anything has any
property at all." 1 Descartes' silence on this issue is noteworthy, and his defense of the
ontological argument is essentially negative; i.e., he succeeds in highlighting the
weakness in each objection, without ever providing a positive demonstration of his
premises. 2 The result is that Descartes neither proves his ''proof," nor does he allow it to
be refuted. His various doctrines address each of the objections in its turn: the theory of
clear and distinct ideas disarms the Thomistic objection; the difference between God and
"limited things" and the modal qualification of the concept of existence reveal the
question-begging nature of the empirical objection; and the theory of innate ideas serves
as a response to the Critical objection. No decisive refutation of the argument appears in

1 AT VII 325· CSM II 226: "You surely see the point that can be made here: just as we afterwards
recognize tha~ the triangle has this property because it is proved by a demons~ation, so, if_we are to
.
recognize that existence belongs to God, this must be proved by a demonstration. Otherwtse I shall easily
be able to establish that anything has any property at all."
2

At AT VII 383-4; CSM II 263 Descartes essentially ignores Gassendi's objection.
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Descartes' correspondence, just as his works contain no thoroughly convincing
formulation of the argument. Neither Descartes nor his critics ever gain the upper hand.
In this as in all other aspects of the dispute, the confrontation between Descartes

and his contemporaries foreshadows the dialogue between Hegel and Kant. In most of
the particulars of the ontological argument, the positions that the Germans hold are nearly
identical to those held by Descartes and his objectors. Kant differs in no important way
from Caterus and Gassendi respectively in his formulations of the Thomistic and
empirical objections. His only apparent advantage over his seventeenth-century
predecessors lies in his Critical objection, or the claim that the notion of God as a
necessary being is an arbitrary conjunction of two distinct concepts. We have discussed
both a negative and a positive side of this objection. The positive side, viz., his story of
how these two concepts arise and of how they are to be employed, is no less arbitrary
than the premise of the ontological argument whose fallaciousness that story is designed
to reveal. From the claim that the concept, e.g., of a necessary being, regulates our
knowledge of the series of contingent beings, it simply does not follow that the origin and
purpose of that concept consists precisely in this regulative use. It is hard to imagine how
one would endeavor to prove a claim of the sort ''the concept of a necessary being is valid
only in the regulation of knowledge of experience," without already presupposing that

"knowledge of experience" (or of the conditions thereof) exhausts the possibilities of
knowledge as such. In other words, Kant's claim presupposes exactly what he intends to
prove by means of it, so that the positive side of his story is ultimately question-begging.

3 The

point here is not a textual claim regarding what K~~•s intention _actua~y was. Per~aps he did not
intend to prove, in the "Dialectic," that knowledge pertammg to expenen~e 1s the only kind of knowledge.
In order to avoid begging the question in the attempt to refute the ontological argument, however, he
needed to prove this.

3

The strength of Kant's Critical objection, on the other hand, lies with its negative side.
His attempt to provide a genetic account of the notions of a necessary being and of a sum
of all perfections highlights the arbitrariness of the premise that the sum of all perfections
necessarily exists. One way of showing that a given claim is arbitrary is to pose an
equally arbitrary claim. Kant's "Transcendental Dialectic" does precisely that, and in the
end it establishes nothing more with respect to the ontological argument than Gassendi
had been able to say in just a few lines.
Hegel agrees with both Kant and Gassendi that Descartes' premise is arbitrary,
and he attempts to correct this basic shortcoming. He understands his Logic to prove the
premise that the ontological argument merely stipulates.4 The Logic indeed provides a
detailed analysis of the premises of the ontological argument, and the "Doctrine of
Essence" in particular is largely an elaboration of the basic concepts of rationalist
metaphysics. Anyone interested in the study of Descartes or Spinoza would do well to
seek in Hegel's work a more thorough treatment of many of the doctrines espoused by
those philosophers. What they will not find, however, is anything resembling a proof that
would suffice to persuade a stubborn critic. The ontological argument, even on Hegel's
formulation, is not demonstrably valid, although it may express a peculiar truth of its
own. Hegel does offer extensive criticism of Kant's criticisms, and he defends the
argument in a negative manner akin to Descartes' defense. In the process he develops the
argument's premises, and in some cases he formulates more consistent and convincing
versions of the doctrines that are cited in support of those premises. His "absolute

Rel. III, 115. This represents Hegel's attitude toward his relationship to both Descartes and Spinoza. See,
among other texts, Suhrkamp 20, 136ff. And 20, 172ff.
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idealism" is a descenden t of the notion that what is clearly and distinctly perceived is
thereby true; he likewise develops the ideas that finite things are dependent upon the
infinite, that "existence " is not attributed univocally, that a special standpoint is required
for the comprehen sion of philosophical truths, and other dogmas on which the
ontological argument depends.
Despite his more elaborate metaphysical doctrines and his longer and more
nuanced arguments advancing them, Hegel is unable to eliminate a certain kind of
arbitrariness from the ontological argument. He is unable, namely, to persuade a critic of
the Kantian sort, one who insists, for instance, that concepts and intuitions are originally
distinct, to abandon his/her assumptions. The controversy over the ontological argument
reduces to the irreconcilability of such fundamental assumptions. These assumptions
occasion diverse approaches to philosophy, and the premises of ontotheology represent
the conditions for one particular approach to philosophy. The general features of this
approach are common to both Hegel and Descartes. Both philosophers formulate a single
argument, the ontological argument, as a kind of summary of philosophy. The basic
feature of the ontological argument is that it expresses a set of doctrines upon which the
whole of a philosophy is constructed. The significance of the argument is thus not
limited to the novel set of doctrines that underlie it, but lies chiefly in its indication of a
kind of philosophizing. The theme of this final chapter is to discuss some of the
characteristics of this kind of philosophizing.
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I.

A metaphysician's transcendental arguments

One way of understanding the difference between an Hegelian and a Kantian
approach to philosophy is in terms of the difference between metaphysics and
transcendental philosophy. Neither of these terms, unfortunately, tends to be employed
in a consistent and precise fashion. Some characterization of the distinction is
nonetheless possible. The purpose of this section is to highlight some of the basic
features of that distinction. The specific concern, of course, is how those features apply
to Hegel's discussions of the ontological argument.

It belongs to the superficial, but not incorrect, understanding of the term
"metaphysics" that it indicates a kind of philosophy that either proposes or analyzes
claims about non-empirical existence. Descartes is undoubtedly a metaphysician, and he
deserves this title mainly because he offers abstract demonstrations of the existence of the
mind and of God. Kant is said to have criticized metaphysics, primarily because he
insists that knowledge of certain ''metaphysical" concepts does not qualify as knowledge
of existents. He expresses this by referring to these concepts as "ideals," "mere ideas" or
"regulative ideas." These three expressions each have a distinct sense and usage, but they
share in common the one feature that they each suggest that no corresponding entity is
supposed to "exist." Hegel is a metaphysician, although in this instance the attribution is
more controversial than it is of Descartes. There is indeed a "non-metaphysical reading"
of Hegel, and this consists precisely in the effort to interpret Hegel as not proposing
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existence claims. 5 Here is not the place to discuss the details of that interpretation. It is
enough to notice that if Hegel is to be numbered among the proponents of the ontological
or any other argument for the existence of God, and this seems rather undeniable, then he
is a metaphysician. The sense of"metaphysics" or "metaphysician" in each of these
cases refers to the proposing of non-empirical existence claims.
The term "transcendental" has frequently been employed in a sense diametrically
opposed to this use of "metaphysical." This term likewise is not employed in a consistent
or precise manner. At various places in the Critique ofPure Reason, however, Kant does
discuss the meaning of the term ''transcendental" with relative precision, so that there is
little danger of misinterpreting his intentions. Three discussions from three introductory
sections of the Critique serve to indicate some of the basic features of"transcendental"
philosophy. In the general "Introduction" to the work, Kant employs the term relative not
to existence claims, but to the cognition of objects (Gegenstaende): "I call all cognition
transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of
cognition of objects insofar as this is possible a priori."6 Transcendental cognition is a
type of knowledge that does not deal with "objects," (and this negative claim is part of its
definition) but rather with the way in which we know objects.
In the "Introduction" to the ''Transcendental Logic," Kant determines the notion

of ''transcendental" further by contrasting this with empirical knowledge. Transcendental
cognition is a particular species of a priori knowledge that involves cognition ''that and

See Klaus Hartmann's "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View'' in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays.
Ed. Alisdair MacIntyre. Notre Dame, 1972. Hartmann's approach has inspired many Hegel scholars for
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the past three decades.
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how certain representations are applied entirely a priori."1 It deals specifically with the
knowledge that certain representations (1) are not of empirical origin but (2) nevertheless
are related to objects of experience. 8 Transcendental cognition is thus the knowledge that
and how certain a priori concepts relate to objects of experience.
In the "Introduction" to the "Transcendental Dialectic" Kant offers yet a third
characterization of "transcendental," this time determining the concept relative to the
notion of ''transcendent." The concepts of the understanding that Kant analyzes in the
"Logic" possess two possible uses. The application of these concepts is either
"immanent," viz., within the limits of possible experience, or ''transcendent," in which
case claims are made that do not recognize those limits. Although Kant distinguishes
''transcendent" from "transcendental," here he uses these terms in a very closely related
fashion. A transcendental use of the concepts of pure understanding is one that ''reaches
9

out beyond the boundaries of experience;" the term ''transcendent" refers only to a
principle that does not recognize the boundaries in question. Kant alleges to discover the
illusion in transcendent principles, and he labels this illusion ''transcendental." The
illusion is ''transcendental" because it is an illusion inherent to transcendental
judgments. 10 Transcendental judgments, remember, concern the relation of a priori
representations to objects of possible experience. These judgments, however, are illusory

7

A 56/ B 80

A 56/ B 81: ''Hence neither space nor any geometrical determination of it a P:i_ori is ~ ~anscendental
representation, but only the cognition that these repr~se?tatio1:15 are not of ~mpmcal ongm at all and the
possibility that they can nevertheless be related a prwrz to obJects of expenence can be called

8

transcendental."
9

A 296/ B353

to A
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to the extent that the rules involved "look entirely like objective principles." 11
Transcendental judgments are thus naturally mistaken for judgments about objects, even
though, according to Kant, these judgments express only the relation of a priori
representations to objects of possible experience. The illusion is nothing but the very
natural tendency to mistake transcendental judgments, i.e., judgments about our mode of
cognition of objects, for transcendent judgments, i.e., judgments about actual objects.
The illusions that Kant alleges to uncover in the "Transcendental Dialectic"
involve claims concerning concepts that (1) are about only "our mode of cognition of
objects" (i.e. ''transcendental" concepts) and (2) are relative to our knowledge of possible
experience. The import of this sense of"transcendental" consists in the denial that the
relevant concepts correspond to actual objects. One particular example of a
transcendental illusion is the conclusion that a necessary being exists. Kant's point is that
the concept does not refer to an actual object, but rather only to our manner of cognizing
objects of possible experience. He makes essentially the same claim about the notion of
an omnitudo realitatis, and these two claims together constitute his critique of the
ontological argument. The critique is ''transcendental" to the extent that, while it
recognizes the validity of certain inferences (e.g., from contingency to necessity), it
denies that these inferences are about "objects," i.e., things that exist. This is the sense of
"transcendental" that is preserved in, among other examples, the labeling ofHusserlian
phenomenology as transcendental. The latter treats phenomena irrespective of any
existence claims.

11

A 297/ B 353
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Below we will critically evaluate "transcendental" philosophy in this sense of the
term, and discuss whether it has any advantages over metaphysical inquiry. Here we are
concerned only to analyze a few further aspects of the distinction between
"transcendental" and ''metaphysical." A second use of "transcendental" refers to a
particular kind of argument. This use of the term does not correspond to any comments
by Kant, but it is indeed employed in the description of his philosophy.

12

A

transcendental argument, roughly speaking, begins from some given x, and proceeds to
infer to a set of conditions for the possibility of x.

13

If Kant is understood as presuming,

for instance, the truth of Newtonian physics, then part of his philosophy consists in the
explanation of certain conditions, (in this case, what the constitution of our cognitive
faculties must be), for our possessing knowledge of objects that obey the laws of
Newtonian physics. The argument describing these faculties is called "transcendental."
The use of the term ''transcendental" to describe a kind of argument is perhaps a
mere equivocation. At any rate, it seems more appropriate to employ the term as a
qualifier for the conditions of x, rather than for the argument inferring to those
conditions. This use occurs in phrases like "transcendental conditions for the possibility
of x." Among other things, Kant's Critique describes the transcendental conditions for
the possibility of (a certain species of) experience. Here the use of ''transcendental" is
more closely related to the sense described above: these conditions (e.g., ''transcendental
12 An abundant literature on the so-called "transcendental argument'' has accumulated, both with and
without reference to Kant. Some essays on Kant's version of these arguments are collected in Reading
Kant: New Perspectives on Transcendental Arguments and Critical Philosophy, ed. Eva Schaper and
Wilhelm Vossenkuhl. Blackwell, 1989. More recent discussions of the transcendental argument in a
contemporary context appear in Transcendental Arguments, ed. Robert Stem. Oxford, 1999.
13 On the structure of the transcendental argument, see Barry Stroud's ''The Goal of Transcendental
Arguments" in Stern, pp. 155-73 as well as Stem's introduction to the volume. The distinguishing feature
of transcendental argument is its a priori claim of necessary conditions.
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subjectivity'') are understood specifically as not-objective, i.e., as not constituting an
object or an existent.
The reference to the type of argument as "transcendental," however, reveals some
further aspects of this approach to philosophy. The argument inferring to transcendental
conditions presupposes a given x. It is allowed that this x is objective, existent, etc., and
"transcendental" refers to the non-existent, non-objective nature of the conditions that are
summoned as an explanation of x. "Transcendental" implies "non-existent" precisely in
relation to the presupposed x that is considered to be more real than the described
conditions for x. The two theses of transcendental philosophy concerning the conditions
for x are ( 1) that these are not objective and (2) that they are relative to x. This style of
argumentation, however, also contains an implicit thesis about x: x is taken for
unquestionably valid.
Ifx is, for instance, Newtonian physics, then a transcendental argument beginning
from this will arrive at certain conditions that explain our knowledge of this physics. A
philosopher of a different persuasion might object, however, that the physical system in
question should be subject to critical examination. In other words, it belongs to a certain
understanding of what philosophical inquiry is that there should be no presupposed x.
Instead of explaining x, on this view, the philosopher should worry about whether x itself
is something true. The philosopher who holds this view should be generally
unsympathetic to the transcendental argument, not because the argument is formally
fallacious but rather because it fails to do what (that philosopher presupposes)

'

philosophy should do. In the case where xis Newtonian physics the point in question is
rather uninteresting. It belongs to other physicists to criticize this particular system. If x,
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however, is something more basic such as "experience," or "discursive knowledge," then
a disagreement will arise between two approaches to philosophy. A transcendental
philosopher may begin from either a certain understanding of "experience," or from a
certain analysis of discursive knowledge, and infer to a set of conditions for those starting
points. Such a procedure would neglect any questions concerning whether, for instance,
this kind of discursive knowledge is true knowledge, or whether that knowledge is
exhaustive of "knowledge."
We have seen Hegel raise exactly this objection with respect to Kant. Kant
indeed assumes that discursive knowledge is valid, and the entire First Critique proceeds
according to this and similar assumptions. Hegel's specific claim is that the critique of
knowledge should inquire into whether discursive knowledge is true. His "Doctrine of
the Concept" represents such an inquiry, and he concludes, famously, that judgmental or
discursive knowledge is inadequate for expressing (philosophical) truth. One can find
similar arguments in Hegel concerning "experience." Instead of explaining the
conditions for the possibility of experience, he argues, philosophy should determine
whether the type of experience in question is something true. Hegel's conclusions in this
regard are also familiar. The experience of finite entities involves an object distinct from
an experiencing consciousness. This distinction, and thus the experience based on it, is
an illusion. One way of understanding the Phenomenology ofSpirit is as an argument for
the thesis that a certain kind (or many kinds) of experience is not true.
One might object to Hegel that claims such as "discursive knowledge is not true
knowledge" equivocate on ''true," or that such claims are not intelligible, that they violate
the indisputable laws of discourse, etc. Objections of this sort, however, typically
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presuppose equally dubitable claims such as "all knowledge is discursive." This last
claim is not such that it could express any knowledge, so that any debate over a question
like whether all knowledge is discursive appears irresolvable. If Hegel claims that
discursive knowledge is not "true" knowledge (and this is perhaps just one way of
overstating the case that it is not the only kind of knowledge), this is because he finds it
inadequate for expressing philosophical truths. If Kant finds certain philosophical truths
to be less than true, this is because he takes discursive knowledge to be exhaustive of
knowledge as such. The disagreement here is not a substantive one. Both agree that if
there are (certain) philosophical truths, then these are unavailable to discursive reasoning.
From that one can conclude, in both cases without full justification, either that the
philosophical truths in question are not available to us or that discursive knowledge is not
"true" (philosophical) knowledge.
The reason for Kant's claim, if it can be called a reason, is that his philosophical
method requires some presupposed x, and discursive knowledge is one of those
presupposed things. What Kant analyzes are conditions for the possibility of discursive
knowledge, of a certain species of experience, etc. Among the consequences of this
approach are that (1) discursive knowledge is not subject to criticism and (2) that the
material analyzed as conditions for discursive knowledge, including the idea of God, is
construed as relative to the starting point, viz. discursive knowledge.
A further inference that is nearly ubiquitous in Kant's writings, and the one that
has been criticized throughout this dissertation, concludes that there is no other
knowledge than the type selected as the starting point for the argument. Parallel
conclusions assert that there is no other experience, no other knowledge of existents, etc.,
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than those presumed as starting points for a transcendental argument. The "reasoning"
behind this fallacious inference is that no other type of knowledge, experience, existent,
etc., satisfies the conditions to which the transcendental arguments infer. The argument
for this "restrictive thesis" is as follows. Y designates certain necessary conditions for x

(x = discursive knowledge). Z (= non-discursive knowledge) would require very
different conditions, p, that are not equivalent to y. Therefore ~z.
Hegel's reasoning in these matters is sometimes quite different from, but
sometimes very similar to, Kant's reasoning. At times Hegel argues transcendentally for
the legitimacy of non-discursive knowledge. In these cases his procedure is distinctively
Kantian, although his concerns are very different from Kant's concerns. We have already
discussed some passages in Hegel's works in which transcendental arguments for
metaphysical conclusions appear. In his Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion, he
claims that we must have knowledge of objects beyond the ''world" or apart from
"experience" (in the narrow sense), on the basis that philosophy presupposes this.

14

The

implicit reasoning is as follows. If there is philosophical knowledge, then there are
objects other than "objects of experience." Evidently (so Hegel assumes) there is
philosophical knowledge, therefore there are objects other than objects of experience.
This argument is transcendental to the extent that it stipulates certain conditions for a
presupposed x (in this case, 'x' is 'philosophical knowledge'), and then concludes that
since x obtains, those conditions (in this case, the existence of certain objects) obtain. In

14

See Rel. I, 33 and the discussion of this above in Chapter Two, II., D., pg. 80

other places, Hegel argues for the legitimacy of knowledge of objects other than finite
ones on the basis that both philosophy and Christianity require this. 15
These arguments are open to the same objections to which all transcendental
arguments are open: instead of criticizing x, they merely presuppose its unconditional
validity. A critic might claim, in Hegel's case, that philosophy in the sense Hegel
intends, as well as Christianity, are vain endeavors that do not yield true knowledge.
That critic would be posing to Hegel the exact same objection that Hegel poses to Kant.
Fortunately for Hegel, he does not rest much importance on his transcendental arguments,
although it is interesting to note that he does occasionally employ that method of
argumentation. He bases his claims to knowledge of the absolute, of God, etc., not solely
on the presupposition that there is philosophical knowledge. He does not merely say that
there is philosophical knowledge, but rather alleges to offer a certain kind of evidence of
that fact. It so happens, however, that the kind of evidence he offers is problematic. It
involves, namely, an appeal to an intuition (the experience of elevation) together with the
admission that not everyone is capable of confirming the occurrence of this intuition.
An important difference between "transcendental" and ''metaphysical" arguments
is now evident. Transcendental arguments begin from some presupposition, and are
always vulnerable to the objection that their starting point is arbitrary. This arbitrariness
is structural to the type of argument that is called transcendental. If a philosopher wishes
to pose a question about x, then it will appear to that philosopher that the transcendental
argument (if x then y; x; therefore y) begs an important question. That x is true is a

premise in the transcendental argument. The relevance of this to the ontological

15

Suhrkamp 6, 91.
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argument is clear; that argument, in Hegel's formulation, involves the claims that
discursive knowledge is not true knowledge, that finite consciousness is illusory, etc. 16 In
other words, Hegel attempts to prove ~x, where xis 'discursive knowledge,' 'our
experience of finite objects,' etc. If the ontological argument entails ~x, then a refutation
of that argument should show ~x. It belongs to the structure of a transcendental
argument, however, that xis not subject to question, so that no proof of x (and therefore
of ~x), is possible. A transcendental argument for the conditions of the possibility of
"experience" thus cannot avoid begging the question posed by the ontological argument.
We have, however, not only a transcendental argument against the ontological
argument, but also both transcendental and metaphysical arguments supporting the thesis
of the ontological argument. It is clear enough that a transcendental argument is
insufficient. The ontotheologian should not merely presuppose that both Christianity and
a certain conception of philosophy are true, and then conclude that we must have nondiscursive knowledge, a priori knowledge of an existent, etc. Rather, some proof of
these claims is necessary. Hegel appears to bring the attempt to offer such proof to its
farthest conclusion. One problem seems irremovable. The validity of non-discursive
knowledge and/or a priori knowledge of an existent can only be established through an
appeal to an intuition or to a certain privileged experience. The type of"proof," in this
instance, seems appropriate to the thing proved. A discursive proof of non-discursive
knowledge would be an illogicality, an this is why the ontological "argument" is not
demonstrable.

r~gard, al~oug~ l~ss explicit, since
16 Hegel is not alone in this last claim. Spinoza is more radical in thi·finis
for him finite consciousness is unequivocally erroneous. For Hege1 te expenence 1s m one sense true
and in another sense untrue.

II. The meaning of existence

If the difference between metaphysical and transcendental arguments concerns
chiefly the positing of existence claims, then some determination of what is meant by
'existence' is requisite for any characterization of the difference in question. The
difference does not concern the basic inferences for which the philosophers argue, since a
transcendental philosopher and a metaphysician will typically agree on any number of
such inferences. The difference between the two approaches appears only when the
former adds that these inferences do not concern objects or existents. We have seen this
in the case of Kant. Kant indeed accepts basic metaphysical inferences such as the claim
that our experience of contingent entities requires us to form a concept of a necessary
entity. His principle of thoroughgoing determination suggests his acceptance of a further
metaphysical claim. Such inferences underlie the conditional premises of transcendental
arguments: if x then y, where xis 'we experience contingent entities' and y is 'we form
the concept of a necessary being'. In assenting to these and similar conditional claims,
Kant expresses a certain level of agreement with metaphysicians. Some contemporary
philosophers even refer to the conditional premise in a transcendental argument as a
metaphysical premise. 17 It is the peculiar "metaphysical" nature of the conditional
premise that distinguishes the transcendental argument from other types of modus ponens
argument. In offering such characterizations of the transcendental argument, however,
these philosophers overlook the difference between that type of argument and a

17

See Stroud, pp. 156-7.
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metaphysical argument. The transcendental argument does not merely conclude with 'y',
but instead characterizes y as transcendental. That y is transcendental means only that it
is not objective or existent.
The transcendental philosopher and the metaphysician disagree, not about y, but
rather about whether y exists. Kant, like Hegel, believes that our concept of a necessary
being is necessary. He differs from Hegel only in claiming that we cannot confirm the
existence of a necessary being. It is clear from the previous chapters, however, that the
two philosophers do not share the same notion of "existence," so that the disagreement
over whether "a necessary being exists" centers, not on the concept of a necessary being,
but on the concept of existence.
Kant provides only a few rough indications of what he understands by
"existence." He claims that our "consciousness of all existence (whether immediately
through perception or through inferences connecting something with perception) belongs
entirely and without exception to the unity of experience."

18

Such claims present more

difficulties than may at first appear. The first question concerns whether the restriction in
question is a matter of mere contingent fact or of necessity. In other words, either it just
so happens that we only have knowledge of existents through perception, in which case it
is possible that there are non-empirical existents, or "existence" refers specifically to
perceptible existence. If the latter is the case, then it is not possible that there are nonempirical existents, since the meaning of "existence" would preclude this.
A Kantian would no doubt choose the former option. Kant's claim is supposed to
concern the limits of human knowledge. Kant does not claim that it is impossible that

18
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there are non-empirical entities. Rather, he claims only that we cannot obtain knowledge
of such entities, and leaves open the possibility that there "actually" are other kinds of
objects than the ones we experience. 19 This claim, however, possesses manifold
difficulties. It seems impossible to prove that we cannot have any knowledge other than
some clearly delineable type. The absoluteness of Kant's expression ("entirely and
without exception") should thus arouse suspicion. There is simply no evidence and no
support for this restriction. The result of this lack of evidence is that Kant's claim is in
effect equivalent to the claim that the meaning of"existence" is limited to perceptible

existence. In other words, Kant's explicit claim may be that the restriction on existence
is only relevant/or us; since he is unable to defend even this subjective restriction,
however, the difference between the restriction's being subjective and not subjective is
inconsequential. The effect in either case is simply that Kant arbitrarily stipulates that
existence is attributable only to objects of possible perception. The arbitrariness of the
stipulation in turn deflates the entire significance of the transcendental character of his
philosophy. If existence can be attributed only to objects of possible perception, then
there is little point in proving that it cannot be predicated of God. This would be to say
nothing more than that God is not an object of possible perception.

If the central claim of transcendental philosophy is that existence cannot or should
not be attributed to certain possible entities, then it seems that a simple deception lies at
the heart of this philosophy; if Kant's entire discussion of the existence of God is
determined by an illicit restriction of the term "existence," then nothing important

~?

19 Toe previously cited passage continues:". ..
though an existe~ce ?utside this field ~~~t be
declared absolutely impossible, it is a presuppos1t1on that we cannot Justify through anything. A 601/ B
629. My contention is that Kant does not allow that we can mean anything by "an existence outside this

field."
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underlies the transcendental critique of the proofs of God's existence. Transcendental
philosophy in Kant's sense is indeed entirely misleading on this and on many other
questions of metaphysics. By treating "existence" as if the restriction of this to "objects
of possible experience" were obvious and uncontroversial, Kant gives the impression of
actually saying something when he writes that we cannot prove that God exists. This
impression is only possible, however, by virtue of a tacit appeal to a meaning of
"existence" that is not limited to objects of possible experience; otherwise Kant should
have simply claimed that the question of God's existence is meaningless, since "exists"
(in his sense) cannot apply to "God." His "refutation" of the ontological argument
instead plays on the pretense of a serious investigation into whether we can prove that
God exists, i.e., of a questioning that would amount to precisely the concern over whether
"existence" also applies to something other than, in Kant's terms, "objects of possible
experience." Since Kant determines the scope of"existence" in advance, however, his
entire discussion of the existence of God is misleading and superfluous. His arguments
rest on nothing but the failure to recognize (or admit) that the controversy is not about
"God," but rather about what existence means.

III.

Hegel's metaphysics

Kant refuses the opportunity to analyze the meaning of "existence" and thereby to
shed light on the controversy over the ontological argument, mainly because he decides
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that the matter precludes instruction.

20

Perhaps this should be taken to mean that his

philosophy presupposes a kind of realism that is not teachable. The exemption of an
important aspect of his philosophy from instruction and argumentation is in any case an
incorrigible shortcoming that is no better and no worse than any charlatan's appeal to a
privileged experience. If, as Hegel insists, Kant's appeal is to a kind of common sense or
common intuition, such an appeal is argumentatively equivalent to an appeal to a
privileged, i.e., less common, intuition. It is entirely irrelevant how many people have
the intuition; philosophical matters are not decided by a majority vote. In either case, the
electors paint the same unflattering portrait of their opponents; Kant's view of the
helplessly confused ontotheologian is strikingly similar to the ontotheologian's view of
the philosophically blind non-metaphysician.
Although Hegel' s arguments fail to secure a decisive victory over Kant, his
writings distinguish themselves from Kant's by the fact that he offers the occasional
commentary on the irreconcilability of their views. His remarks are humorously
polemical, and it is the humorous aspect of his approach to his clash with Kant that is
most admirable. Among Hegel's most important criticisms of Kant are the rhetorical
remarks that highlight both the latter's sense of realism and his refusal to explain that
sense. Kant indeed writes as if philosophical ideas are less "excellent" than things that
can be touched with our hands, although he never bothers to note how misleading this
suggestion can be. 21 This problem could be avoided only through an explicit discussion

Like Hegel, I also have a favorite passage from the Critique ofP~re R~ason. Min~ appe~ at A 598/ B
626: "I would have hoped to annihilate this over-s~btle argumentation w1tho~t ~y d1gres_s1~ns ~ough a
precise determination of the concept of existence, 1f I bad ~ot ~ound that _the 1llus1on cons1stmg m the
confusion of a logical and a real predicate (i.e., the detemunation of a thing) nearly precludes all

20

instruction."
21

See Suhrkamp 6, 258 and the discussion above in Chapter Four, pg. 139.
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of what existence means and how it is to be employed. The unexpressed nature of Kant's
restriction of "existence," however, merely caters to his realistic sensibility; what exists,
what is "real" are those things that we can touch. We cannot touch God and the other
objects of philosophy. Therefore these do not exist, or are not real, and this suggests that
they are somehow less excellent than touchable things, since what is real is greater than
what is unreal. All of this is, of course, merely implicit in Kant's actual writings. lfhe
had even once made his restriction of " existence" explicit, then there would have been no
point at all in discussing metaphysical arguments. His discussion of the existence of God
instead exploits the fact that "existence" is sometimes understood such that it is not
restricted to touchable things (this is the entire point of saying something like "God
exists"). That discussion, and thus the heart of his critique of metaphysics, relies on the
failure to clarify whether "existence" is being treated equivocally or univocally.
Hegel does not share Kant's realism, partly because he does not neglect to discuss
what existence means. The virtue of Hegel's metaphysics is that he does not begin with
some fixed conception of "existence" and then inquire into whether God exists. He
rather begins with "being" and asks what this is; he eventually concludes that it is, among
other things, God. Hegel's does not merely assert that "God exists," since such a claim
would appear misleadingly analogous to other assertions of the form ''x exists." If xis
some physical object, then the meaning of "exists" in this instance is clear. To say that
some physical object exists is to say that it can be found in some place among the other
physical objects. To say that God exists, however, is manifestly not to say that God can
be found in some place among other objects. The expression "God exists" is thus either
meaningless or misleading. Hegel's position is that the expression is simply misleading.
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The claim "God exists" is not analogous to every other claim of the form "x exists."
Rather, the claim concerns "exists" more than it does "God," and should be rephrased
''being is God." In other words, since the real topic of the question of whether God exists
is not "God" but "exists," that term should be placed in the subject position.
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